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ABSTRACT 
Developed, maturing, and emerging market countries are making considerable 
progress in the legal and institutional reforms necessary to allow and facilitate real 
estate and tourism (specifically hotel) foreign direct investment (FDI). From a 
political perspective, countries used to view real estate as one of the "crown jewels" 
of an economy (Lynn, 2007). No longer does this view hold consistently across 
countries as countries have recently recognised that real estate and hotel FDI is a 
way to encourage fixed capital investment, create jobs, and to introduce best 
practices from multinational corporations. 
The purpose of this research is to identify the main determinants of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in the commercial real estate (CRE) as well as hotel sectors, in 
selected Middle Eastern countries. 
Utilising existing theories of FDI, a set of determinants (drivers and barriers) were 
selected to be empirically tested, utilising Dunning's (Ownership-Location- 
Internalisation-OLI) eclectic paradigm. As Dunning consider FDI for all industries 
with a special focus on the manufacturing industry, this research enlarges the scope 
by commercial real estate and hotels specific considerations. This research utilises 
the Location dimension of Dunning framework as a basis to explain the determinants 
of FDI in the CRE and hotel sectors. 
The literature on both real estate and hotel FDI relies heavily on collecting primary 
data through surveys; recently however, very few studies (including He & Zhu 
(2010); He, Wang, & Cheng (2009); Anop (2010) and Rodriguez & Bustillo (2008)) 
have utilised the availability of data in real estate and started constructing 
econometric models with the aim of testing set hypotheses. This research fills a gap 
in the literature by utilising secondary data to develop and test different econometric 
models, using data from various sources. 
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The empirical work of this research therefore consists of two parts: the first is an 
econometric analysis of FDI in commercial real estate for eight Middle Eastern and 
North African (MENA) markets namely, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey, Tunisia and the UAE during 2003-2009; the second part is an 
econometric analysis of FDI in hotels for the same countries for the same time 
period. The econometric analysis is carried out using the pooled Tobin model 
technique, for panel data, which uses both time-series and cross-sectional data. 
The findings for the econometric analysis of FDI in commercial real estate shows that 
country specific factors (i. e. economic health, standards of living and levels human 
development as well as political stability and absence of violence) as well I as real 
estate sector-specific variables (size of institutional real estate market), are significant 
variables and consistently support their hypotheses as explanations for commercial 
real estate related FDI for the selected MENA countries. 
The second part of the econometric analysis related to determinants of FDI in hotel 
greenfield projects, reveals that country specific factors (i. e. taxation environment, 
human development level and real growth of economy and political stability and 
absence of violence and terrorism) as well as hotel sector-specific variables (i. e. real 
visitor expenditure and level of investment freedom); are significant and consistently 
support their hypotheses as explanations for hotel FDI. These indicators are found 
to provide -a good explanation of location decision-making in both commercial real 
estate and hotel sectors. 
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I. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO-? HE RESEARCH 
Developed, maturing, and emerging market countries are making tremendous 
progress in the legal and institutional reforms necessary to allow and facilitate real 
estate and tourism (specifically hotel) foreign direct investment (FDI). From a 
political perspective, countries used to view real estate as one of the "crown jewels" 
of an economy (Lynn, 2007). No longer does this view hold consistently across 
countries as countries have recently recognised that real estate and hotel FDI is a 
way to encourage fixed capital investment, create jobs, and introduce best practices 
from multinational corporations. 
Thus far, mainstream theories of FDI in relation to `real estate' are inadequate and 
fail to explain whether foreign real estate investments are considered as FDI. Until 
recently, Dunning & Lundan (2008, p. 76) believe that there is not much that the 
academic scholars can do about it, as they point out that although the investment is 
`classified' as direct, the motives of the purchases have the attributes of portfolio 
investment. 
They clarify this by describing direct real estate investments as 'passive' investments 
and that they are primarily financially motivated, through expectations of future land 
and property values, and they argue that the 'foreignness' impact on the use of these 
assets are limited. However, it must be noted that investing in 'greenfield' 
developments entails fixed capital investment, create jobs, and introduces best 
practices from multinational corporations (D'Arcy, 2009). And therefore, this 
research will mainly focus on greenfield projects for both commercial real estate 
(hereafter, CRE) and hotel developments, as they can be considered as FDI and 
hence mainstream theories can explain their attributes and determinants. 
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Using existing theories of FDI, a set of determinants were selected to be empirically 
tested, utilising Dunning's Eclectic Paradigm. As Dunning consider FDI for all 
industries with a special focus on the manufacturing industry, this research enlarges 
the scope by CRE and hotels specific considerations. 
Many research methods can be employed to achieve the main aim of the research, 
including interviews, questionnaires as well as utilising secondary data to build 
econometric models, with the aim of testing set of hypotheses. 
The literature on both real estate and hotel FDI relies heavily on collecting primary 
data through surveys; recently however, very few studies (including He & Zhu 
(2010); Anop (2010) and Rodriguez & Bustillo (2008)) have utilised the availability of 
data in real estate and started building econometric models with the aim of testing 
set hypotheses. This research fills a gap in the literature by utilising secondary data to 
develop and test different econometric models, using data from various sources. As 
this research intends to investigate both CRE and hotels FDI's made for specific (and 
longest) period of time (i. e. from 2003-2009). The research employs different 
dependant and independent variables for both CRE and hotel investments. 
The following section presents the key definitions for terms used in this research. 
1.2 KEY DEFINITIONS 
There are several definitional issues related to key terms referenced and used within 
the research. For instance, what is property, what types are included in the research? 
What is foreign direct investment (hereafter FDI) in the context of real estate and 
hotel sectors? What defines a foreign capital flow, why focus on Middle Eastern 
economies, are several matters that require further clarification. 
The main motive for choosing the MENA real estate and hotel sectors was the 
scarcity of empirical work in this region. Very limited academic literature in the body 
of knowledge, and they are mainly related to aggregate FDI determinants. Further, 
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responses to the exploratory study have shown enthusiasm about investing in certain 
MENA countries. Another influential factor was essentially the availability of data in 
the selected countries. 
The study separates CRE (only office and retail) from hotel sectors. Primarily, the 
real estate sector is divided into four asset classes - office, retail, residential and 
industrial. Hotels however, have not been regarded as commercial real estate asset 
class for a variety of reasons (Newell & Seabrook, 2006): the lack of understanding of 
the industry by investors; very volatile when compared to other property asset 
classes, resulting from unstable cash-flows; and difficulty in having a quick exit 
strategy. 
Another reason for this separation is the fact that CRE and hotel investors have 
different motives and barriers when venturing into these sectors (see Chapter two 
for details of the many determinants of investing in both sectors). For instance, hotel 
investors are more concerned with tourism demand and the development of the 
tourism industry, while CRE investors could be more concerned with population 
growth and levels of employment. The separation therefore is crucial to 
understanding the behaviour of both types of investors. 
The study however, does not examine the other two sectors (i. e. residential and 
industrial), as the main source of data (fDi Intelligence only covers office and retail 
related projects). There is only one exception where 'residential' properties may be 
included, and this where they are under the 'mixed-used' project category. 
Within this research, 'property' or `real estate' is defined and limited to non- 
residential and non-industrial fixed assets of office, retail and mixed-used buildings. 
This definition generically applies throughout the thesis. As all the discussion 
throughout the thesis as well as for the primary database is restricted to CRE and 
hotel buildings to be constructed and/or to be renovated and owned (partially or in 
full) by foreign entities, in the period (Q I -2003 to Q4-2009), for all Algeria, Egypt, 
Morocco, Qatar, Tunisia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. 
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In this research property investment is used in the real sense of a physical structure 
being constructed. It is not `investment' in the sense used in property finance (Ball, 
Lizieri, & MacGregor, 1998). A property market is also defined here as the economic 
agents involved in the creation and operation of commercial real estate, which 
includes developers, contractors, brokers, property managers, and also 
environmental, legal, regulatory and financial factors that have a direct and indirect 
relationship with the evolution and maturity of the property market (Ball, Lizieri, & 
MacGregor, 1998) 
. 
There are many definitions of FDI in the current body of knowledge. However, 
because this study is more concerned with 'sectoral FDI', a tailored definition has to 
be considered, and therefore, this research defines FDI as 'the direct investment 
announced and committed by foreign commercial real estate and hotel investors in a 
host country, which will result in creating a new asset or expanding of an existing 
asset which will entail capital investment and create jobs. ' 
In this research, only greenfield (new assets) and expansions of existing projects are 
considered where additional investment and jobs are created. Joint ventures are also 
included in the research where they lead to a new physical (greenfield) operation. 
Mergers & acquisitions (M&A) and other equity investments are not included as part 
of this research. Appendix 8.1 summarises the key definitions that will be used 
throughout the research. 
1.3 AREA AND AIM OF THE STUDY 
This work is being driven because of the lack of understanding in theoretical and 
practical terms about determinants (drivers and barriers) of FDI in sectors such as 
real estate and hotels (D'Arcy, 2009) and (Baum & Murray, 2010). This research tries 
to fill this gap by identifying and explaining the factors that influence FDI in CRE and 
hotel sectors in selected Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries. 
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Among the many factors, market openness, maturity and transparency which are 
believed to be some of the obstructing issues. In this vein, the international real 
estate investment and hotel FDI literature have revealed several arguments claiming 
that foreign investors are more attracted to mature markets and avoid less 
developed and opaque markets (Lee, 2005) and (Baum, 2008). If we accept this 
argument, the question that led to this research is easily answered. We could then 
hold market immaturity and/ or opacity responsible to explain the inflow of FDI into 
CRE and hotels into MENA countries (see Chapter 5.3 for details about FDI inflows). 
However, it was believed that the existing determinants must be empirically 
investigated, tested and justified. Therefore, econometric models are developed to 
explain the determinants of FDI in the MENA countries in both CRE and hotels 
sectors. 
This study therefore aims at examining the determinants (drivers and barriers) that 
explain foreign capital flows into eight selected MENA markets in both sectors (i. e. 
commercial real estate sector and the hotel sector). 
In order to achieve the research aim, the following broad objectives are devised: 
Objective# I. To develop theoretical frameworks considering the key 
determinants (drivers and barriers) to FDI in commercial real estate as well as 
FDI in hotels. 
a. To critically assess the theoretical underpinnings to international real 
estate and hotel investments. 
b. To thoroughly review the literature on determinants of foreign direct 
investments in both the CRE and hotel sectors. 
Objective#2. To provide an overview on the selected MENA countries 
a. To position the MENA region in relation to other continents in the 
globe. 
b. To assess the overall investment environment for the selected 
countries, covering political, economical, demographical structures as 
well as taxation and foreign investment regimes. 
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Objective#3. To use the theoretical frameworks as a basis for constructing 
the research models (i. e. the econometric models). 
a. To construct the econometric models based on the available literature 
and by referring to other similar studies in the existing body of 
knowledge. 
Objective#4. To estimate the models and test hypotheses. 
a. To use the best available tools and techniques when estimating the 
econometric models. 
b. To develop the research hypotheses based on the reviewed literature 
and intuition. 
Objective#5. To validate the models. 
a. To use the most cited validity and robustness tests for testing the 
estimated models. 
1.4 RESEARCH JUSTIFICATION AND CONTRIBUTION TO THE BODY OF 
KNOWLEDGE 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge in many ways. Firstly, the research 
aims at developing econometric models (using both conventional and unique set of 
variables), to be generalised and applied to any developed or emerging market. The 
models are comprehensive and utilised the key themes emerged from the literature, 
covering economic, political, socio cultural as well as sectors specific variables. These 
variables can be examined in future studies within different regions. 
Secondly, the research studies eight selected MENA real estate and hotel markets 
from (2003-2009), a timeframe and geography not studied by previous empirical 
work on hotel and commercial real estate investments. The study applies the most 
appropriate techniques in estimating the models, including the pooled Tobit model. 
Thirdly, the research provides a multi-dimensional discussion on the influence of key 
variables on FDI in CRE and hotel sectors in theory and practice. The research also 
applies the Location (L) dimension of Dunning's OLI paradigm as a theoretical 
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explanation to CRE and hotel foreign investors' behaviour towards the selected 
MENA markets. 
Because government are always planning for growing their economies, and one 
channel to achieve certain levels of growth is to attract FDI, governments are always 
seeking attracting capital so they design policies that will improve the overall 
investment environment and encourage FDI. This study tries to assist governments 
of understanding the main barriers to sectoral related FDI in these markets and help 
governments reconsider their policies towards these sectoral FDIs, by providing 
certain recommendations to foreign investment policy-makers in the selected MENA 
markets, as the main findings are more relevant to policy related variables such as 
regulatory environment, taxation, political and economic factors. 
1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN 
In order to achieve the research aim set above in the previous sections, this research 
is designed as follows. 
1.5.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The research will include an extensive literature review to construct a basis for the 
research by providing a conceptual framework for the study of the determinants of 
foreign direct investment in both CRE and hotel sectors. 
The theoretical framework of the determinants of FDI is based on Dunning electic 
framework. The framework considers many possible motives to FDI, including 
economic, institutional and other motives. These determinants will be discussed 
separately for both sectors (i. e. CRE and hotels) and will be econometrically 
estimated. 
The econometric models were informed and inspired by the recent researches in 
this arena. -For 
instance, He, Wang, & Cheng (2009), who constructed econometric. 
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models to explain the flow of FDI into Chinese real estate developments. They used 
macro-level variables as well as real estate market specific variables to explain the 
determinants of FDI in this region. They also used the pooled Tobit model technique 
to estimate their regression models, as the dependant variables had zero 
observations. Other studies also have influenced the development of our 
econometric models (will be discussed in details in Chapters two and three). 
1.5.2 EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
1.5.2.1 EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS 
In order to develop a better understanding of the determinants of FDI in real estate, 
an exploratory study was carried out with real estate investment professionals (four 
in total), in order to help scope a richer picture of international property 
investments as well as main determinants of investing in the MENA real estate 
market. 
The data was collected and analysed using NVivo version 2. The analysis reveals that 
global investors' decision to invest in the Middle Eastern region is affected by various 
factors such as lack of transparency, difficulties associated with finding appropriate 
local partners and lack of knowledge about the potential of Middle Eastern markets. 
However, respondents believe that the MENA region has the potential to appeal 
investors, and that they are determined to invest in different attractive parts of the 
region particularly, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. 
As they point out that MENA markets have excellent demographics, high population 
growth, good GDP growth and huge need for residential, retail & office real estate 
that are good reasons for institutional investors to invest and diversify their 
portfolios into the region. However, they think that the immaturity of MENA 
property markets are the most ineffectual hurdle to further attract global funds into 
the region, and suggest that further research may assist to develop a better 
understanding of those interesting Middle Eastern property markets. 
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1.5.2.2 INFERRING SECONDARY DATA 
As the results of the interviews were not enough to achieve the research aim and 
objectives, secondary data were consulted. The most important source of data was 
from a private organisation (fDi Intelligence part of Financial Times Ltd. ), as they 
provide (at a cost) details of greenfield real estate related projects undertaken by 
foreign investors globally. The data collected was for Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, 
Qatar, Tunisia, Turkey, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. The 
choice of host countries was determined by the availability of data as well as 
responses to the interviews from the exploratory study, as potential good location of 
investments within the MENA region (will be discussed in details in Chapter five). 
And as the intention of this research is to investigate both FDI in CRE as well as FDI 
in the hotel industry, data were collected for both sectors for the eight MENA 
countries. 
This work therefore, consists of two part: the first is an econometric analysis of FDI 
in CRE for the eight MENA markets namely, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey, Tunisia and the UAE during 2003-2009; the second part is an 
econometric analysis of FDI in hotels for the same countries for the same time 
period. 
The econometric analysis is carried out using the pooled Tobit model technique, for 
panel data, which uses both time-series and cross-sectional data. 
The Tobit model is a censored regression model, censoring zero observations in the 
dependant variables, so to avoid any inconsistency and biasness can arise from using 
the ordinary least square (OLS) (Gujarati, 2004). This technique is characterised by 
the use of all available information in estimating the coefficients model, and this is a 
method of estimating the full information in comparison to other models that rely 
only on the time series or cross-sectional data. 
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Pooling eight countries increases the number of observations significantly, thus giving 
more information and more degrees of freedom, making the regressions more 
efficient. Panel data analysis is also better at detecting issues that are undetectable if 
the time-series or cross-sectional data alone is used. Furthermore, panel data is 
capable in controlling for country heterogeneity (Baltagi, 2005). Another reason for 
the practical use of this technique is that it addresses the problem of non-availability 
of long time-series on foreign direct investment in the MENA region. Therefore, 
panel data is used to address the problem of data through a combination of time- 
series and cross-sectional data to increase the number of observations and thus 
achieving a higher degree of efficiency in the analysis. 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is made up of three parts, comprising six chapters in total (Figure 1): 
Part One 
Chapter one gives a brief background to the study and the reasons for carrying out 
this research. It also introduces the research aim, research questions, and describes 
the structure of the thesis. 
Chapters Two reviews the determinants of FDI in real estate and hotels sectors as 
well as maturity issue, empirical modelling, and institutional assessment issues to 
investing in those sectors. In doing so, these chapters identified a clear gap in existing 
research on MENA markets, which provides direction for the research design and 
methodology for the thesis. Chapter Three is concerned with MENA economies and 
its fit in the global context. 
Part Two 
Chapter Four explains the research methodology and provide justifications to 
choices made in selecting best approaches and techniques. 
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Chapter Five is divided into three sections, starting with the exploratory study and 
its impact on the research, followed by the quantitative empirical analysis of the 
determinants of FDI in CRE in the eight MENA markets based on the results of 
econometric modelling. This section tests a series of macroeconomic, political, as 
well as social factors, based on Dunning's Locational dimension, in order to find out 
the drivers and barriers to FDI in the CRE sector in the selected MENA economies. 
The third section presents the empirical results from assessments of determinants of 
FDI in hotels in the selected MENA economies, based on the OLI framework. 
Part Three 
Chapter Six summarises the findings and conclusions and sheds some light on the 
main limitations and provides directions for further research. 
1.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced the research in terms of aims and objectives and as well as 
the design of this research. The next two chapters are concerned with the literature 
review, where the next chapter explains FDI in the context of real estate, as well as 
providing a comprehensive review to the literature in terms of the determinants of 
FDI in real estate. 
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2. CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW ON FDI IN CRE AND 
HOTEL SECTORS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In understanding foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, it is important to recognise 
the fundamental motivation for an investor or a MNC when investing in another 
country, rather than using other source of internalisation such as licensing or 
franchising their services to the foreign country's firms to perform the business on its 
behalf. 
The first section of this chapter presents a summary of the relevant theories that 
contribute to the understanding and fundamental motivation of FDI. A study of these 
theories will assist in selecting appropriate paradigm which applies most to our 
sectoral FDI of real estate and hotels. 
The second section reviews the key themes related to international real estate 
investment. The section is divided into subsections, where it starts with an overview 
on forms of investment in commercial real estate (four quadrant model), and then 
present a review of the relevant literature related to the decision-making process of 
investing in international real estate. This is followed by the application of the most 
suitable paradigm (i. e. Dunning's Ownership-Locational-Internalisation (OLI) 
framework to real estate. Towards the end of the section, a comprehensive review 
of the many factors influencing international real estate investments is discussed. 
The third section of this chapter also reviews the main themes related to foreign 
direct investment in hotels. The section is also divided into main subsections, where 
it starts by linking tourism to the hotel industry, and then present the most common 
market entry strategies of hotel MNC's including both FDI and non-equity forms of 
exposure. This is followed by a discussion on the application of the OLI framework 
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to the hotel industry. Towards the end of this section, a review of the main factors 
influencing internationalisation of hotel MNC's is discussed. 
2.2 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI): A THEORETICAL 
BACKGROUND 
Dunning & Lundan (2008) trace FDI theories and hypotheses as back as 1930's, and 
they argue that until 1960's, there was no established theory of FDI, as most 
hypotheses focussed only on explaining particular types of FDI in a positivistic 
manner (rather than using integrated approaches). Prior the 1960's, attempts to 
explain the activities of firms outside their national boundaries represented a blend 
of (Dunning & Lundan, 2008): 
I. A fairly well-formalised theory of (portfolio) capital movements; 
2. A number of empirical and largely country-specific studies on the factors 
influencing the location of FDI; 
3. A recognition by some economists that the internationalisation of some 
industries required a modification to neoclassical theories of trade; 
4. An appreciation that the common ownership of the cross-border activities of 
firms could not only be considered as a substitute for the international cartels 
and combines, but could also be explained, in part at least, by the perceived 
gains of vertical or horizontal integration; and. 
5. An extension of the extant theory of international capital movements to 
embrace the role of entrepreneurship and business competence. 
The I960's however saw the introduction of more holistic theories or paradigms of 
FDI, but partial explanations continued to develop. In the latter part of the 1980s and 
1990s more attention was given by trade economists to incorporating variables of 
foreign-owned production into their models. During this period, renewed interest in 
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FDI as a financial phenomenon and its relationship with foreign portfolio investment 
developed (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). 
Razin (2003) divided FDI theories into two categories, namely micro (or industrial) 
and macro theories (finance or cost of capital theories). He describes 
microeconomic theories as the ones that principally focus on market imperfections 
and on the desire of MNC's to expand their market power. 
Dunning & Lundan (2008) state that Hymer (1960) was the first to systematically 
analyse issues related to the advantages of MNCs, market imperfections and control 
in foreign markets with the successful competition between domestic producers and 
foreign firms. The theory states that firms constantly seek market opportunities and 
their decision to invest overseas is explained as a strategy to capitalise on certain 
capabilities not shared by competitors in foreign countries (Morgan & Katsikeas, 
1997). Nonetheless, market imperfections theory did not explain why foreign 
production is considered the most desirable means of harnessing the firm's 
advantage. Dunning (1980) and Fayerweather (1982) (cited in Dunning & Lundan 
(2008)) have addressed this issue and developed a macroeconomic theory which can 
be described as international production theory. 
According to Morgan & Katsikeas (1997), international production theory suggests 
that the propensity of a firm to initiate foreign production will depend on the specific 
attractions of its home country compared with resource implications and advantages 
of locating in another country. A related aspect of this foreign investment theory is 
the concept of internalisation which has been investigated by Buckley (1982,1988) 
and Buckley and Casson (1976,1985) (cited in (Dunning & Lundan, 2008)). 
Internalisation theory suggests that firms aim to develop their own internal markets 
whenever transactions can be made at lower cost within that firm. Accordingly, 
internalisation involves bringing new operations and activities, formerly carried out 
by intermediate markets, under the ownership and governance of the firm (Dunning 
& Lundan, 2008). Dunning & Lundan (2008) state that macroeconomic theories on 
FDI concentrate on comparative advantages as well as environmental dimensions, 
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and how the latter may affect comparative advantages. These theories mainly deal 
with the question of where MNCs will locate their operations. 
A more recent blended FDI theory (i. e. micro as well as macro aspects), which 
essentially aimed at answering the locational questions related to FDI, is the eclectic 
theory of Dunning (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). According to Moon & Roehl, (1993), 
none of the general theories of FDI, except Dunning's eclectic theory, which is based 
on the OLI (ownership, location and internationalisation advantages) paradigm, 
succeeded in satisfactorily explaining the international activities of firms. 
Indeed, for more than two decades, the eclectic paradigm has remained the 
dominant analytical tool for accommodating a variety of operationally testable 
economic theories of the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the 
foreign activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs) (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). 
The paradigm states that the extent, geography, and industrial composition of foreign 
production undertaken by MNEs are determined by the interaction of three sets of 
interdependent variables: ownership, location, and internalisation advantages, 
hereafter referred to as OLI. The OLI framework was an attempt to explain why 
companies decide to go for FDI instead of other possible forms of foreign 
investment, such as licensing, strategic alliances, joint ventures or exporting (Dunning 
& Lundan, 2008). 
Dunning (1993) summarises the debate between pure services and pure production, 
as most of the above discussed theories were product-oriented explaining MNC's 
activities in the manufacturing industry. He argues that the eclectic paradigm can also 
be applied to service-oriented FDI. Indeed, this is also been conformed and 
supported by (Holsapple, Ozawa, & Olienyk, 2006) and (Laposa, 2006). As a result, 
Dunning OLI paradigm is sought to best explain our sectoral, service-oriented FDI 
(i. e. real estate and hotels FDI), and will be discussed in more details in the following 
sections, in relation to both real estate FDI as well as hotel FDI. 
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The following section covers the key themes related international real estate 
investing as well as the main theories explaining international investments (including 
the OLI paradigm). 
2.3 FDI IN COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE GREENFIELD PROJECTS 
2.3.1 FORMS OF EXPOSURE TO INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE 
CLUSTERS 
In general, the structure of all property investment products can fit into four 
property investment quadrants - private equity, public equity, private debt and public 
debt (Hudson-Wilson, et al, 2005). Figure 2 below shows these forms as they are 
almost available in every developed property market. 
In the context of international investments, direct investment refers to direct partial 
or complete ownership of the property. Indirect investment, on the other hand, 
refers to the ownership of securities that represent real property or mortgage 
ownership such as shares in a real estate investment trust or mortgage-backed 
securities (Hines, 2001). 
Figure 2: Real estate four quadrant model 
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Sources: Hudson-Wilson, et al (2005) & Hoesli & Lekander (2008) 
To initiate direct investment as an entry into international property market, 
investors have several options as suggested by Hines (2001): (I) purchase income 
producing existing properties that need no or minor renovation; (2) purchase of 
existing properties that need some or major renovation and redevelopment; (3) 
purchase of existing properties that will be demolished and replaced by new land 
development; and (4) development of the land and construction of buildings. The 
least amount of risk and possibly the lowest investment return are usually associated 
with the first option. The highest amount of risk and the possibility of the highest 
investment returns are usually associated with all other options (Hines, 2001). 
Often investors who seek to own international real estate wish to invest with local 
partners who may be more knowledgeable about their domestic market, the 
economy and its trends, the political system and trends, the laws affecting the real 
estate investment, taxation, and any other important information. When the 
investment requires a large sum, investors may wish to spread their monies to more 
than one real property in the same and other countries, and selects partners to 
share in the financial obligation (Hines, 2001). 
According to Hoesli & Lekander (2008), there are many forms of business 
organisational that prospective investors may choose from, for instance, sole and 
joint legal ownership forms. The joint ownership forms include a variety of 
partnership forms and a variety of corporate legal forms. Investment in a joint 
venture (JV) makes it possible to align the interests of a local partner with those of 
an international investor. JV structures, however, are not easy to access and are not 
harmonised, leading to difficulties in initiating and managing these exposures (Hoesli 
& Lekander, 2008). Another possibility to exposure is the private fund market, i. e. 
dedicated investment vehicles set up for the sole purpose of placing investor capital 
in the property market (Hoesli & Lekander, 2008). 
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The selection of a business organisational form usually depends on the investor's 
need for limited legal liability, limited financial liability, fund-raising capability, time 
span of the investment, active management of the property, the risk associated with 
the investment, the investment restraints imposed by the foreign government, the 
cost of the proposed acquisitions, tax situation, and current need for funds (Hines, 
2001). 
As mentioned earlier, the intention of this research is to focus on commercial real 
estate and hotel FDI developments in the selected MENA markets, and therefore, it 
is rational to identify the main forms of exposure international developers have in 
both clusters, and observe how investors approach each type of investment. 
2.3.2 INTERNATIONAL REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT DECISION-MAKING 
PROCESS 
According to Roberts and Henneberry (2007), researchers approach the property 
investment decision making process as a normative model, as they deal with it as an 
exercise of rational analysis which also depends on the use of tools such as Modern 
Portfolio Theory (MPT) to inform decision making. They as well as Parker (2009) 
argue that the current treatment of property investment decision-making is 
inadequate as it does not present a real-world view of the process of decision- 
making, and that a better appreciation of the nature and character of the decision- 
making process is required. Indeed, there is not much known about investors' 
decision-making process when deciding to invest internationally, as what factors they 
look at? And how do political, economical, socio-cultural factors impact their 
decision to invest internationally? 
It is therefore, worthwhile to consider how investors invest internationally, and the 
main stages they encounter when deciding on an investment in property. 
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Roberts and Henneberry (2007) propose a ten stage composite model of the 
property investment decision making process, based on their analysis of combination 
of various normative models proposed in the literature (see Figure 3). They have 
mapped those ten stage normative model against the decision-making processes of 
investors in three market contexts, France, Germany and the UK. They found that 
there is a simplification of the ten-stage- normative model produced from the 
literature. The ten-stage normative model was reduced to five stages in the context 
of French and German investment decision-making and six stages in the context of 
UK investment decision-making (see Figure 3). 
It must be noted though that their study are concerned with domestic property 
investment decision making process, however, in the context of international 
property investment, the decision making process gets more multifaceted. 
According to Tschabold (2003), the approaches to international real estate 
investment decisions can be defined as the logical process that can be followed in a 
bottom-up or top-down approaches or both, which depend on the investment style 
of the decision maker. Where, a bottom-up approach consider investment 
opportunities that brought to the investor or fund manager and then only after the 
investment meets the initial objectives (e. g. risk and return characteristics) and 
criteria of the fund, the investment could be considered (Tschabold, 2003). 
In contrast, a decision is considered as top-down, when an investment is strategically 
made to add international property to a portfolio and then solicited to conform to 
target allocations between countries and sectors. This entails the analysis of a set of 
economic indicators and a number of factors reflecting the relative maturity of real 
estate markets (Tschabold, 2003) & (Mueller & Ball, 2006) & (Doorn, 2003). 
Fuchs & Scharmanski (2009), in their recent study also assert that the international 
property investment 'rational' decision-making process consists of a multilevel 
process of filtering starting with 'screening' ending with 'acquisition', where the 
particular investment represents the last link in a long decision chain which mainly 
runs top-down (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 3: Comparison of stylised national investment decision-making heuristics with 
normative model 
Source: Roberts and Henneberry (2007) 
Figure 4: Decision-making process of international property investors 
Source: Fuchs & Scharmanski (2009) 
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Their findings demonstrate that global investors introduce a procedure of rational 
decision making. Although they try to overcome path dependencies (the authors 
identified three path dependencies i. e. increasing returns; organisational proximity 
and community opinion), which most investors stick to them when deciding on an 
international market. The result therefore, is a combination of rational and path- 
dependent decision making. 
In Figure 4, the first stage in the top-down approach is the `screening' stage, whereby 
investors start 'screening' worldwide countries using specific criteria and scoring 
models. Indeed, an interviewee (in the exploratory study), assured that this stage is 
vital and that they usually use scoring models to make comparisons between 
countries (See Appendix 6 part 4). 
Lee (2005) also consider this stage an important one, and having a robust 
methodology to determine the potential of each country's real estate in general is 
key to understanding the similarities and differences between the countries, further 
he develops a systematic methodology (i. e. the Real Estate Potential REP index) that 
consists of four key dimensions that determines the investment potential of 
international markets; the index is constructed using four key variables (1) country's 
expected growth, (2) country risk, (3) transparency, and (4) real estate market 
specific risk. Each of which looks at the countries from the macro level, as he argues 
that investing internationally require undertaking the following analysis stages: 
I. Nationwide analysis, (screening stage) where the REP index can be employed 
2. Sector wide analysis (e. g. retail, office, etc) 
3. The investment process itself. (E. g. joint venture, direct, etc. ) 
It is noticeable that countries like Egypt for instance, rarely pass the first 'screening' 
test, and this could be due to specific factors such as lack of transparency or other 
influential factors that did not meet investors' risk-return objectives. 
This research therefore has to focus at the first 'screening-macro-stage' and identify 
those factors that influence international investors at the national level, as it is 
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hypothesised that major national level factors do affect international investors' 
attractiveness to the MENA region. 
2.3.3 THEORIES OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) IN REAL ESTATE 
As mentioned earlier, the literature available on the subject of FDI is many. 
However, most of the empirical and theoretical work has been investigating the 
manufacturing and production of FDI. Research on FDI in the real estate sector is 
very much lacking. This view is supported by Laposa (2006) and Holsapple, et al 
(2006). Even the theories on FDI and Multi-national Companies MNC's were 
developed to explain FDI in manufacturing sector and only lately the application is 
being extended into the real estate sector by researches undertaken by He, Wang, & 
Cheng (2009), Rodriguez & Bustillo (2008), Laposa (2006) and Holsapple, et al, 
(2006). As such it is imperative that more emphasis is given to FDI research in real 
estate sector since the scarcity of the empirical works in this area. 
As the theory of foreign investment involving international real estate investment is 
underdeveloped (Holsapple, et al, 2006) & (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Dunning & 
Lundan (2008, p. 76) believe though that there is not much that the academic 
scholars can do about it, as they point out that although the investment is classified 
as direct, the motives of the purchases have the attributes of portfolio investment. 
Dunning & Lundan (2008) clarify this by describing direct real estate investments as 
'passive' investments and that they are primarily financially motivated, through 
expectations of future land and property values, and they argue that the 'foreignness' 
impact on the use of these assets are limited. However, it must be noted that 
investing in greenfield developments entails fixed capital investment, create jobs, and 
introduces best practices from multinational corporations. 
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As mentioned earlier, understanding FDI in real estate might entail utilising the 
comprehensive framework which was developed and used in the manufacturing 
industry, which is Dunning's Eclectic Paradigm (Dunning, 1980). He integrated three 
key dimensions; the (0) ownership, (I) internalisation and (L) location advantages or 
factors to form a single theoretical framework known as the OLI (Ownership, 
Location and Internalisation advantage) paradigm. 
The following sections therefore, starts by explaining the risk diversification theory in 
the context of real estate, as it is also practically related to international real estate 
investing, and its role in motivating global investors to invest outside their domestic 
markets. This is followed by a synthesis to Dunning's OLI framework and its 
application to real estate. 
2.3.3.1 RISK DIVERSIFICATION THEORY 
Markowitz (1952) mean-variance (MV) efficiency is the classic paradigm of modern 
finance for efficiently allocating capital among risky assets (Richard & Robert, 2009). 
The theory provided an answer to the fundamental question: How should an 
investor allocate funds among the possible investment choices? Markowitz suggested 
that investors should consider risk and return together and determine the allocation 
of funds among investment alternatives on the basis of the trade-off between them 
(Fabozzi, et al, 2007). Bodie, Kane, & Marcus (2002) state that, according to 
Markowitz, the variance of the rate of return (on an asset), is a significant measure of 
portfolio risk under a reasonable set of assumptions. 
So why do investors invest and diversify their portfolios internationally? Two main 
factors explain their attractiveness to diversifying internationally. First, the 
correlation between the returns of the assets or securities that makes up a portfolio 
which is crucial in determining the associated level of risk. In general, the lower the 
correlation between assets, the lower the portfolio risk, and risk-averse investors 
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tend to choose assets with low correlation (Markowitz, 1952). Second, the 
correlation between domestic and foreign returns is expected to be lower than 
between purely domestic assets or securities. This is due to the monetary, fiscal and 
industrial policies varying from country to country, which add up to differing 
industrial composition (Hauss, 2004). 
According to Keng (2004), when economies are not completely integrated, so 
property returns in different countries will not move together, and therefore risk 
reduction can be achieved through international diversification. 
Studies by ((Webb et al (1988), Stevenson (1999), Steinert and Crowe (2001), and 
Conover et al (2002), citied in (Keng, 2004)), confirmed the significance of 
international property in efficient mixed-asset portfolios. Even though investing in 
overseas property would assume additional risks, additional portfolio diversification 
was also achieved (Newell & Webb, 1996). However, Cheng, et al (1999) found that 
international property was unlikely to produce significant diversification benefits and 
suggested that investors should not allocate more than 10% in international property, 
and 5% or less for investors with a low risk tolerance. 
Gordon, et al (1998) and Maurer & Reiner (2002) also observed significant 
diversification benefits for including international property securities in the mixed- 
asset portfolio and the diversification benefit was even more significant for low to 
medium risk portfolios. The source of diversification gains was mainly in risk 
reduction. Liu & Mei (1998) also found that international property-related securities 
provided incremental diversification benefits over and above that associated with 
international stocks. These benefits were relatively more obvious at lower risk- 
return levels of the optimal portfolios and were present regardless of whether 
currency risks were hedged. 
2.3.3.2 THE APPLICATION OF DUNNING'S ECLECTIC OLI PARADIGM TO REAL 
ESTATE 
As the objective of this section is to realise the behaviour of international real estate 
developers in developing countries, the OLI paradigm needs to be discussed in a real 
estate context. It must be noted though that there are very few studies that consider 
the application of the paradigm to the real estate industry. Therefore, the following 
sections will discuss the OLI dimensions and their theoretical foundation, and their 
relevance to property markets and especially FDI in greenfield real estate projects. 
2.3.3.2.1 Ownership-specific advantage 
In the manufacturing industry, many books, journal papers, and other sources explain 
clearly how the OLI can be applied to MNE's when deciding on undertaking 
manufacturing related FDI. In contrast, there are very few studies which try to 
illustrate the OLI paradigm in a real estate context. 
In real estate, D'Arcy (2009) describes the OLI framework as the process of 
transferring both tangible and intangible assets by market actors across countries. 
Whereby, Ownership advantages (Oa) include property rights or intangible assets. 
Depending on the nature of national and regional property right laws and legislations, 
domestic firms generally posses Oa advantages over foreign firms, or at least a 
comparative advantage over foreign firms on issues such as government approval 
processes for development (Laposa, 2006) and (D'Arcy, 2009). Accordingly, it is 
reasonable to expect that foreign property firms interested in acquiring or 
developing property in the MENA region engaged domestic firms that possessed 
domestic property rights (Oa) or who understood the local political environment to 
secure property development rights. 
Moreover, other competitive advantages might include Intangible assets (see Figure 
5), which could comprise project management and delivery skills, marketing, 
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knowledge and know-how of delivering world class developments, knowledge of 
international markets, negotiation strengths, learning ability as well as human capital 
experiences (D'Arcy, 2009). Indeed, D'Arcy (2009) asserts that these ownership 
advantages can have an impact on the overall competitive edge of international 
market actors over local actors. 
D'Arcy (2009) also explains how the (Oa) can impact the level of internationalisation; 
he illustrates this by an example of both investment and development activities, as 
the investment activities has always high levels of internalisation than the 
development activities which can be described by the ownership advantages of each 
approach. Indeed, this observation is confirmed in this research, as the number of 
greenfield real estate (development) projects is considered very low (e. g. SI projects 
in Egypt), which might be considered low when compared to the level of investment 
in standing properties, for instance. 
Holsapple, Ozawa, & Olienyk (2006), extended Dunning's OLI framework into the 
context of international real estate investments. They argue that in international real 
estate investments, there are hybrids of direct (FDI) and portfolio investments (FPI). 
And subsequently they have extended Dunning's OLI framework to include the 
portfolio 'P' sub-paradigm in the framework (i. e. OPLI instead of OLI), in order to 
allow the disadvantage of being foreign in a foreign environment to be explicitly 
incorporated in this sub-paradigm. 
It is required here to illustrate the dynamics of this framework (hereafter OPLI), and 
the main thrusts underling it. 
The framework divides Dunning's '0' advantages dimension (in the OLI paradigm) 
into two sub-paradigms, thus '0' (in the OLI) is equivalent to (0 & P) in the OPLI 
framework, where P is the portfolio advantages. Holsapple, et al (2006) asserts that 
investors must evaluate both 0 and P advantages when deciding on an investment in 
a foreign country. 
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They explain the 0 advantages as the advantages that held by firms operating in their 
home countries and are transferable into foreign countries including both tangible 
and intangible assets. They divide the 0 advantages into two specific advantages (Oa) 
and (Ot); where, (Oa) is about intra-firm specific advantages, (e. g. asset specific 
advantages and firm specific advantages such as marketing and specific technologies). 
The (Ot) is inter-firm asset specific advantages, that stem from coordinating the Oa, 
(e. g. management skills, multinational network, and access to financing). Also, they 
assert that (0*) must be taken into account, whereby, (0*) is the advantages held by 
local firms operating in the host country. 
Also they argue that in order to operate profitably in a foreign market, global 
investors need to take into consideration the fixed costs (f) of operating in a foreign 
environment, and these are Location specific costs that needs to be taken into 
consideration. And as they argue that for a necessary condition for FDI, deducting 
the fixed costs (f) from the 0 advantages must be greater than the (0*) (i. e. the 
advantages held by local firms in their domestic markets). 
Embedded in the '0' dimension is the 'P' sub-paradigm, whereby, investors are 
advised to realise any portfolio specific advantages. Holsapple, et al (2006) divides 
this sub-paradigm into (Pe) and (Pd) advantages. They describe (Pe) as the process of 
evaluating foreign exchange risk, portfolio arbitrage opportunities, existence of 
capital market imperfections and debt denomination consideration, from the home 
country perspective. They also describe the (Pd) as the advantages directly related to 
portfolio diversification when measured by the covariance of predicted returns with 
other multinational activities. Here, they argue that as a necessary condition for FPI 
decision, Pe+Pd must be greater than zero, so the firm can improve the overall 
portfolio return and/ or diversification through undertaking the FPI. 
They also argue that when the 0 and/ or P advantages exist, investors can then look 
at the Location (L) and Internationalisation (I) advantages, and that the sequence of 
deciding on FDI, FPI or another form foreign engagement (e. g. franchise, contract for 
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fee, etc. ), follows a logical sequence of questions (i. e. What?, Where?, and How? ), 
whereby, the 'What' question tries to answer whether any 0 or P advantages exist, 
and the Where question tries to evaluate the Location advantages exist in a foreign 
market. The How question is the last and tries to answer what investment mode and 
structure is best to internalise. 
It must be noted though, and as discussed earlier, global investors follow a 
combination of rational and path-dependent decision making, when deciding on an 
international real estate investment. For instance, and as discussed earlier, investors 
go through a process as they start by `screening' countries worldwide (i. e. employing 
the L dimension), looking at national and macro level factors, only then and after 
filtering and deciding on specific countries, they focus on the sectoral level analysis 
(i. e. office, retail etc. ), and only when they find the appropriate opportunity in a 
specific sector (either a development or acquisition opportunity), they can evaluate 
the 0, P and I advantages, so in fact the paradigm should have the ordering of 'LOPI', 
instead of OPLI. This is a key point in understanding and employing the paradigm, as 
L specific factors (Where question), will influence the (Oa), (Ot), (0*), (f), (Pe), (Pd) 
and (I) variables, and must be followed by the `What' and `How' questions. 
2.3.3.2.2 Location-specific advantage 
Location considerations are important for FDI in real estate, since they have the 
capacity to foster or hinder its flow. FDI in real estate developments may be 
attributable to market size, market need or to financial gains, as well as other 
competitive advantages, which may include a unique source of demand, geographical 
location, a large domestic market, high liquidity, high purchasing power, tax policies, 
or lower levels of political risk in the host country. 
D'Arcy (2009) explains how real estate actors get attracted to certain countries and 
how the Location advantages depend to a large degree on the type of barriers both 
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direct and indirect which market actors encounter in host countries. He- asserts that 
the institutional environment, regulatory barriers and business culture are important 
influences when formulating strategies for internationalisation (see Figure 5). 
As an example, Saudi Arabia's location is potentially very attractive for the 
hydrocarbons industries, oil refineries, petrochemicals and plastics. Entry into the 
property sector may also be very attractive because of the good growth in 
population, persistent at over 3 per cent per annum, of whom 65 per cent are under 
25 years old, and a sound infrastructure are also among the location-specific 
advantages of Saudi Arabia (Cityscape, 2009). However, there might be other 
location specific factors that hinder FDI into the property market including culture 
proximity and other factors that will be explained in the following sections. 
In Holsapple, et al (2006) OPLI extended framework, location advantages require 
investors to ask the `Where' question, which look at factors such as host country 
political risk, regulations and laws, and fiscal and monetary policies. 
Holsapple, et al (2006) state that location advantages must be measured against 
recurring costs of being foreign (other than exchange risk), such as operating a long 
distance from the investment or differential treatment in the host country. 
They argue that if firms relying only on Portfolio advantages, they can simply acquire 
passive interest in existing real estate assets in the host country, and the Location 
factor is not so effective. 
For the purpose of this research, it is hypothesised that only greenfield development 
real estate FDI will be considered and therefore those key 'Location' factors are 
considered vital in understanding drivers and barriers to investing in Middle Eastern 
property markets. 
2.3.3.2.3 Internalisation-specific advantage 
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The internalisation advantage can be considered as the view of exploiting the 
ownership advantage (Oa) discussed earlier, by not contracting out of the associated 
activity, but by purposely pursuing it and retaining control over it. 
By means of internalisation in the manufacturing industry, a firm might carry out 
transactions within its wholly- or partially-owned facilities in the host country rather 
than relying on external markets (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). By doing so, a foreign 
firm will be able to overcome some of the difficulties and risks and might improve its 
performance. Internalisation gains arise from avoiding market imperfections 
(uncertainty, economies of scale, problems of control, the undesirability of providing 
full information to a prospective purchaser, limited business support services 
'secondary markets' and so on) (Dunning, 1980). The existence of internalisation 
advantages obviously depends to some extent on the existence of ownership 
advantages. 
Internalisation of real estate activities however, as explained by D'Arcy (2009), is the 
process which determines the organisational mode by which actors choose to 
transfer intangible assets and/ or capital across boundaries. Those intangible assets 
might include management and human expertise, knowledge, and the reputation of 
the internationalising firm (D'Arcy, 2009). The transfer of capital could be originated 
and provided either from debt or equity positions, along with the financial structure 
associated with its proposed transfer (D'Arcy, 2009). 
In regards to the 'How' question, which is related to Internationalisation 'I', 
Holsapple, et al (2006) suggest that when L advantages exist, it will be more 
beneficial for firms having 0 advantages to own the investment itself rather than sell, 
lease, or franchise the advantage to foreign firms located in the host country (see 
Figure 5). 
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2.3.4 DETERMINANTS (DRIVERS AND BARRIERS) OF FDI IN REAL ESTATE 
Given the scarcity of theoretical frameworks for real estate FDI, particularly 
macroeconomic ones, the empirical analysis is also very limited and has mostly 
adopted a non structural approach. The lack of macroeconomic theories on real 
estate FDI explains the scarcity of the empirical analysis in this area. 
To bridge this gap, the following sections present the main themes emerged from the 
empirical literature on the determinants of general FDI, together with the few 
specific studies on real estate FDI. 
If one takes the theoretical literature on general FDI, there are a number of 
macroeconomic drivers, which may explain a decision to invest abroad. This is hardly 
the case for real estate FDI, where exiting theories mainly focus on microeconomic 
aspects of supply and demand. 
It is the intention of this research to focus on the national (or macro) level factors 
that impact international real estate developers' decisions in emerging and developing 
markets. 
For the purpose of this research, a thorough review of the literature has been 
carried out on the theoretical and empirical studies that examined factors and/ or 
variables related to international real estate investment. 
The factors/ variables considered here are related to the OLI framework and more 
specifically the Location 'L' factors, this is because those factors are mainly 
concerned with the 'country level' variables that investors look at in the 'screening/ 
initial' stage which covered earlier in the literature. Some of the key variables 
covered either theoretically or empirically tested, are listed in Appendices 2&4. 
From the, researcher's point of view, among the many variables covered and tested, 
few themes emerged from the literature covering many variables related to 
international real estate investment. The themes can be grouped into both drivers 
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and barriers. Therefore, the first section provides an overview on the drivers to 
international real estate investment, followed by the barriers to such investments. 
2.3.4.1 LOCATION DRIVERSTO FDI IN REAL ESTATE 
There has been much discussion in the literature about the drivers to investing in 
international and emerging markets. Gordon (2003) identifies the key drivers for 
international investments. The drivers are ranked based on importance to various 
sources of institutional capital from all over the world: 
" Higher Return: acquiring higher returns as the most cited driver. 
" Diversification: this can be achieved through portfolio risk reduction. 
" Cross-border service: having higher standard of cross-border service through 
investment managers operating in many regions around the globe. 
" Rising Transparency: the cross-border investors' analysis of new markets raises the 
level of transparency as well as raising the level of financial/market reporting. 
The next sections present the main factors that are believed to be of importance on 
deciding on an international potential market for investment (for a summary of the 
drivers see Figure 7). 
2.3.4.1.1 The Importance of market size and economic health 
Market attractiveness or market size can be measured by examining country's GDP, 
population, growth of GDP and GDP per capita (see Appendices 2&4 for other 
variables examined in the literature). Empirical evidence investigating market size in 
potential investable countries as variables influencing international real estate 
investments has shown same results as most findings support the theoretical view 
that large real estate markets attract international investors. 
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Baum (2008) in his recent work on number of unlisted property funds targeting 
particular countries; he finds a strong relationship between population and GDP per 
capita (as independent variables) with the number of funds targeting particular 
countries (dependant variable). 
One recent study by Rodriguez &. Bustillo (2008) on FDI in Spanish housing 
acquisitions, finds GDP per capita to be a significant determinant of Spanish housing 
acquisitions by foreigners mainly tourists. In contrary, He, Wang, & Cheng (2009), 
finds GDP per capita insignificant as a determinant to FDI in real estate in China. 
Anop (2010) uses other proxies to market size, including real GDP growth, and 
GDP. She finds real GDP growth to be insignificant, while GDP is a significant 
determinant to FDI in real estate in selected European countries. 
Lim, McGreal, & Webb (2006) found from their survey on the perception of US and 
European investors on real estate investment opportunities in Central South 
America and Africa, that sound economic policies and market orientated reforms in 
foreign countries, are important reasons for holding foreign property. They also find 
that the healthier the economic state and the better track record of macroeconomic 
policies, the more attractive is the location. 
Chin, Dent and Roberts (2006) also found similar results from their survey on South 
East Asia cities, as they conclude that a sound economic structure coupled with a 
strong and stable macroeconomic environment are the most significant factors in the 
ability of the region to attract foreign real estate investments. 
Chen and Hobbs (2003) constructed the Global Real Estate Risk index, which is 
based on three components: country, structural and cyclical real estate risks. They 
found that the size of a country's economy positively affects investment activity, and 
argue that larger economies are usually more capable of surviving external economic 
shocks and are therefore more stable than smaller economies. They also argue that 
inflation, the unemployment rate, and change in the unemployment rate are 
important proxies for measuring the economic situation in their index. 
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It is evident that host countries with larger market size, faster economic growth and 
higher degree of economic development will provide more and better opportunities 
for investors to exploit their ownership advantages and, therefore, will attract more 
real estate FDI. The intuition is that these factors can be significant for FDI in real 
estate sector. 
2.3.4.1.2 The importance of the institutional framework 
According to All, Fiess, & MacDonald (2010), the institutional framework of a 
country "consists of all kinds of humanly devised constraints that shape the human 
interactions, including economic exchange". 
This research adopts a well known definition of institutions on the work of North 
(1990) who has been able to explain institutions at the macro level. North (1990) 
defines institutions as formal rules (for instance, constitutions, laws and regulations) 
and informal constraints (norms of behaviour, conventions and self-imposed codes of 
conduct). Institutions (and their enforcement mechanisms) set the 'rules of the 
game', which organisations, in pursuit of their own learning and resource allocative 
goals, must follow. 
As the empirical evidence review shows, there is strong evidence that good 
institutions play an important role in attracting FDI. The institutional determinants of 
aggregate FDI are related to the characteristics of the host country's investment 
environment that are designed and regulated by government's policies and other 
political and social factors as well as the level of economic, political and social risks, 
political stability, democratic accountability, the degree of openness of the economy 
and trade regime, functioning bureaucracy, reliable and transparent regulatory 
framework covering FDI policies and tax system, effective property rights protection, 
the rule of law, enforcement of contracts, efficiency of justice and the lack of 
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corruption and the type of privatisation process (Dumludag, Saridogan, & Kurt, 
2007). 
In the context of institutions that are directly related to property markets, Keogh & 
Darcy (1999) illustrate a three-level hierarchy for institutions involved within 
property markets (see Figure 6). At the top level, the institutional environment is 
constrained by the political, social, economic and legal rules and conventions by 
which the market is organised. As mentioned above, at this level, institutions play a 
crucial role in attracting or deterring FDI into property markets. 
At the next level, the property market is considered as an institution in itself with a 
range of characteristics which determine its structure, scope and function. At the 
bottom level, the main organisations which operate in the property market can be 
considered in terms of the way they are structured and the way they change (Keogh 
& D'Arcy, 1999). 
Figure 6: The institutional hierarchy of property markets 
Source: Keogh & D' Arcy (1999) 
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2.3.4.1.3 The importance of infrastructure 
The infrastructure of a particular country is also an important factor for FDI in real 
estate. A recent study by Anop (2010), finds `road infrastructure' to be a significant 
determinant to FDI in real estate in European countries. Lieser & Groh (2010) after 
analysis of a composite index of real estate markets attractiveness for 66 countries 
concluded that infrastructure should become an integral part of the strategy to 
attract international real estate investments. 
At the aggregate FDI, Loree & Guisinger (1995) found that a developed 
transportation infrastructure has a positive influence on inward FDI flows. Wheeler 
& Mody (1992) also concluded that, for developing countries, infrastructure is one of 
the dominating determinants for FDI decisions. 
2.3.4.1.4 The importance of market liquidity 
Real estate is a relatively small investment market and the limited number of 'liquid' 
investment markets further exacerbates impacts resulting in a concentration of 
investment in the larger more liquid markets. 
Connor and Liang (2000) argue that public sources of equity capital, primarily as 
REITs (Real Estate Investment Trusts), are particularly important for a vivid real 
estate investment activity due to the potential to securitises financial claims and to 
raise capital in the public market at relatively low cost. D'Argensio & Laurin (2009) 
also argue that the existence of REIT operators should enhance the liquidity of the 
real estate market, as they have used this variable in their study on cap rates 
movements. 
On the other hand, Baum & Murray (2010) argue that the lack of liquidity is 
considered as a key risk facing global investors. They found that the majority of 
investors responded to their survey found lack of liquidity as a high barrier to 
entering into an emerging market, especially during the recent economic crisis 
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(2008), and found that institutional investors are keen to withdraw from less liquid 
emerging markets. 
Another point raised by Baum & Murray (2010) is that for opportunity funds, who 
find liquidity is key for them to acquire and sell in short period of time, to maximise 
return and performance fees, which is not the case in most emerging markets, and 
especially the MENA markets, where only few countries like Turkey, Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE, have the liquidity and operating REITs in their property markets. 
Figure 7: Drivers to FDI in real estate 
I. Real estate 
market 
Institutional real 
estate market size 
Market maturity and 
transparency 
Market liquidity 
Economic output 
and growth 
Economic size and 
health 
Inflation and interest 
rates 
2. Economic and 
demographic 
factors 
S. Socio-cultural 
factors 
Source: developed for this study 
Population 
Population growth 
Employment growth 
Cultural proximity (e. g. level of 
human development and language) 
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2.3.4.2 LOCATION BARRIERS TO FDI IN REAL ESTATE 
International investors face markets composed of many different factors for example, 
different economies, different cultures and different regulations, from their common 
domestic markets. In order to cope with these significant factors and to make 
profitable investment decision on global market level, investors assess the risks of the 
investment taking into consideration all these key factors while deciding on an 
investment opportunity (Hines, 2001). 
Table I below shows the key constraints to direct property investment in an 
international context (Morell, 2003). 
Table I: Constraints to direct international property investment 
According to Tschabold (2003), other common problems often used to justify 
avoiding international real estate in an investment portfolio include: 
"ý Management and operation once investment is made; 
"- Lack of local expertise; and 
" Potential for misunderstands due to cultural or language difficulties. 
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Moreover, Lee (2001) categorises the key constraints for international real estate 
investment that hinder cross-border investment under four key headings (in view of 
the Asian market): investment risk; political risk; currency risk and institutional risk. 
As can be seen, there is no universally accepted taxonomy of FDI barriers in the real 
estate sector. However, a recent study by Baum & Murray (2010) categorised the 
barriers to formal (direct) and informal (indirect) barriers. 
The direct barriers are those that affect the ability of foreign investors to invest in 
emerging markets, for example in the form of taxes and foreign ownership; indirect 
barriers are those that affect investor's willingness to invest, mainly due to 
reservations regarding language, cultural or political issues, which may entail more 
transaction costs (D'Arcy, 2009) & (Baum & Murray, 2010). Some countries try to 
lessen or even eliminate the impact of those barriers that are most likely to segment 
the local market from the global capital market (Baum, 2009). 
2.3.4.2. I. I Direct barriers 
Direct barriers may include formal legal barriers related to taxation and ownership, 
as well as restrictions to capital accounts (Baum & Murray, 2010) and (D'Arcy, 2009). 
From the researcher's point of view, among the variables covered and tested, the 
following factors are considered as the chief variables related to direct barriers to 
FDI in real estate for the region under investigation (see Figure 8). 
2.3.4.2.1.2 Investment freedom 
A distinctive characteristic of FDI is that once an investment has been made, a 
foreign investor cannot prevent the government in the host country from changing 
the environment in which the investment decision was made. The investment climate 
therefore, is an important determinant to international real estate investors. Two 
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forms of restrictions can be faced by international investors: a) ownership 
restrictions and 2) expropriation of investments. 
Restrictions on foreign ownership in general, can limit the possibility of acquiring a 
bundle of rights in a particular country if investors are not citizens of that country. 
Guert & Jaffe (1996) have examined restrictions on foreign ownership which 
indicates the managerial control that investors can exercise over companies in the 
host country, and found it to be a significant risk to international real estate 
investment. 
On the other hand, expropriation which takes different forms (direct and indirect), 
where, a direct act of expropriation involves nationalisation of foreign-owned 
corporations, in which the government simply takes control of the capital stock. 
There are also indirect forms of expropriation that multinational corporations face. 
Examples include excessive taxation, capital controls, manipulation of exchange rates, 
and bribes and permits demanded by government officials. 
In real estate, capital controls affect the ability of investors to repatriate their 
investment. If domestic savings are scarce in the host country, it is likely that capital 
account transactions will be restricted. A common direct restriction could be the 
imposition of a minimum period of investment (Bekaert, 1995). It follows from this 
that restrictions on international financial flows are less prevalent in high-income 
countries with large domestic savings (Eichengreen, 2001). Baum & Murray (2010) 
find that real estate investors are likely to consider restriction to capital accounts a 
high barrier to investing in emerging markets. 
Therefore, the intuition is that the more open a country is, the more it may attract 
real estate related FDI. 
2.3.4.2.1.3 Taxation 
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Taxes affect the incentives of agents and firms in all areas of economic activity, and 
FDI is no different. Unfortunately, there is a scarcity in the empirical work in regard 
to taxation and its impact on FDI in real estate. This can be attributed to the 
complexity nature of taxation in real estate (see chapter 3, for a summery on tax 
instruments used in the selected MENA countries). 
Baum (2009) explains the different forms of taxation that can be faced by 
international investors. One example is the case of a real estate fund that is 
domiciled outside the fund's country of origin; taxes to that investor in the fund can 
include withholding tax, and taxes on capital gains (Baum, 2009). Taxes also may be 
applied to the investor in the funds that home domicile (for instance, income tax, 
taxes on capital gains) (Baum, 2009). 
At the property level, taxes may be applied to the investor in the domicile of the 
property (Baum, 2009); he gives an example of such tax, which is applied in France 
and is 3%. Taxes may also be applied to the holding entity in the domicile of the 
property (local taxes); or the domicile of the fund (corporate taxes, withholding tax). 
Taxes may be applied to the entity in the domicile of the entity (corporate taxes). 
Taxes can be applied to the property in the domicile of the property (VAT, stamp 
duty and other transfer taxes) (Baum, 2009). 
Therefore, and as a proxy of tax effects, this research examines the total tax rate of 
the target country. All else being equal, it is expected that a country with a lower 
total tax rate would attract investment. However, this measure does not address tax 
credits, multinational-specific taxes, or the issue of double taxation. Therefore, 
results using this tax rate measure must not be treated as definitive. 
A second line of argument, one subject to less ambiguity in measurement problems, 
is to examine the effect of tax treaties between two countries. Unfortunately, it is 
difficult to find internationally comparable measures of after tax returns to capital. 
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2.3.4.2.2 Indirect barriers 
Indirect barriers relate to country specific risks which might include governance risk, 
market/ liquidity risk, economic policy risk and, macroeconomic instability, and real 
estate market transparency (Baum & Murray, 2010) and (D'Arcy, 2009). 
Among the many factors and variables covered in the literature, the following 
indirect barriers are believed to be of importance to the region under investigation. 
2.3.4.2.2.1 Governance (country) risk 
Actions by government affect real estate investment decisions almost everywhere 
(Lee, 2005). Governance is defined as the traditions and institutions by which 
authority in a country is exercised(WGI, 2010). This includes the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government 
to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and 
the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among 
them (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009). 
According to Lee (2005) very little has been done to examine the effects of 
governance and country risks on international portfolio investment. He states that 
country risk is a broad concept that is not simply political risk and this is why little or 
no work has been done to examine country risk in developed countries. He argues 
that country risk is a combination economic conditions; discriminatory tax 
regulations; limitations on foreign ownership; lack of information; capital controls; 
and transactions costs. In his recent work developing the Real Estate Potential (REP) 
index, he assigns country risk as one key dimension in his index, which consists of 
four, dimensions. 
He uses the Euromoney Country Risk index which is a combination of subjective and 
objective assessment. However, this study breaks down country (governance) risks 
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into six key dimensions that measure voice and accountability; political stability and 
absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and 
control of corruption. It is believed that these dimensions cover key indirect barriers 
faced by foreign investors. 
2.3.4.2.2.1.1 Political stability and absence of violence 
As discussed in section 2.5.1.2, political stability is a key institutional determinant and 
it is very important to investors to be operating in a politically stable environment. 
This view is supported by Azzimonti & Sarte (2007), as they draw attention to the 
importance of political instability. They focus on the propensity of some governments 
to expropriate assets (nationalisation) or indirectly (through changes to tax codes 
and exchange rates, capital controls, bribery, and licensing). The authors claim that 
poor institutional quality, expropriation in its many forms, and a lack of policy 
commitment are negatively related to FDI. 
In a real estate context, Keogh and D'Arcy (1999) argue that countries' national 
property markets are defined by their socio-cultural and political environment. The 
socio-political risk comprises social risk and government policy risk and is an 
indicator of institutional problems in a country's public sector. 
Lim, McGreal and Webb (2006) as well as Chin, Dent and Roberts (2006) found 
political stability to be the most important factor underpinning international 
investors' country choices when entering emerging or transition economies. 
Lee (2001) notes that the level of perceived corruption faced by business within a 
country can prove a major impediment to the successful implementation of an 
investment strategy. Geurts and Jaffe (1996) also argue that a country's socio-cultural 
framework is closely related to its political environment influencing the overall 
investment climate. 
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2.3.4.2.2.1.2 Government effectiveness 
Government effectiveness can be defined as the quality level of public services, civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment 
to such-policies (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009). 
Unfortunately, no previous empirical work for this specific dimension however the 
intuition is that the better the government effectiveness the more FDI the country 
will attract. 
2.3.4.2.2.1.3 Voice and accountability 
Voice and accountability can be defined as the extent to which a country's citizens 
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 
2009). 
Again no previous empirical work in regard to FDI in real estate can be reported 
here, so the intuition is that countries with better voice and accountability 
environment will be able to attract more FDI in real estate. 
2.3.4.2.2.1.4 Rule of low 
The rule of law can be defined as the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence. 
It is well known that the more respect for the rule of law naturally leads to less 
corruption, less risk of government expropriation and strong coercion of contract. 
That what is found by Liao & Mei (1999), when trying to relate the rule of law to real 
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estate returns, they found rule of law variable to be positively correlated with other 
risk variables, and concluded that rule of law and economic freedom may reduce 
property variance risk so enhancing property returns. 
2.3.4.2.2.1.5 Regulatory quality 
Regulatory quality is defined as the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009). 
D'Arcy and Keogh (1998) argue that each country's real estate market is 
conditioned, amongst other things, by landlord and tenant law, planning law, and 
urban policy. The burden of doing real estate business and taxation are considered to 
directly affect the operational efficiencies of any kind of business. 
Worzala (1994) and Adair et al. (1999) note that this affects foreign investors at a 
large extent at three times: when investing, operating or exiting a market. 
Keivani, Parsa, McGreal (2001) argue that regulatory limitations, exchange controls 
and the repatriation of capital restrain international capital flows and hence, provoke 
a major source of concern for investors. Chin, Dent, & Roberts, (2006) found that 
the more restrictions & regulations imposed on foreign investors, the less attracted 
investors are to that country. 
2.3.4.2.2. l. 6 Corruption (control of corruption) 
Control of corruption can be defined as the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well 
as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests (Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2009). 
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Lee (2004) (cited in Lee, (2005)) finds a significant correlation of 0.91 between the 
level of corruption in a country, as measured by the 2004 Transparency International 
Corruption Perception (CPI) Index and the level of real estate transparency, as 
measured by the 2004 Global Real Estate Transparency (GRET) Index produced by 
Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL), and concludes that corruption prospers on a lack of 
transparency, and suggests that corruption is likely to be a problem in implementing 
any international diversification strategy, in both developed or developing countries. 
Geurts & Jaffe (1996) also used the corruption variable in their study, as they used it 
as a signal for weak legal framework. They hypothesised that countries that have 
weak private property rights protection and corruption, are likely to be higher than 
in those countries with stronger legal protection. And they conclude that corruption 
is likely to hinder economic activity by raising transaction costs for investors. 
As well as the six dimensions of governance indicators discussed above, there are 
other indirect barriers that could be influencing foreign investors in the region under 
investigation. These can be summarised as follows. 
2.3.4.2.2.2 Security of property rights 
Guert and Jaffe (1996) state that security captures the level of confidence amongst 
investors and that their persons and property will be protected. They categorised 
this variable under property rights as they believe that the higher the level of 
confidence that investors' property will be protected, the lower the required return 
should be on their investments. 
Chin, Dent, & Roberts, (2006) and Lim, McGreal, & Webb (2006) found that 
standardisation of property rights and market practice is important determinant to 
attract foreign investors. Lee (2005) also have used this variable in his Real Estate 
Potential (REP) index, as he wanted to measure the security of property rights and 
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the effectiveness of contracts and leasers, and therefore, he used Property Rights 
(PR) index to achieve this purpose. 
2.3.4.2.2.3 Real estate market maturity and transparency 
Understanding specific property market requires considering the nature of that 
market and its evolution, as well as economic conditions. Property market analysts 
usually look at national and regional levels and urban economics when analysing 
economic conditions (Chen & Dent, 2005). However, they tend to ignore the 
cultural and institutional framework dimensions and concentrate on the demand and 
supply conditions in the three sub-markets: user, investment and development 
(Keogh, 1991). 
Keogh (1991) suggests that the determination of capital values and yields may be only 
partly explained in terms of the decision-making rules of investing institutions or the 
social symbolism of property as an asset. Opportunities in both the user and investor 
markets will be constrained by the legal system of property rights and the quality of 
professional advice available to those transacting property interests, with obvious 
implications for property rights (Chin, 2002) and (Laposa, 2007). 
Keogh and D'Arcy (1994) proposed a paradigm of property market performance, 
which rests not only on economic fundamentals but also on an explicit consideration 
of market maturity. They define market maturity as a function of the degree of 
diversification of user and investor opportunities, flexibility of adjustment of property 
interests, market openness, the existence of information and research systems, 
professionalization, and standardisation of property rights and market practices. 
Within this context, the market maturity paradigm has been forwarded as a basis for 
examining property market processes particularly for international comparisons and 
as a measure of competitiveness of cities in attracting investment (Keogh and D'Arcy, 
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1994; Armitage and Keogh, 1995; D'Arcy and Keogh, 1998; cited in Mcgreal, et al, 
2002). 
Keogh & D'Arcy (1994) in their study of London, Barcelona & Milan property 
markets, were they developed the market maturity paradigm, they have used the 
following comparison criteria as a basis for their analysis: user and investor 
opportunity; market flexibility; availability of professional bodies; adequate property 
market information and research; market openness; market standardisation; value 
stability; development stability and economic development. 
They concluded that the concept of market maturity is too complex to provide a 
simple route to define the market activity. They also assert that market maturity 
does not necessary follow the same route for all of the markets. 
Market maturity framework was further utilised by several authors to analyse the 
level of development of real estate markets, including Armitage (1996), Lee (2001) 
and McGreal, et al (2002) (see Appendix 3 for a summary of the studies). 
One recent study utilising the concept of market maturity is carried out by Chin, 
Dent, & Roberts, (2006) in their recent research on Southeast Asia cities. They have 
extended Keogh & D'Arcy's framework and added some key factors to the definition 
of market maturity, these are; the quality of property product, market information 
standardisation and availability, and presence of property intermediaries, which were 
utilised by Lee (2001). 
Laposa (2006) argues that the concept of market maturity is by some means 
incomplete, as it excludes other important factors related to FDI decisions, such as 
foreign property demand and supply, foreign property capital flows and foreign 
property service providers. These factors are important when comparing cities, and 
also are part of investors' decision making processes. 
One measure of market maturity and transparency is the JLL Global Real Estate 
Transparency index, which is according to Lee (2005), based on a structured survey 
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conducted within LaSalle Investment Managers (LIM) of their global network of 
researchers and covers the following five key attributes of real estate transparency: 
(I) Legal factors; (2) Regulatory burden; (3) Availability of information on market 
fundamentals; (4) Listed vehicle financial disclosure and governance; and (5) 
Availability of investment performance indexes (see Appendix 5 for information on 
major real estate data providers in the MENA region). 
A country with a perfect 1.00 would be the country with the highest level of 
transparency. A country with a total of 5.00 would be a country with total opacity. 
From this data countries are assigned a composite GRET index and grouped into five 
broad tiers of transparency: 
Tier I: Highly Transparent 
Tier 2: Transparent 
Tier 3: Semi-Transparent 
Tier 4: Low Transparency 
Tier 5: Opaque 
He uses the JLL GRET Index (2004) to measure the transparency of the 51 countries 
in his REP index. Baum (2008) also uses the JLL Transparency Index scores across 41 
countries, applying a score. He finds that TI score was correlated negatively and 
significantly with both the number of unlisted funds and target Gross Asset Value 
(GAV) (dependant variables). He concludes that countries receiving significantly less 
investment than that predicted by his equation have average TI indicators of 4.07 
(opaque). This assures that transparency is a key variable in this study. 
2.3.4.2.3 Other barriers 
There are other barriers that have been covered in the literature, for instance 
currency convertibility and risk of fluctuations. Among the few studies that have 
examined this issue, e. g. Sirmans & Worzala (2003) conclude that currency 
fluctuations change the diversification benefits associated with international real 
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estate investments. This is not surprising as the adjustment of local markets return 
for exchange rate fluctuations leads to changes in all the parameters of the portfolio 
problem and so the risks and returns of the efficient frontier produced using local 
market returns will inevitably be different from that using exchange rate adjusted 
data. This would even be the case if the asset holdings and weights of the two 
efficient frontiers are identical. In other words, the risks and returns of the efficient 
frontiers using unadjusted or adjusted data are different is not enough to indicate 
whether currency risk really matter to investors. Since if the portfolio compositions 
of the efficient frontiers using exchange rate adjusted and local market returns are 
essentially the same, portfolios based on local market real estate will perform equally 
as well as those based on data adjusted for currency risk. In contrast, if the portfolio 
compositions are radically different using unadjusted or exchange rate adjusted data, 
currency risk needs to be explicitly accounted for when analysing international real 
estate investment (Thomas & Lee, 2006). 
Spremann & Gantenbein (2003) and Baum (2009) argue that currency issue is a major 
risk factor in international real estate investment and it is common that most 
institutional investors to have a formal currency policy to deal with exchange rate 
fluctuations. 
Spremann & Gantenbein (2003) suggest that the main techniques used to mitigate 
currency risk are; to use domestic loans to fund overseas investments, back-to-back 
loans (foreign), forward purchasing of currency for known cash flows/ consideration 
of hedging techniques, financing by local banks, hedging under extreme 
circumstances, currency is left un hedged, use of various financial tools - options and 
futures and to leave it to corporate currency/ Treasury people. Ziobrowski, 
Ziobrowski and Rosenberg (1997) also suggest that a currency swap may well reduce 
the risk of currency fluctuations on the income return of foreign property. 
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2.4 FDI IN HOTEL GREENFIELD PROJECTS 
2.4.1 HOTELS, TOURISM AND THEIR FDI RELATED ACTIVITIES 
The hotel industry is an important-sub-sector of the tourism industry and provides 
accommodation and related services-to tourists. 
Hotels are defined by the World Tourism Organisation (WTO) as "collective tourist 
establishments", comprising: hotels, apartment-hotels, motels, roadside inns, beach hotels, 
residential clubs and similar establishments providing hotel services including more than bed- 
making and cleaning of rooms". 
So is there a link between the hotel sub-sector and real estate sector? Primarly, the 
real estate sector is divided into four asset classes - office, retail, residential and 
industrial. Hotels however, have not been regarded as an asset class for a variety of 
reasons (Newell & Seabrook, 2006): the lack of understanding of the industry by 
investors, as it is very specialised industry with specific features; very volatile when 
compared to other property asset classes, resulting from unstable cash-flows (from 
lack of long-term leases, out-dated management agreements and seasonal influences); 
and difficulty in having a quick exit strategy. However, in recent years hotels have 
become more mainstream in the eyes of the investors and one recent study by 
Larkin (2007) concluded that hotels can now be regarded the 'fifth asset class' in the 
real estate sector and that hotels will possibly be a familiar asset class for real estate 
fund managers for many years to come. 
Investment in hotels is only one FDI activity in what is called "international tourism 
economy" (UNCTAD, 2007). Ryan (1991) defines tourism `from the economic 
viewpoint' as "a study of the demand for supply of accommodation and supportive services 
for those staying away from home, and the resultant patterns of expenditure, income 
creation and employment". Clearly this definition identifies tourism as an industry, 
where hotel accommodation is key sub-sector of this industry. Indeed FDI in tourism 
was mainly in hotels, as Table 2 below shows how the intensity of FDI activities, and 
--- - ----- -- ---- ----- -- --- - 541 Page 
that the main FDI activities are concentrated in hotels and restaurants, with little FDI 
in airline, for instance. 
According to the UNCTAD comprehensive report and survey on FDI in tourism 
UNCTAD (2007), tourism accounts for no more than I or 2% of total outward FDI 
stocks from the largest source countries; and an even smaller proportion of total 
inward FDI stocks for the largest host countries. Reflecting this, tourism does not 
have as many global mega corporations as in other sectors (for example, 
manufacturing). The UNCTAD (2007) report also states that tourism-related FDI is 
also largely concentrated in developed countries. Although it has been growing fast, 
it is estimated to be as little as 10% in developing countries. 
Table 2: FDI is concentrated in a subset of tourism activities 
TSA components Frequency with which FDI appears to occur 
Most frequent Occasional Rare 
Hotels and similar J 
Restaurants and similar J 
Second homes J 
Passenger transport rental equipment J 
Railway passenger transport services J 
Air passenger transport services J 
Road passenger transport services J 
Water passenger transport services J 
Passenger transport supporting services J 
Travel agencies and similar J 
Cultural services J 
Sports and other recreational services J 
Source: UNCTAD (2007) 
2.4.2 MARKET ENTRY MODES IN THE HOTEL INDUSTRY 
In the context of hotel investments, determining the path to ownership is an 
important element to consider by foreign investors. There are various ways to 
ownership ranging from developing a new hotel to acquiring existing hotels of 
various profiles or converting existing buildings into hotels (Larkin, 2007). 
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According to Quer, Claver, &.: Andreu (2007), entry modes of hotel firms can be 
divided into three large groups: (I) supplying foreign markets through commercial 
transactions (exportation); (2) transferring knowledge to the destination country 
through a contractual agreement; (3) or moving productive or commercial 
capabilities, providing capital through foreign direct investment (FDI), either jointly 
(joint venture) or on its own (wholly owned subsidiary). 
These modes of entry fall into two broad categories: non-equity entry modes 
(including exports and contractual agreements) and equity entry modes (including 
FDI modes) (Quer, Claver, & Andreu, 2007). 
The main considerations in determining the entry-mode selected is the level of 
equity investment demanded and the degree of control required over the operations 
(see Figure 9). The figure shows that there are non-equity strategies of management 
contracts and franchising (with lower levels of control and equity commitment) on 
one side, and acquisition of-local-operators and foreign direct investment on the 
other. Strategic alliances and joint ventures may be seen to occupy the "middle 
ground, " depending largely on the level of investment and other resources 
committed by the respective companies. 
The following section discusses each of the entry modes in more details: 
Figure 9: Relationship between control and ownership in the hotel industry 
Source: Contractor & Kundu (1998) 
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2.4.2.1 FDI (EQuirY) MODES 
Figure 9 above shows equity based strategy can be a wholly-owned equity, where the 
MNC owns the entire hotel, or partial equity, where the MNC owns a share in 
conjunction with a local partner. According to UNCTAD (2007), the local partner 
may be in some cases a government, reflecting the historical trend in many 
developing countries where many hotels were State-owned. 
The concept of control (see Figure 10 below), is somewhat important in the hotel 
industry, as it may occur at different levels, for instance: (I) daily operational and 
quality control in each hotel property (2) control over the physical assets or the real 
estate (3) control over tacit expertise embedded in the routines of the firm (4) 
control over the codified assets such as the global reservation system and the firm's 
internationally recognised brand name (Contractor and Kundu, 1998). 
Figure 10: level of control in hotel operations in relation to entry modes 
(MODE) 
Source: Contractor & Kundu (1998) 
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As can be seen from the above figure, the control over operations and assets is 
directly related to the mode of ownership so the control increases when the equity 
involvement increases. 
According to Johnson (2002), the principal equity-involved entry or expansion modes 
(ranked according to level of control over the entrant) can be divided into the 
following: 
2.4.2.1.1 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A's) 
FDI in either a new property or a series of properties is a potentially profitable 
option for hotel companies, but with a correspondingly high degree of risk. 
According to Johnson (2002), the major concern is the political and economic 
stability in the country, in the light of the potential market in terms of demand and 
growth. 
According to UNCTAD (2007) privatisation was a significant driver of FDI in many 
developing countries in the 1990s, and there continue today to be investments that 
occur through privatisation. UNCTAD (2007) asserts that greenfield investment is 
expected to be particularly important, unlike in other areas of an economy where 
entry through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is more prevalent. 
However, Endo (2006) argues that M&A's has been an important part of the hotel 
industry for many years. According to his recent study for the period (1987-2002), 
covering 2591 cross-border M&A deals from 33 sectors, with 34% took place in 
hotels and motels, 13% in eating places, 11% in travel agencies and 8% in scheduled 
air transportation; with an aggregate transaction values of for $160 billion, 
representing 3% of the cross-border M&A deals in all the industries in the same 
period, he finds that M&A's are an important part of investment in tourism, and that 
most of big deals are concentrated in developed countries; as well as that hotels and 
motels represent the major part of "tourism" related deals. 
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His study also reveals other interesting findings for instance, he finds that developing 
country investors are active in acquiring assets in developed countries; he also finds 
that few Asian economies were the major targets as well as, in many cases, the major 
acquirers of hotel assets. 
2.4.2.1.2 Long-term leasing 
This mode of market entry is comparable to the full-equity mode, as it commits the 
MNC's to dedicate financial resources and assume control for a long period 
(Johnson, 2002). Requiring as it does significant investment over time, long-term 
leases are given careful consideration by development directors, especially the 
corresponding risk and market desirability of the host country (Johnson, 2002). 
2.4.2.1.3 Strategic alliance 
A strategic alliance is a low-cost, limited-risk form of linkage or partnership between 
two or more companies. It allows multinationals to gain domestic market awareness 
and increase their network coverage (Johnson, 2002). Forms of alliance range from 
relatively low risk and low-visibility information sharing and referral of business to 
more overt joint branding (Johnson, 2002). 
Strategic alliances are especially attractive to hotel companies operating in 
fragmented markets with small market share. Specifically, members from the alliance 
benefit from (Olsen & Zhao, 2008): 
" Risk reduction 
" Achieving economies of scale 
" Technological exchanges 
" Creating barriers to entry/blocking competition 
" Overcoming government-mandated trade or investment Barriers 
" Facilitating international expansion of inexperienced firms 
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" Vertical quasi-integration of linking the complementary contributions of 
partners in a value chain. 
According to Olsen & Zhao (2008), there are two types of strategic alliances that 
include formal and informal arrangements of cooperation. The two modes include 
equity participation and non-equity based cooperation, which define the nature of the 
relationship between partnering firms. Formal relationships are seen in joint ventures 
wherein two firms come together to create a new entity, in which equity 
participation from both parties take place (Olsen & Zhao, 2008). Non-equity mode 
of alliance formation leads to cooperative arrangements which result in collaboration 
entailing informal relationships rather than the use of formal governance methods 
(Olsen & Zhao, 2008). 
2.4.2.1.4 Joint venture 
Joint ventures often take the form of partial equity investment and may involve the 
establishment of joint business projects with host countries or with regional partners 
(Johnson, 2002). They may be comprised of companies with substantial financial 
resources, which in time lead to wholly owned subsidiaries with full ownership and 
control. By its nature the joint venture assumes a certain period of financial 
obligations and control, and has been used to good effect by multinationals in 
securing properties in key locations (Johnson, 2002). 
According to Olsen & Zhao (2008), multinational hotel firms have been increasingly 
forming joint ventures recently with strategic partners to employ their location- 
bound assets and mature service and production resources, especially in the 
emerging markets, such as China, India, and Russia (Olsen & Zhao, 2008). 
2.4.2.2 NON-EQUITY MODES 
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Figure 10 above shows the most common types of non-equity modes (i. e. 
management contract and franchising) (Contractor & Kundu, 1998), (Endo, 2006) & 
(UNCTAD, 2007). 
2.4.2.2.1 Management contract 
Contractor & Kundu (1998) define a management service contract as a "long term 
agreement, of up to ten years or even longer, whereby the legal owners of the property and 
real estate enter into a contract with the hotel firm to run and operate the hotel on a day to 
day basis, usually under the latter's internationally recognized name. " According to 
Johnson (2002), there is a wide range in the duration of management contracts (from 
20-25 years), but in recent years, the trend was towards shorter terms. 
This mode is considered the closest type of mode to an equity arrangement in the 
sense that the foreign enterprise has control over the management of the enterprise 
(see Figure 10). Contracts vary, as most include providing an internationally 
recognised brand name and booking system, in addition to day-to-day managerial 
operations. The management team usually comprises a small group of senior 
managers who employ and train local employees. 
2.4.2.2.2 Franchising 
In a franchise contract, by contrast, a local owner buys the right to use the brand 
name, marketing systems and reach, but does not expect the franchising company to 
provide day-to-day managerial or operational control. The MNC control is 
minimised in this mode (see Figure 10 above). 
Advantages for the franchiser include reduced capital investment, fast growth 
expansion, additional revenues/profits, and a potential for larger market 
share(Johnson, 2002). In the hotel industry, franchising was mainly used in the budget 
and mid-market sectors, but more recently has been effective even in the five-star 
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bracket, e. g. through the franchise of the Four Seasons' Regent name to Carlson 
(Johnson, 2002). 
Generally, MNCs combine the above modes of operations (i. e. more than one type 
of association within the same hotel) that fit best to their interests depending on the 
conditions of host countries, e. g., owning a small equity interest in a hotel and 
operating it under a management contract or a franchise agreement) (Endo, 2006) & 
(UNCTAD, 2007). 
Factors influencing choosing non-equity mode of operation 
There are many factors that influence hotels MNC's in choosing between the 
different entry modes (see Figure II below). However, and according to UNCTAD 
(2007) survey, there are mainly five factors to be contributing to preferring non- 
equity involvement in global tourism investment, in developed as well as developing 
countries (UNCTAD, 2007): 
I. Hotel MNC's have the competitive advantage of intangible assets such as 
managerial and organisational expertise permitting, for example, a consistent 
range and quality of services across locations in many different host countries. 
Associated assets might include globally recognised brand names, access to, 
and use of, global reservation systems, and scale advantages in purchasing 
hotel equipment and other goods and services for customers (UNCTAD, 
2007). 
2. These intangible assets are separable from tangible and capital-intensive ones 
(such as real estate), and can be protected (through contracts and other 
means), thereby facilitating the possibility for non-equity based agreements 
(UNCTAD, 2007). 
3. Non-equity agreements enable the separation of management risk from 
investment risk. According to the UNCTAD (2007) survey interviews, this 
appeals to many MNCs not least because of the relatively high equity-to debt 
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ratio typical in the hotel industry (as high as 50: 50 for some developing 
countries). 
4. Contracts can be sufficiently detailed to cover the design, style and layout of a 
hotel, the size of and equipment in rooms, as well as additional facilities such 
as swimming pools or car parks - features that can influence the quality and 
potential profitability of the hotel (and ensure that the value and reputation of 
a MNC brand is not threatened as in situations where foreign investors do 
not directly own the operations) (UNCTAD, 2007). 
5. A final factor is a host country's policy. In the past, many developing countries 
had a strong preference for control of physical assets, including hotels, on 
their territory. They therefore preferred local ownership, sometimes in joint 
ventures with foreign investors, leading to the establishment of non-equity 
forms. Currently, however, with the liberalisation of FDI policies and intense 
competition for FDI, many countries seek not only the presence of 
international hotel chains, but also capital investment by them. As a result, in a 
more liberal investment climate, companies have a greater choice of the 
modes of entry (UNCTAD, 2007). 
Figure I I: reasons for choosing modes of operation (average ranking in order of importance) 
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Source: UNCTAD (2006) survey cited in UNCTAD (2007) 
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2.4.3 THE APPLICATION OF THE OLI PARADIGM TO. HOTEL FDI 
The ownership aspect deals with the internal strengths of the corporation which 
encompass investment and operational resources, competitive advantages, skills and 
equity. The aspect of locations condition, involves more of the external factors such 
as considering the financial and political risks in various locations and choosing the 
most feasible location or international market to invest in. The internalisation 
advantage considerations determine if direct or indirect foreign investment 
approaches to a particular location is more appropriate. It entails an analysis of the 
cost and benefit factors that are associated with utilising the corporation's resources 
in foreign investments. Low cost and above marginal benefits induces fully equity 
ownership, while high cost and marginal benefits induce indirect investment (joint 
venture, licensing, or contractual agreement) (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). 
The theoretical approach requires a hotel firm to establish an affiliate in a host 
country if three factors come together simultaneously (Dunning & Lundan, 2008): (1) 
if it possesses ownership-specific technological or other advantages which allow it to 
compete effectively with local companies; (2) if there is some benefit to locating in 
the host country (location advantages such as cheap labour, or local assets such as 
"sand, sun and sky" (SSS or 3Ss, for some tourism destinations) (UNCTAD, 2007); 
and (3) if the net benefits of intra-company transactions (i. e. between the company 
and its foreign affiliate (internalisation) outweigh those of an equivalent market 
transaction between the company and a firm in the host country; and according to 
UNCTAD (2007), the third factor (i. e. internationalisation in tourism), occurs much 
less than it does in other economic activities. 
Figure 12 shows FDI decisions in hotels using the OLI framework. It can be noted 
that the-figure is only related to undertaking 'FDI' not management contract nor 
licensing/ franchising. 
According to UNCTAD (2007), when firms only meet the first condition (i. e. 
Ownership); they can rely on exports or licensing/franchising, rather than on FDI, to 
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service a foreign market. And when only, first and second conditions are met (i. e. 
Ownership and Location), firms can use management contract or licensing/ 
franchising to service the market - again, not FDI (UNCTAD, 2007). 
When the first and third (firm-specific) conditions are met (i. e. ownership of 
competitive advantage(s) and benefits of internalisation), then equity investment 
becomes the preferred mode of servicing foreign markets, but only in the presence 
of (host country -specific advantage) (Location-specific advantages) (UNCTAD, 
2007). In this vein, for FDI to occur the only ones that host governments can 
influence directly are those relating to location (UNCTAD, 2007). 
According to UNCTAD (2007), the location-specific factors have a crucial influence 
on which countries will appear on the hotel firms' radar screen. 
Figure 12 applies the OLI approach to the hotel industry in which FDI has been found 
most likely to occur. It shows how the three OLI conditions must occur 
simultaneously. 
As mentioned earlier, the greater incidence of non-equity forms of MNC activities in 
hotel industry is a factor that should be borne in mind when analysing FDI in hotels. 
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2.4.4 DETERMINANTS OF FDI IN HOTELS 
Determinants of FDI in hotels are no- different from other industries (Endo, 2006). 
Such determinants include cultural/ historical/geographical distance, political and/or 
economic risks, level of economic development, socioeconomic environments, 
privatisation of the industry, liberalisation of FDI regime (including restrictions on 
land ownership by foreign investors), taxation, investment incentives, availability and 
quality of hard and soft infrastructures (e. g., electricity and water supply, roads, 
airport facilities, labour costs, local knowledge and capabilities, availability of local 
suppliers), and cooperate strategies or company-specific factors(Endo, 2006). The 
following section sheds some light on the main drivers and barriers to FDI in hotels. 
Figure 13 & Figure 14 below present the key drivers and barriers to undertaking FDI 
in the hotel industry, which have been covered in the literature. 
2.4.4.1 DRIVERS TO FDI IN HOTELS 
A recent survey conducted by UNCTAD (2007), reveals interesting factors that 
influence MNC hotels' choice of location in developing countries. The survey reveals 
that demand (from both developed and developing countries) is key to attracting the 
MNC to a location. This is followed by size and economic growth. Interestingly, the 
survey shows that FDI related regulations and incentives are not important as a 
location determinant. Further, cultural and geographical proximity is moderately 
important to MNC hotels choice of the location in a developing country. 
The following sections briefly cover the main factors that are believed to be of 
importance to MNC hotels when venturing into developing or emerging markets: 
2.4.4.1.1 The Importance of market size and economic activity 
The UNCTAD (2007) survey reveals that economic size and growth rates are 
important reasons for hotel firm choice of location, and this could be indirectly 
affected by government policies and incentives for FDI. 
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Dunning & McQueen (1981) in their seminal work on internationalisation of hotels 
also found in that the size and rate of growth of the tourism sector in a host country 
an important determinant of FDI in the travel business. 
A recent study in locational strategies of hotel investors by Johnson & Vanetti (2005) 
reveals that investors consider size & growth of the economy as well as the size of 
the target city are important determinants of their strategy. An earlier study by 
Dunning & Kundu (1995) also finds that size and growth rate of host economy as 
well as size and nature of the city in host country are of important locational 
determinants for host countries. 
Another study by Newell & Seabrook (2006) on factors influencing hotel investment 
decision-making in Australia, reveals that economies of scale as well as sound 
macroeconomic are considered important in the decision making process. 
In an econometric framework, Kundu & Contractor (1999) have used the size of the 
economy as a determinant to country choice of location in their study on hotel 
internationalisation. They found that the size of the economy is significant and 
positively associate with the hotel MNC choice of location. 
2.4.4.1.2 The Importance of tourism demand 
According to UNCTAD (2007) report, the localisation decisions of hotels depend on 
the extent of tourism demand for a specific destination, as well as its specific 
tourism-related assets (e. g. nature, culture). Responses to the UNCTAD (2007) 
survey indicates that demand from developed-country tourists is the single most 
important factor, although demand from developing countries is also increasingly 
important. 
The concept of tourism demand originated from the classical definition of demand in 
economics, namely the desire to possess a commodity or to make use of a service, 
combined with the ability to purchase it (Song, et al, 2010). 
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Song & Witt (2000) define international tourism demand as "the amount of a set of 
foreign tourist products that consumers are - willing to acquire during a specific period of 
time, and under certain conditions which are-controlled by the explanatory factors used in 
demand theory". 
Tourism demand can be measured in a variety of ways. Kim (1988) as cited in Song, 
et al (2010) categorised the measurement criteria for all types of travel and tourism 
demand into four groups: (I) a doer criterion: including the number of tourist 
arrivals, the number of tourist visits and the visit rate; (2) a pecuniary criterion: for 
instance the level of tourist expenditure (receipts) and share of expenditure 
(receipts) in income; (3) a time-consumed criterion: such as tourist-days, tourist- 
nights; and (4) a distance-travelled criterion: for instance, the distance travelled in 
miles or kilometres. However, the doer criterion and pecuniary criterion dominate 
international tourism demand studies (Song, et al, 2010). Considering statistical 
availability and consistency between data sources, tourist arrivals and tourist 
expenditure (receipts) are the most commonly used tourism demand measures in 
empirical studies (Song, et al, 2010). They also argue that hotel investors rely greatly 
on forecasts of tourist arrivals and that investors are more interested in tourist 
volume that have direct impact on supply capacity of tourism product! service 
suppliers. 
Recent studies by He & Zhu (2010), He, et al (2009) and Rodriguez & Bustillo, (2008) 
have used the number of international tourists as a proxy for tourism demand. They 
found it to be positively and significantly influencing FDI in real estate. He & Zhu 
(2010) and He, et al (2009), investigate FDI in real estate in China, and they believe 
that the number of international tourists can be a driver to international hotel 
investors to be attracted to a market. Similarly, Rodriguez & Bustillo, (2008) found it 
positively and significantly influencing FDI in housing, which is mainly acquired by 
tourists. 
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Kundu & Contractor (1999) study has used tourism receipts as a proxy for tourism 
demand and they found it to be positively and significantly influencing hotel MNC 
location choice. 
It is the intuition that this research employs both variables (i. e. tourism arrivals and 
tourism expenditure). 
2.4.4.1.3 Other drivers 
There are other factors that have been examined in the literature and were 
considered important to hotel operators and investors when considering 
internalisation strategies especially in developing and emerging markets. 
In terms of factors that have been covered in the literature, a recent survey by the 
UNCTAD (2007) reveals a number of interesting factors that are considered 
important for a host country to attract hotel related FDI's, these include, FDI-related 
regulation and incentives, geographic and cultural proximity, tourist assets, as well as 
national stability. 
Another recent study, Johnson & Vanetti (2005) finds that government policy 
towards FDI, tourist attractions, infrastructure as well as culture proximity are 
regarded as key locational factors for hotel investors. An earlier similar study by 
Dunning & Kundu (1995) also finds the general infrastructure, the psychic and 
physical proximity of host country, host government policy towards foreign 
investment as well as political, social and economic stability of host country, are 
considered important factors for a host country to attract hotel related FDI's. 
Other factors have been discovered by Newell & Seabrook (2006), in their study on 
factros influenceong hotel investmnent decision making process, and they found that 
current hotel supply, interest rates, tourist spending patterns, extent market is 
mature or emerging, historical rates of return, economies of scale advantages, 
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geographic diversification, segment diversification as well as regulatory influence to 
be of importance to Australian hotel investors. 
Figure / 3: drivers to FDI in hotels 
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2.4.4.2 BARRIERS TO FDI IN HOTELS 
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Barriers to FDI in hotels can also be divided into both direct and indirect barriers. 
Although there are no previous studies that econometrically examined barriers to 
FDI in hotels, few studies have surveyed hotel investors and operators in this regard. 
For instance, the UNCTAD (2006) cited in UNCTAD (2007) report reveals few 
direct and indirect barriers cited by respondents, for different modes of operation 
including `whole-owned' and `joint venture' modes. 
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As part of the direct barriers, wholly-owned (WO) hotels found problems in 
acquiring land for hotel development. Another problem was reported by a joint 
venture QV) hotel operators was repatriation of profit. Both WO's and JV's found 
weak infrastructure to be a key direct barrier and a problem to their operations. 
On the indirect barriers, WO operators found unpredictable political and economic 
change-and corruption to be of major problems. JV operators reported difficulties in 
raising commercially attractive rates as well as problems in cultural differences when 
dealing with local partners. Both WO and JV operators agreed that weak legal 
system; problems with the administration, political interference as well as the 
weak banking system are considered as major threats to their operations. 
In the UNCTAD (2007) survey, only a small number of hotels reported that 
government policies and incentives for FDI had been an important determinant in 
their location decision. Indeed, Kundu & Contractor, (1999) which has used an index 
of host country business environment which considers the overall investment climate 
rating, comprising a weighted average of political, economic and financial factors, 
found this index insignificant. 
Sequeira & Nunes (2008) tests country risk influence international tourism using a 
dynamic panel data analysis, they proxy country risk by using two variables (i. e. the 
International Country Risk Guide indicator (ICRG) composite index and the ICRG 
Political Risk Index). They found political risk to be a major threat to countries of 
Central and South America, the Middle East and Southern and Eastern Europe, and 
that this risk is the greatest obstacle to their tourism development. 
This also comparable with what has been found by Eilat & Einav (2004) that political 
risk has a significant impact on tourism demand in both development and developing 
countries. 
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2.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter was mainly concerned with international real estate investment and 
investments in hotels. It presented the many forms of investment in commercial real 
estate, and covered the decision-making.. process of investing in international real 
estate. The chapter also critically reviewed theories related to real estate including 
Modern Portfolio Theory and Dunning's Ownership-Locational-Internalisation (OLI) 
framework, and specifically applied the OLI framework to the real estate sector by 
employing the L dimension as explanation to FDI decisions. The chapter also 
provided a comprehensive review of the different factors influencing international 
real estate investments (including economic, political, institutional as well as real 
estate specific factors), to formulate a conceptual framework of the determinants of 
FDI in real estate. 
This chapter also presented foreign direct investment in hotels. The chapter linked 
tourism to the hotel industry, and then presented the most common market entry 
strategies of hotel MNC's including both FDI and non-equity forms of exposure. 
Then, suggested the application of the OLI framework to the hotel industry, by 
employing the L dimension to explain the FDI decisions. The chapter ended by a 
comprehensive review of the different factors influencing internationalisation of hotel 
MNC's, which formulated a framework of the determinants of FDI in the hotel 
sector. 
It was found that not all developing countries receive as much real estate and hotel 
related FDI as they might expect, despite liberalisation efforts and economic reforms. 
Nonetheless, the rising significance of global real estate and hotel related FDI as two 
attractive sectors have encouraged very few researchers to produce literature about 
determinants of these secotoral FDI. However, there are many gaps in the literature 
which led to this research. The major gap is that there are no empirical studies on 
the determinants of commercial real estate and hotel FDI on emerging and 
transitional countries that specifically focus on the MENA region. 
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3. CHAPTER THREE: THE MENA REGION: AN OVERVIEW WITH 
SPECIAL FOCUS ON THE EIGHT SELECTED MENA ECONOMIES 
This chapter provides an overview on the MENA regional economies, with special 
focus on the eight selected economies. The chapter starts by defining the MENA 
region and its fit into the global context. It also provide a review for each selected 
country, in the research sample, covering issues like political and economic structure, 
taxation regimes, main foreign investment laws and regulations as well as the key 
investment risks as seen by leading global advisory firms. 
3.1 THE MENA AND ITS FIT INTO THE GLOBAL CONTEXT 
There are many classifications of worldwide countries, for instance, The World Bank 
uses the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita as the main criterion of classifying 
countries. And then fits the outcomes into three broad categories, the first is by 
Income group, where economies are divided according to GNI per capita, The 
groups are: low income, $995 or less; lower middle income, $996 - $3,945; upper 
middle income, $3,946 - $12,195; and high income, $12,196 or more. At this group, 
Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia fall in the 'lower-middle-income economies' category, 
while Algeria and Turkey fall in the 'upper middle income' group, and UAE, Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar fall in the 'high-income economies' group. 
The second category is the by Geography, (i. e. East Asia and Pacific, Europe and 
Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank only report those countries with 'low- 
income' and `middle-income economies' only. And they refer to them as developing 
economies. Under the MENA group, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia are found 
to be developing in our sample countries. 
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The third category in the World Bank classification is the Lending category, where 
only countries that had a per capita income in 2009 of less than $1,165 are reported. 
None of our sample countries fall in this category. 
Another classification of worldwide countries was introduced by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), which classifies the world countries into two major groups: 
advanced economies and emerging and developing economies, with the latter divided 
into both Not Least Developed (NLD), and Least Developed (LD) countries (See 
Figure 15 below). The classification is not based on strict criteria, economic or 
otherwise, but instead has evolved over time. The advanced economies include 38 
countries from the Euro Area, the Major Advanced Economies (G7), the Newly 
Industrialised Asian Economies as well as other Advanced Economies (Advanced 
Economies excluding G7 and Euro Area) (IMF, 2010). All other countries fall into the 
second group (i. e. emerging and developing countries), with the MENA region in the 
Not Least Developed subgroup (see Figure 15). 
Figure 15: Classification of world countries 
  Advanced economies 
Emerging and developing economies (not least developed) 
  Emerging and developing economies (least developed) 
Source: International Monetary Fund 
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There is no standard definition of the Middle East. The term was used by the British 
in the late 19th century to refer to the Persian Gulf region. By 1950, the Middle East 
included not only Iran, Israel, and the Arab states of Western Asia, but also Cyprus, 
Egypt, and Turkey. The boundaries are sometimes stretched eastward to take in 
Afghanistan and westward as far as Morocco (Farzaneh & Mary, 2007). According to 
(Kamal, 2009), the Middle East is a western concept portraying a region vaguely 
covering a territory with variable geographical parameters. It is flexible and 
extendible territory covers and overlaps into three different continents as it is 
located between the Near East and the Far East. Where the latter is associated with 
countries of Eastern Asia, particularly China, Japan, Mongolia, North and South 
Korea and the former with countries of the Levant (Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Israel, 
and Palestine), Turkey, and in some cases North Africa. 
According to the World Bank, the MENA is an economically diverse region that 
includes both the oil-rich economies in the Gulf and countries that are resource- 
scarce in relation to population, such as Egypt, Morocco, and Yemen. With two- 
thirds of the world's known petroleum reserves, the region's economic and political 
importance far outweighs its population size. It has the world's second-fastest 
growing population, after sub- Saharan Africa. 
Political and religious movements, as well as natural resources, have shaped the 
modern Middle East. In the last 400 years most MENA countries were either part of 
the Ottoman Empire, British protectorates or members of the British 
Commonwealth. Indeed, as recently as the 1960s, the Gulf countries used the 'Gulf 
Rupee', issued by the Reserve Bank of India, as their currency (McKinsey, 2008). 
Islam eventually forged a common cultural and religious bond throughout the region. 
According to Farzaneh & Mary (2007), people of the MENA have long played an 
integral, if sometimes volatile, role in the history of human civilisation. Three of the 
world's major religions originated in the region Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. 
According-to Kamal (2009), Judaism was established first in the MENA region, then 
Christianity, and then Islam. These three religions share the same God, and share 
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most of the prophets, except that Judaism does not believe in Jesus and Mohammad, 
and Christianity does not believe in Mohammad. Islam, on the other hand, believes 
that all the prophets, including Moses, Jesus and Mohammad, are his messengers. In 
recent years, the population is overwhelmingly Islamic, yet includes substantial Jewish 
and Christian minorities. And, while Arabic is the predominant language, two of the 
region's largest countries Iran and Turkey and Israel, are not Arabic-speaking 
(Farzaneh & Mary, 2007). 
The economic and political linkages between the MENA countries date back 
thousands of years, as they have been trading partners throughout history and have 
been governed by the Persian, Ottoman and British Empires and the Caliphate. This 
common history has created shared customs, traditions, languages and religions that 
have stood the test of time and have become a catalyst for expanded economic 
opportunity and growth (McKinsey, 2008). 
In recent years, and as never before has the inflow of financial liquidity into the 
MENA region from hydrocarbons and the availability of skilled labour been so large, 
and never before has economic development in the region been accompanied by 
comprehensive government reforms. According to McKinsey (2008), leaders across 
the MENA region are initiating and implementing reforms that will liberalise the 
economies of their countries. Governments are promoting the role of the private 
sector and foreign investments, while they move towards more regulatory and 
monitoring roles. 
The growing level of financial liquidity is increasingly being invested back into the 
region as both governments and entrepreneurs witness the need for regional 
investments. According to Global Insight (2009), around $2 trillion has been invested 
in the development of the MENA economies in the last ten years. 
The resources of the MENA countries are complementary and diversified, as some 
countries have hydrocarbon wealth, while other countries have large numbers of 
talented labours. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, as well as Algeria 
and to a lesser extent Egypt, account for 99 percent of MENA's total oil and natural 
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gas reserves, while Egypt and Turkey account for 90 percent of the region's 
population (Global Insight, 2009). 
Recently however, MENA countries were diversifying their economies away from 
their natural resources by utilising the concept of 'economic free zones' to attracting 
foreign capital and resources. Essentially economic free zones are geographical areas, 
subject to special rules and regulations, which seek to attract companies by easing 
establishment and by offering various tax and business incentives. There are three 
main elements that make free zones attractive for companies (McKinsey, 2008): 
" Financial incentives: Free zones offer exemptions from corporate and personal 
income tax, as well as from customs and commercial levies that might exist 
elsewhere in the country. 
" Reduced business barriers: Free zones can offer up to 100 percent foreign ownership, 
as well as minimum red tape and quick, hassle-free approval procedures. 
" Supportive infrastructure: Successful free zones offer modern, state-of the- art 
infrastructure in an attractive working environment. 
The GCC alone is home to more than 60 functioning free zones, of which around 20 
are in UAE. The Jebel All Free zone Area (JAFZA), established in 1985 in UAE, is one 
of the largest economic free zones in the world. Starting from a base of 19 
companies, it now accommodates approximately 6,000 companies from over 110 
countries throughout the world. The Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) 
and the Qatar Financial Centre (QFC) are examples of financial free zones, hubs for 
commercial and investment banks and other financial institutions providing services 
including underwriting, private equity and foreign exchange trading. Typically, these 
financial free zones offer licensing services for wholesale and offshore operations and 
services such as information provision and visa application assistance (Zawya, 2009) 
and (Cityscape Intelligence, 2009). 
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The next section provides an overview of each of the selected MENA countries, in 
terms of their political systems, economic structure, investment regulations as well 
as the overall taxation regimes. 
3.2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE SELECTED MENA ECONOMIES 
As mentioned earlier, this research focuses on eight MENA countries (see Figure 
I6). The eight countries analysed are fairly representative of this region. They include 
states in the Mashreq and the Maghreb, oil and non-oil as well as low-oil economies. 
Among them are those with low and others with higher income per capita, 
monarchies and republics. 
Figure I6: The eight MENA selected markets 
Source: developed for this study 
The following sections provide an overview for each selected MENA countries, 
covering their political and economic systems as well as the main rules and regulation 
in relation to foreign investments (if obtainable), taxation and key incentives as well 
as the main investment risks as seen by major international research and advisory 
companies such as EIU and others. 
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3.2.1 ALGERIA 
3.2.1.1 POLITICAL AND ECONOMICAL STRUCTURE IN ALGERIA 
In general, the political systems vary across the sample countries and Algeria is a 
presidential republic. The President of Algeria is the Head of State. Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika has been in office since 1999, currently serving his second 5-year term. 
The Prime Minister, Ahmed Ouyahia, is the Head of Government. The parliament is 
bicameral, consisting of a lower house with 389 members and an upper house with 
144 members (EIU, 2010a). 
In terms of economic structure, Algeria is highly dependent on oil and natural gas, 
which account for more than 95% of all export earnings, and over 38% of 
GDP(Euromonitor International, 2008). Its population is around 34m, making it the 
second-most populous country in North Africa after Egypt. It is classified as a lower- 
middle-income country, with a GDP per head of over US$8,000 (measured using 
purchasing power parity-PPP-exchange rates) in 2008, slightly above the average for 
North Africa (EIU, 201 Oa). 
According to Euromonitor International (2008) report, growth stood still in the 
1990s but was solid in 2001-2007, spurred by oil and gas exports. The non-oil sector 
also performed well during this period and the country's fiscal position was much 
improved. The pace of growth fell in 2009 however. Faced with mounting social 
demands, the government has increased its spending in order to boost employment. 
Booming hydrocarbon exports made it easier to adopt this aggressive approach. The 
non-oil sector accounts for about 98% of all employment. Household consumption 
has seen a long-term rise as a result of increases in salaries and a gradual drop in 
unemployment. While the overall pace of structural reform remains slow, some 
progress has been achieved in trade liberalisation. 
Algeria is opening up to foreign investors and new investment codes are being- 
implemented to motivate these investments. For instance, foreign investors are given 
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a 3-year exemption from the value-added tax on goods and services acquired locally 
or imported, as well as an exemption on property taxes. The incentives are- more 
attractive for companies whose production is export-oriented. The. share of 
production that is exported is exempt from taxes. Furthermore, foreign investors 
settled in the free-trade zones are exempt from taxes and customs duties(McKinsey, 
2008). In 2007, total FDI rose to USD 4 billion, growing from USD 2 billion in 2002. 
Also, partial and total privatisation deals were carried out in Algeria during the same 
period, with several companies in the pipeline for privatisation. These companies 
span a number of industries, including banking, telecommunications, ports and Air 
Algeria (McKinsey, 2008). 
3.2.1.2 TAX INSTRUMENTS IN ALGERIA: 
According to Deloitte International Tax and Business Guides (2010) website, the 
following is the main tax instruments used in Algeria: 
The corporate income tax rate is 25% for companies in the services sector, except in 
the tourism sector where the rate is 19%. The 19% rate also applies to companies in 
the production sector. 
Property tax is charged on developed land; tax holidays may be granted for new 
buildings and those located in specified development areas. A transfer tax is 
applicable to land and buildings at a rate of 5% of the value, plus I% for registration. 
Value-added tax is 17%, with a reduced rate of 7% applying to various basic items or 
where no input tax is recoverable (e. g. construction and internet services). Exports 
are zero-rated. 
As for the withholding taxes for non-residents, the Dividends are taxed I5%, interest 
at 10% and royalties at 24%. 
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The Algerian government provides some tax incentives through its Investment Code, 
which intended to encourage and stimulate productive investments in Algeria, and 
provides certain general guarantees and incentives. Significant incentives include- a 10- 
year corporate tax and property tax exemption. 
3.2.1.3 MAIN INVESTMENT RISK IN ALGERIA 
The following key risks are considered by the Economist Intelligence Unit 
comprehensive country report on Algeria EIU (2010a): 
Political stability risk 
According to the report, political risk is high due to sporadic unrest which persists in 
various areas of the country, stemming from inadequate affordable housing, high 
unemployment and corruption. Opacity of the political system and pervasive 
clientelism also create problems (EIU, 2010a). The moderately reformist president, 
Mr Bouteflika has replaced conservatives in the military and elsewhere with his own 
supporters, but has failed to achieve tangible reform (EIU, 2010a). In November 2008 
he passed constitutional amendments that redefined the role of the prime minister, 
created deputy prime ministers, and allowed the president to stand for and win 
election for a third term in April 2009. 
Government effectiveness risk 
Most of the military elite have probably been convinced of the value of foreign 
investment (as long as it does not impinge on their own retail operations or import 
concessions) (EIU, 2010a). In sectors such as power, water, road-building and 
housing, foreign firms are involved in Build-Own-Operate (BOO)-style projects and 
the process is reasonably transparent (EIU, 2010a). However, more broadly, the 
quality of the bureaucracy is extremely poor and red tape and a reluctance to make 
decisions are major problems (EIU, 2010a). Cronyism is also a plague in government 
departments, certainly in respect of hiring; less so in the award of contracts. The fact 
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that unemployment remains high means that the bureaucracy is unlikely to be 
streamlined in the short term. 
Legal & regulatory risk 
Algeria signed an Association Accord with the EU in December 2001 and has 
officially stated its commitment to join the World Trade Organisation (though 
necessary legislation-on intellectual property rights for example-has not as yet 
been passed, but progress has been made) (EIU, 2010a). Membership would help 
bring transparency to the legal process (EIU, 2010a). However, for the moment the 
proper enforcement of business regulations is subject to political pressure, as well as 
bureaucratic inertia (EIU, 2010a). 
Infrastructure risk 
Algeria's infrastructure risk is high (EIU, 2010a); reflecting an interruption of 
investment during the civil war ravaged 1990s, though the government is investing in 
improvements (EIU, 2010a). The road network is sparse and in disrepair in many 
areas. Until recently, construction and repairs were hampered by the threat of 
Islamist attacks but the government has recently started a vast programme of road- 
upgrading (EIU, 201 Oa). A $2.1 bn rail contract was awarded to a Chinese company in 
July 2009. Water supply is being upgraded, but from a very low base. A severe 
earthquake in May 2003 further debilitated the housing stock (EIU, 201 Oa). 
3.2.2 EGYPT 
3.2.2.1 POLITICAL AND ECONOMICAL STRUCTURE IN EGYPT 
Egypt is a republic with limited democratic features. Direct presidential elections 
were introduced in 2005. The president has full control over policy. The People's 
Assembly (the lower house of parliament) approves policy. Opposition parties have 
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been permitted since 1977, but their formation is tightly controlled and they often 
boycott elections. The largest opposition force is the Muslim Brotherhood, a banned 
Islamist movement. 
Egypt has the largest population in the Arab world, but only the fourth-largest 
economy after Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Algeria. About half of GDP is accounted 
for by services, including public administration, tourism and the Suez Canal. Although 
tourism is vulnerable to political events, it has become increasingly resilient (EIU, 
2008a). 
Manufacturing industries (including oil refining), which are heavily concentrated in the 
capital, Cairo, and the Nile Delta, are also a mainstay of the economy, making up 
around 19% of GDP in 2006/07 (EIU, 2008a). Mining (especially oil and gas 
extraction) is also significant, accounting for 8.6% of GDP in 2006107. There is a large 
informal sector, which the Ministry of Finance estimates represents some 30% of 
total economic activity (EIU, 2008a). 
Liberalisation of the centrally planned, state-dominated economy has resulted in a 
two-tier economy. First, private firms, many of them using foreign technology and 
business practices, staffed by employees with western-level incomes and 
consumption patterns. Most of the rest of the population is employed by the 
government in state-owned enterprises. And a smaller proportion is employed by 
the private sector in small and medium-sized enterprises (EIU, 2009). 
According to the EIU (2009) report, there is significant scope for a rapid acceleration 
of growth through an improvement in skill levels, an increase in efficiency and the 
continued push for a business-friendly environment, which has already begun. Egypt's 
geographical location has facilitated its competitive advantage, as it links Africa and 
Asia and is close to Europe. Further, the Suez Canal is a key conduit for trade 
between Europe and the Mediterranean basin and southern Asia. 
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3.2.2.2 OVERVIEW ON INVESTMENT REGULATIONS 
According to PRS Group (2008) report, the Investment Incentives Law 8 of 1997 was 
designed to encourage domestic and foreign investment in targeted economic 
sectors and to promote decentralisation of industry from the crowded Nile Valley 
area. 
The law and its executive regulations and amendments provide over 20 investment 
incentives. The law allows 100 percent foreign ownership of investment projects and 
guarantees the right to remit income earned in Egypt and to repatriate capital. Other 
key- provisions include: guarantees against confiscation, sequestration, and 
nationalisation; the right to own land; the right to maintain foreign-currency bank 
accounts; freedom from administrative attachment; the right to repatriate capital and 
profits; and equal treatment regardless of nationality. The Income Tax Law enacted 
in June 2005 eliminated some of the incentives in the Investment Incentive Law, 
namely all corporate tax exemptions and tax holidays that the latter law had 
authorised for newly established companies (PRS, 2008). 
Under the Investment Incentives Law, qualifying investments in various fields are 
assured approval, effectively creating a "positive list. " These fields include land 
reclamation; fish, poultry, and animal production; industry and mining; tourism 
(covering hotels, motels, tourist villages, and transportation); maritime 
transportation; refrigerated transportation for agricultural products and processed 
food; air transportation and related services; housing; real estate development; oil 
production and related services; hospitals and medical centres that offer 10 percent 
of their services free of charge; water pumping stations; venture capital; computer 
software production; projects financed by the Social Fund for Development; and 
leasing. Projects in certain fields, however, still require special approval (generally 
security clearance) from relevant ministries. Such projects include: any investments in 
the Sinai and any investments related to military production and related industries 
(PRS, 2008). 
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Procedures for obtaining approval to establish new companies are becoming simpler 
and waiting times shorter than in the past (PRS, 2008). General Authority for 
Investment (GAFI's) "One-stop-shop" interfaces with other government ministries 
on behalf of new investors and provides after-care services for existing companies. 
The One-stop-shop reportedly processes approvals for new investments on average 
within 72 hours (PRS, 2008). 
Land/Real Estate Law 15 of 1963: 
This law explicitly prohibits foreign individual or corporate ownership of agricultural 
land (defined as traditional agricultural land in the Nile Valley, Delta and Oases). 
Prime Ministerial Decree No. 548 for 2005 removed restrictions on foreign property 
ownership in a number of tourist and new urban areas, namely the Red Sea, 
Hurghada, Sidi Abdel-Rahman and Ras Al-Hekma in Matrouh Governorate. Foreign 
individuals are still, however, limited to ownership of a maximum of two residences 
in Egypt. Companies/citizens of other Arab countries have customarily received 
national treatment in this area. 
In April 2005, Egypt revamped the property ownership law to extend identical 
ownership rights and privileges to foreigners as those enjoyed by native Egyptians. 
Ownership follows a freehold model with the only exception being in Sinai, where 
the ownership is based on a 99-year long lease system, usufruct system' (CI Capital, 
2008). 
For foreign investors, the ownership is limited to two residential properties per 
family with a maximum area of 4,000 square-meters. Foreign investors can resale 
their properties but after five years of ownership, but exceptions could take place in 
certain cases. Registering the property can be done after inspection and payments of 
taxes. And as most markets, holding deposit is payable (Cityscape Intelligence, 
2009b). 
The Egyptian legal system provides protection for real and personal property, where 
real estate ownership laws are complicated and it is difficult to establish and trace 
' *Usufruct system: It is the right to use and exploit property belonging to another person. 
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titles to real property. As a priority for 2007, the Ahmed Nazif government (the 
prime minister of Egypt) has modernised the lows on real estate ownership and 
tenancy (PRS, 2008). 
Law No. 83 for 2006, issued in June 2006, amended certain provisions pertaining to 
notarisation fees, which remain high, and the Land Register Law. In June 2006, a new 
Real Estate Tax Law was also passed, decreasing real estate taxes from 40 to 10 
percent of the rental fee and exempting from taxes leases below LE 600 per annum 
(PRS, 2008). But the tax rate will still be controlled and dependant on the division of 
geographical areas into zones based on the quality of real estate and the 
infrastructure and services available (Cityscape Intelligence, 2009b). 
These reforms helped streamlining the process of property purchase in Egypt, 
facilitating the purchases for overseas buyers, and focusing investors' attention on 
Egypt as a prime location for real-estate buyers as well as developers (CI Capital, 
2008). 
Tourism related laws in Egypt 
The tourism subsector is ruled by number of legal instruments as shown in Table 3 
below. The first step for any company or individual wishing to participate in the 
tourism subsector is to register with the ministry of tourism (WTO, 2005). 
Table 3: Legislation applied to the tourism subsector 
Legislation Application 
Law 1/1973 Hotels and tourist constructions, amended as per Law 10211992 
Law 2/1973 Supervision by the Ministry of Tourism of tourist zones and their 
exploitation 
Decree 181/1973 Conditions and procedures of licensing hotel and tourist establishments 
Ministerial Decree 343/1974 Implementation of certain provisions of Law 1/1973 on hotel and tourist 
establishment 
Law 38/ 1977 Reorganisation of tourist companies 
Decree 222/1983 Executive statues of Law 38/1977 
Ministerial Decree 96/1996 Conditions and controls on time-sharing system in hotel establishments 
Ministerial Decree 194/1997 Definition of tourism activities 
Ministerial Decree 99/1999 Regulation and conditions and rules granting authorisation to companies 
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engaging in marine activities and diving 
Ministerial Decree 318/2000 Conditions and rules of licensing scuba-diving centres at hotel and tourist 
establishments 
Prime Minister's Decree Controls on investment guarantees and incentives enjoyment by the 
1034/2002 integral tourist development activity 
Source: WTO (2005) 
Table 4 below shows incentives provided to private investments in the tourism 
sector. The benefits provided by the Investment Guarantees and Incentives Law are 
eligible on both national and foreign investors in addition to special customs 
privileges and incentives for land development(WTO, 2005). 
Table 4: Investment incentives in the tourism industry 
Scheme Exemptions or concessions 
Taxes All tourist establishments except restaurants are exempt from paying taxes for 5 
years in Cairo; 10 years in remote areas; and 20 years in EI Wady El Gedeed 
and Toshka areas, under the Investment Guarantees and Incentives Law 
(8/1997). 
Rebuilding and expansion activities of tourist-related premises are exempt from 
taxes on 50% of income. 
Law 93/1996 allows a reduction up to 75% of fees for tourist and passenger 
ships entering Egyptian ports. 
Customs duties Under Decree 11/1996, all imported equipment, except for restaurants, benefits 
from a reduced customs duty of 5%. 
Limousines with no more than seven seats that are imported by tourism 
transportation companies are subject to a unified custom duty of 5%. 
Alcoholic beverages may be imported by hotels at a rate of 300% duty, instead of 
the usual rates ranging from 1,200% (beer) to 3,000% (spirits). 
Land Law 5/1996 allows ownership or lease of state-owned lands in desert areas. 
acquisition/development 
Low interest loans are provided to developers for infrastructure services, by the 
Tourism Development Authority. 
Law 72/1996 allows the expansion of tourist facilities and exemptions for tourist 
projects. 
The Tourism Development Authority offers land to private developers for a 
nominal rate of US$ I per square metre in designated tourist areas. 
Source: WTO (2005). 
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3.2.2.3 TAX INSTRUMENTS IN EGYPT 
According to Deloitte International Tax and Business Guides (2010) website, the 
following is the main tax instruments used in Egypt: 
Corporate income tax 20% for manufacturing, trading and services companies and 
40.55% for companies engaged in the exploration and production of oil and gas. 
All real property in Egypt is subject to the real estate tax. The tax rate is 10% on the 
annual rental value after allowing a 30% deduction from the rental value to cover 
related costs for residential property and a 32% deduction for non-residential 
property. 
As for transfer taxes, Egypt does not impose any, however Egypt impose a value- 
added tax of 10%. 
As for the withholding taxes for non-residents, the dividends are not taxed, the 
interest is taxed at 20% and royalties are taxed at 20%. 
Concerning tax incentives offered by Egypt, projects established under the Free 
Zone System of the 1997 Investment Law No. 8 enjoy a corporate income tax 
exemption for the term of the specified project 
3.2.2.4 MAIN INVESTMENT RISKS IN EGYPT 
The following key risks are considered by the Economist Intelligence Unit 
comprehensive country report on Egypt, EIU (2010): 
Risk of political instability 
The president, Hosni Mubarak, has been in power for over three decades and the 
country is officially in a permanent state of emergency, introduced after the 
assassination of Mr Mubarak's predecessor, that gives the executive and the security 
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services extensive powers (EIU, 2010). A limited political liberalisation in 2005 has 
largely been reversed and the authorities are likely to be even more intolerant of 
dissent in the run-up to the presidential election in 2011 (EIU, 2010). 
In January 2011, Egypt erupted in mass protests to bring the regime of President 
Hosni Mubarak to a precipice. The revolution in Tunisia earlier in December 2010 
seemed to set fire to decades worth of smoldering grievances against Mr. Mubarak's 
heavyhanded rule. 
According to NYT (2011), the protests began on a Tuesday, Jan. 25. The government 
quickly banned all demonstrations, but on Wednesday the protesters returned and 
clashed with the police in cities across the country. By that Friday Mr. Mubarak had 
called the army into the streets. He ordered his government to resign, but did not 
offer to step down himself. Mr. Mubarak named the head of military intelligence, 
Omar Suleiman, as his new vice president, and the air force chief, Ahmed Shafik, as 
prime minister, in an attempt to shore up support among the military. 
Government effectiveness risk 
Under Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif, the government has been improving its 
effectiveness in managing the economy, but bureaucracy remains a serious constraint 
on growth and a major problem for investors, especially at the local government 
level (EIU, 2010). Significant advances have been made with taxation, tariffs and 
policies towards foreign investors. In the run-up to the controversial 2011 election, 
there is a particular risk that new economic policies that prove unpopular could be 
stalled or reversed (EIU, 2010). 
Legal & regulatory risk 
The legal system is slow and inefficient (EIU, 2010). A significant backlog means that 
cases still require an average of six years to resolve, although the government is 
working hard to improve the legal system. New economic courts, which specialise in 
business matters, started to operate in 2009 and should gradually help speed up 
procedures. The means of punishment at a court's disposal are, in many cases, 
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insufficient and enforcement is weak. The legal system is prone to political influence, 
although less so than other public institutions. There is no evidence that Egyptian 
courts favour local companies over foreign ones in civil disputes. Egypt is signatory to 
most international agreements on arbitration. Businesses are advised to make sure 
that a clause on international arbitration is inserted in all contracts for joint ventures 
or co-operation agreements (EIU, 2010). 
Macroeconomic risk 
Real economic growth in fiscal 2009 (year ending June 30th 2009) was 4.7%, well 
below the 7% average growth in 2006-08, as a result of the global recession. Growth 
is forecast to pick up slightly in fiscal year 2010 to 5.4% as world trade recovers. 
Inflation will remain high, at 10.5% in 2010, although well below its peaking of 23.5% 
in September 2008 (EIU, 2010). The government's fiscal policy is to remain strongly 
expansionary in 2010, despite falling tax receipts, which will lead to a widening of the 
budget deficit to 9.3% of GDP (EIU, 2010). 
Infrastructure risk 
Many aspects of Egypt's infrastructure have improved markedly in recent years (EIU, 
2010). Most of the country is now connected by fairly adequate main roads although 
local routes are often in a poor state of repair (EIU, 2010). Power generation has 
improved considerably with brown-outs less frequent than before. In addition, the 
telecommunications system is increasingly reliable. After years of neglect, the port 
system is being modernised and installations upgraded to allow for faster transactions 
and higher volumes (EIU, 2010). The rail network is in dire need of investment. If the 
government is to improve the railways and roads as well as meet ambitious targets 
for expanding Egypt's infrastructure, it must exploit private financing methods such as 
build-operate-transfer (BOT) (EIU, 2010). The government is also increasingly 
looking into public-private partnerships as a means to bringing in private finance, and 
this will open the door for private sector opportunities in areas as diverse as 
housing, road-building and waste-water management (EIU, 2010). 
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3.2.3 MOROCCO 
3.2.3.1 POLITICAL AND ECONOMICAL STRUCTURE IN MOROCCO 
Morocco gained its independence from France in 1956, with the restoration of the 
Alawi monarchy under King Mohammed V. He was succeeded by King Hassan II in 
1961, the ruler most responsible for building modern Morocco. His reign was 
characterised by a combination of skilful foreign policy and ruthless suppression of 
domestic dissent. The current king, Mohammed VI, came to the throne in July 1999, 
at the age of 36, on the death of his father, King Hassan II. 
In terms of political structure, Morocco is a constitutional monarchy with a 
parliament of two chambers. The Assembly of Representatives has 325 members 
elected for five-year terms, comprising 295 members elected in multi-seat 
constituencies and 30 in national lists consisting only of women. The Assembly of 
Councillors has 270 members, elected for nine-year terms by local councils (162 
seats), professional chambers (91 seats) and wage-earners (27 seats). The prime 
minister is appointed by the monarch. 
Economically, and according to Euromonitor International (2009a) report, agriculture 
provides employment for a substantial portion of the Morocco's workforce (about 
43%). Morocco's vulnerability to erratic rainfall patterns has forced the government 
to search for ways to diversify, particularly towards manufacturing and services 
(including tourism). Policy makers hope to make the agricultural sector more 
resilient to the effects of drought over the medium term. 
Morocco has a strong manufacturing base which is dominated by the textile industry. 
Policies to encourage the development of industries such as communications and 
vehicle manufacture are underway. Morocco's proximity to the EU makes it an 
appealing location for foreign investors from both Europe and the USA (Euromonitor 
International, 2009a). 
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Tourism is the country's second largest earner of foreign exchange and the industry 
employs one out of every ten workers. The opportunities for tourism are substantial 
although the industry is relatively underdeveloped. Investors from the Arabian Gulf 
plan to spend US$14 billion over the next ten years in major tourist destinations 
such as Marrakech. The government has also set aside US$95 million in 2009 for 
development of the tourist industry. Moroccan officials have set a target of 10 million 
visitors by 2010 but that goal may not be met owing to the global recession. The 
number of visitors fell by more than 3% in the first half of 2009 (Euromonitor 
International, 2009a). 
The mineral sector is a mainstay of the economy, producing phosphates, fluorite, 
manganese, cobalt, lead, zinc, copper and antimony. The country is estimated to hold 
three quarters of the world's phosphate reserves (Euromonitor International, 2009a). 
3.2.3.2 TAX INSTRUMENTS IN MOROCCO 
According to Deloitte International Tax and Business Guides (2010) website, the 
following is the main tax instruments used in Morocco: 
Corporate income tax is 30%, with a 37% rate applying to leasing companies and 
credit institutions. 
As for real property tax, there is no specific rate, however, there are other taxes 
such as business tax on legal entities carrying on business activities in Morocco which 
is based on the rental value of buildings, premises, etc., used for the business, and 
levied at rates ranging from 10% to 30% of the rental value. 
Transfer tax is 6% registration duty and a 1% real estate tax are levied at the time 
real property is acquired. 
Value-added tax in Morocco is 20% with reduced rates of 7%, 10% and 14% applying 
to certain transactions. 
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As for the withholding taxes for non-residents, the dividends are taxed at10%, the 
Interest is at 10% and Royalties are taxed at 10%. 
In terms of tax incentives offered by Morocco, incentives include an exemption from 
the business tax for the first 5 years of operations; and an exemption from corporate 
income tax for companies exporting goods and services for the first 5 years of 
operation, with a 50% reduction thereafter on export sales. 
3.2.3.3 MAIN INVESTMENT RISKS IN MOROCCO 
The following key risks are considered by the Economist Intelligence Unit 
comprehensive country report on Morocco, EIU (2010c): 
Security risk 
There is some risk that Moroccan militants could link up with similar groups 
elsewhere in the Maghreb, notably Algeria (EIU, 2010c). There is prospect of an end 
to the long running territorial dispute over the Western Sahara region. The Polisario 
is militarily weaker than Morocco and has only one major international backer, 
Algeria. Organised crime, mainly involving drug smuggling and illegal migration, is 
common, although this does not often impinge on the activities of foreign businesses 
(EIU, 2010c). 
Political stability risk 
The real source of political power is the king, Mohammed VI, who has a firm grip on 
the government. Parliamentary elections in September 2007 passed without major 
incident, although there were widespread allegations of vote rigging. The resulting 
ruling coalition remains fairly weak in terms of initiating policy. The king will 
dominate key decision making even as he encourages modernisation elsewhere. 
Bureaucracy remains heavy, and efforts to cut red tape will be limited by the desire 
to provide jobs. Strikes and social discontent will persist - the result, in part, of the 
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weak economy - but will remain mostly non-violent. With power concentrated in the 
hands of the king, the government is not highly accountable. Restrictions on the 
press have been eased in recent years but some topics (notably the king and the 
status of Western Sahara) remain off-limits, or in the case of the role of Islam in the 
state, remain sensitive with public violations of these boundaries dealt fairly harshly 
(EIU, 2010c). 
Government effectiveness risk, 
According to EIU (2010c) report, government effectiveness risk in Morocco is high. 
Policy execution is not strong: pressures from disparate interest groups have led to 
lengthy delays in the implementation of much-needed economic reforms. The 
government has tried, but has been unable, to address adequately rising poverty, high 
unemployment and high tariffs. The quality of the bureaucracy is not good, although 
the king has pushed forward more dynamic figures to lead several senior government 
departments. Corruption is widespread in most sectors of government and 
bureaucracy. Businesses will see evidence of this in the regulatory and legal systems 
(though the situation is improving), as well as in the trade and customs arenas. The 
judiciary is particularly weak, although the king is keen to address this problem. In 
general, public officials have not been held accountable for their actions, but this is 
beginning to change with several high-profile corruption investigations in recent 
years. Red tape is pervasive (EIU, 2010c). 
Legal & regulatory risk 
The EIU (2010c) report views the legal and regulatory risk as moderate. The 
judiciary is slow-moving and unreliable and plans for reform are likely to be slow 
moving. Foreign companies in Morocco seldom use the local courts, and are more 
likely to resolve disputes through arbitration. The creation of new commercial 
courts has, however, begun to improve the environment for foreign firms. Contracts 
are generally enforced, and there have been no recent instances of the expropriation 
of foreign property. However, competition policy is not well developed, and there 
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are few safeguards against anti-competitive practices. Tax regulations are opaque and 
time consuming. The customs system has been notoriously slow and inefficient, 
although improvements are being made. Intellectual property rights are not well 
enforced although some improvements are being made as a result of the free trade 
accord with the US (implementation began in January 2006). Price controls exist for 
a number of goods, such as fuel products (EIU, 2010c). 
Infrastructure risk 
According to EIU (2010c), infrastructure in Morocco is poor and a major cost to 
business. Although roads are generally adequate, congestion is becoming a concern 
and new roads are not being built as fast as needed. Ports, especially at Casablanca, 
are busy, but upgrading is under way, led by work on the Tangiers-Med deep-water 
port at Clued R'Mel on the Mediterranean coast near the Strait of Gibraltar, which 
will become the second-largest in Morocco after Casablanca. Airport service is 
barely adequate for commercial purposes, and the railways are well below western 
standards. Telecommunications infrastructure has been improving, and is generally 
adequate in major cities. Overall, however, telephone penetration rates are low and 
Internet and computer take-up is lagging. The government has taken some steps to 
improve the supply of housing, arguing that urban deprivation contributes to support 
for radical Islamic political groups. However, bureaucratic inertia has limited progress 
in providing new housing (EIU, 2010c). 
3.2.4 QATAR 
3.2.4.1 POLITICAL AND ECONOMICAL STRUCTURE IN QATAR 
Qatar is an absolute monarchy with Emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, being 
the Head of State and the Head of Government. The Cabinet includes appointed 
ministers and is headed by the Prime Minister, Hamad bin Jassem bin Jabr al-Thani. 
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Under the 2003 constitution, two-thirds elected, 45- member parliament will be 
formed, which will have the power to draw up laws and question ministers. 
In terms of economic structure, Qatar's policy of economic diversification has led to 
a surge in investment in projects for the export of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and 
petrochemicals. Qatar has the world's third largest reserves of natural gas and 
borrowed heavily to fund export facilities that would chill the gas into liquids which 
allow the country to export to previously unreachable markets in Asia, Europe and 
the USA (Euromonitor International, 2009b). 
Gas exports will reach 77 million tonnes in 2010, up from 31 million tonnes in 2005. 
At present, the country's oil and gas industries employ the greater part of the active 
workforce and provide well over 90% of export revenues (Euromonitor 
International, 2009b). 
Qatar also has a limited industrial sector, concentrating on basic materials such as 
cement, steel, ammonia, fertiliser and petrochemicals. Farming is severely restricted 
by a shortage of suitable land. To deal with this issue, the government has created a 
state-backed food security company with US$ I billion in funding. The company has 
already made investments in Sudan and has a presence in Mozambique. The 
international community has growing doubts about the strategy however 
(Euromonitor International, 2009b). 
In the future, Qatar's vast wealth of natural gas will provide a huge boost to wealth 
generation. Inevitably, this development will make the country a major player in 
global financial markets. The state-owned Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) 
continues to grow but in 2008 it was forced to take stakes in local banks to shore up 
liquidity (Euromonitor International, 2009b). 
The government's desire to develop an up-market tourist sector appears to be 
making progress. In addition to luxury hotels, Qatar is spending freely to create 
attractions that will appeal to rich tourists. The government plans to build a new 
waterfront city for 200,000, known as Lusail, and to develop a reclaimed island for 
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luxury living. An international airport will be opened in 2011 at a cost of US$14 
billion. New port and roads are being built along with a rail system linking Doha to 
Lusaid. Altogether, more than US$80 billion will be spend on infrastructure 
development and real estate projects over the next five years (Euromonitor 
International, 2009b). 
3.2.4.2 OVERVIEW ON INVESTMENT REGULATIONS 
According to GMB (2008) the Foreign Capital Investment Law (No. I3), 2000 (the 
Foreign Investment Law) is the main legislative act affecting foreign investment 
protection in Qatar, which offers investors protection from expropriation of their 
investments and the ability to repatriate the profits made from such investments. 
Apart from this law, there are no other acts, decrees or decisions relevant to foreign 
investment protection in the country (GMB, 2008). 
The Foreign Investment Law is generally regulated by the ministry of business and 
trade; however, depending on the nature of the investment, approvals from other 
government authorities may also be required. For instance, if the investment is in the 
form of a manufacturing project, then an industrial licence would be required from 
the ministry of energy and industry. Alternatively, if a tax exemption is being 
requested, approval from the ministry of finance would be required. Usually, such 
applications are by way of a letter rather than a particular form, and approval can 
take up to a few weeks to be granted (GMB, 2008). And according to GMB (2008) 
report, there is no specific agency responsible for facilitating and promoting foreign 
investments. 
Foreign investors obtains all the rights of a juridical person once they have obtained 
the approval to establish a presence in Qatar, including the right to open a bank 
account, to lease property, to engage in trade and business, to borrow money, to 
enter into contracts, etc. The only restraints on them are the restrictions that 
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generally apply to foreigners in the country, such as the inability to purchase land 
outside specified zones (see below). 
Article 8 of the Foreign Investment Law specifically provides that foreign investments 
are not subject to expropriation, whether directly or indirectly, unless the same is 
required for "public utility" (a term that is not defined in the law). 
Article 9 provides for the repatriation of funds, granting full liberty to foreign 
investors to make transfers relating to their investments to and from abroad without 
delay. These transfers include (GMB, 2008): 
" Revenue from their investment(s); 
" Proceeds from the sale or liquidation of an investment; 
" Payments arising from the settlement of disputes relating to an investment; 
and/or 
" Compensation paid in the event of any expropriation. 
Article 10 of the Foreign Investment Law grants foreign investors the freedom to 
transfer investment property to another foreigner or Qatari national (GMB, 2008). 
The Foreign Investment Law, in most circumstances, precludes foreign capital 
investment of more than 49 per cent of the total value of the assets involved, 
including shares and land. Certain sectors can be exempt from the 49 per cent rule 
by way of an application to the ministry of business and trade. These include the 
following sectors (GMB, 2008): 
" Agriculture; 
" Industry; 
" Health; 
" Education; 
" Tourism; 
" Development and utilisation of natural resources; 
" Energy and mining, with preference given to projects that would achieve 
optimum utilisation of locally available raw materials; and 
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" Industries/projects involved in: 
o The export of products; 
o Introducing new products; 
o Employing modern technologies; 
o Localising world-famous industries; and 
o Projects that train and qualify Qatari nationals. 
Nationals of Gulf Cooperation Council countries are also granted a further 
exemption by having the 49 per cent rule increased to a 50 per cent rule (GMB, 
2008). 
Real Estate Law 
Generally, foreign investors are not able to own land in Qatar, but certain zones as 
mentioned above, where the zones grant leasehold rights are: Mushaireb, New Doha, 
Al Ghanem Al Atiq, Al Rifaa, Al Salta, New Al Murqab, Al Dafna, and more(GMB, 
2008) and (Cityscape Intelligence, 2010a). 
There is a privilege for GCC individuals among other nationality in having the 
permission to own up to three properties in residential areas but ownership must be 
for the purpose of accommodation for the owner and his family only (Cityscape 
Intelligence, 201 Oa). 
Other GCC natural persons (individuals) and entities who are licensed to carry on 
economic activities in Qatar may own land for the purposes of pursuing their 
licensed economic activity subject to obtaining Council of Ministers approval. This 
allows ownership of an office or workshop etc; it does not permit buying and selling 
property where this is the business itself. When the business ceases the land must be 
sold. Carrying on economic activities is itself subject to separate foreign investment 
restrictions. And they can fully own land in three areas, namely Lusail, Kharayegh and 
Jabal Thouaileb. Ownership in these three areas does not count towards the three 
areas set out in 3 above - this is separate and there is no restriction in the law on 
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how many properties can be owned in these three areas (Cityscape Intelligence, 
2010a). 
For all other nationalities including GCC nationals, full ownership on lands in certain 
places is given; areas include Pearl, Lusail and AI-Khor resorts. Where in these areas 
no restrictions have been made on the number of properties to be owned. In 
addition to the full ownership, non-GCC nationals can oen shares in Qatari 
companies. Moreover, Non-Qatari nationals may have the right of usufruct for a 
term of 99-years, renewable, in respect of real estate of any description in the above- 
mentioned Investment Areas (Cityscape Intelligence, 201 Oa). 
3.2.4.3 TAX INSTRUMENTS IN QATAR 
According to Deloitte International Tax and Business Guides (2010) website, the 
following is the main tax instruments used in Qatar: 
Concerning corporate income tax in Qatar, the first QAR 100,000 is exempt, with 
subsequent amounts taxed up to 35% (with the top rate levied on income exceeding 
QAR 5 million). Tax is not levied on wholly owned Qatari business. 
Qatar however, does not impose taxations on real property, transfer, value added or 
any withholding taxes for non-residents. 
In terms of tax incentives, Qatar offers few incentives and mainly includes tax 
holidays, foreign capital investment incentives, and incentives related to the Qatar 
Financial Centre and the investment free zone. Companies registered under the 
Financial Centre regime are subject to a flat rate tax of 10%. 
3.2.4.4 MAIN INVESTMENT RISKS IN QATAR 
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The overall business operating risk in Qatar is low (EIU, 2010d). Power remains 
concentrated in the hands of the emir, and plans for the inauguration of a two-thirds 
elected legislature has seemingly been postponed indefinitely. The legal, regulatory 
and tax regimes favour domestic interests but are slowly becoming more even- 
handed. An open trading and payments regime exists. Macroeconomic conditions are 
heavily influenced by oil prices, although the exploitation of Qatar's vast natural gas 
reserves has helped it to lessen this dependence (as gas prices lag fluctuations in oil). 
The currency is pegged to the US dollar at a rate that is unlikely to change until the 
process for convergence towards a gulf single currency is decided. Infrastructure risk 
is low as Qatar has modern road, port and air networks, but the expansion 
programme for all three is struggling to keep pace with demand (EIU, 201 Od). 
The following key risks are considered by the Economist Intelligence Unit 
comprehensive country report on Qatar, EIU (2010d): 
Political stability risk 
Political power remains concentrated in the hands of the emir, Sheikh Hamad bin 
Khalifa al-Thani. Constitutional reforms in the pipeline would devolve some power, 
but even the most radical element, the formation of a partly-elected legislature, is 
limited by various safeguards that ensure that the emir retains overall control over 
the policymaking process (EIU, 2010d). 
Qatar also lacks a tradition of smooth government transition. The last two emirs 
have come to power through palace coups, which, although causing little political or 
social disruption, have raised questions about the succession. However, the Qatari 
population has gained considerably from the emir's economic programme, and social 
unrest is unlikely (EIU, 2010d). 
Government effectiveness risk 
The emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, rules by decree, although in practice his 
authority is somewhat limited by the need to pacify competing factions within the 
ruling family and the interests of the major trading families. The eventual inauguration 
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of a new partly elected Shura Council would ensure greater participation, although, 
even if it is established, all bills will still need emiri ratification. There is a fairly strong 
culture of bureaucracy, with lower-level officials often unwilling to make decisions. 
Red tape is more of a problem than outright bribery and corruption, which has 
declined in recent years (EIU, 2010d). 
Legal &- regulatory risk 
Since 2000 a range of changes to foreign investment regulations has been introduced, 
easing the legal barriers to foreign entry into the market (EIU, 201 Od). The 
government has promised further liberalisation, but change is likely to be slow (EIU, 
201Od). As covered earlier in the previous sections, local laws fully recognise private 
property and contractual rights, and the risk of expropriation is very low, but the 
court system is slow and bureaucratic avenues for dispute resolution are limited. 
There is no effective competition law and, despite some recent improvements, 
intellectual property rights are still not well protected in law or in practice. Utility 
and petrol prices are set by the government, although plans are in place to end the 
government's involvement in utility price-setting (EIU, 201 Od). 
Infrastructure risk 
According to EIU (2010d) report, infrastructure risk in Qatar is relatively low. 
Transport infrastructure roads, ports and airports is adequate and well maintained, 
but capacity is struggling to keep up with demand. Telecommunications are also of a 
high standard, and prices may begin to fall now that Qatar Telecom's monopoly in 
the mobile sector has ended. Internet access is high for the region, but its 
development might be hampered because of political concerns. Power shortages 
have been largely addressed by capacity expansion at one of the country's existing 
power plants and the building of new independent water and power projects 
(IWPPs), but the demands of the industrialisation programme and population growth 
mean that occasional power outages can still occur during the summer months. A 
fourth IWPP is planned for 2011 (EIU, 2010d). 
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3.2.5 SAUDI ARABIA 
3.2.5.1 POLITICAL AND ECONOMICAL STRUCTURE IN KSA 
Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy. King Abdullah bin Abdel-Aziz Al Saud 
ascended to the throne in August 2005. The Council of Ministers holds both 
legislative and executive powers and is headed by the King. A Consultative Council 
was appointed in August 1993. 
In terms of economic structure, oil exports making up around 90-95% of total 
export earnings, 70-80% of state revenues, and around 40% of GDP, Saudi Arabia's 
economy is heavily dependent on its energy sector. Investments in petrochemicals 
have also increased the relative importance of the downstream petroleum sector 
(Euromonitor International, 2010). 
In an effort to diversify, the government has embarked on the biggest 
industrialisation programme ever attempted. The programme includes a series of 
industrial city developments, and the development of investment zones. Despite all 
this government spending, the construction industry is experiencing a dramatic 
contraction as private investors cut back and regional projects are deferred 
(Euromonitor International, 2010). 
The agricultural sector is infinitesimal. The government has tried to buy large 
amounts of fertile land overseas to supply the home market but has run into political 
objections. Opposition to this strategy is growing (Euromonitor International, 2010). 
Saudi Arabia's banking industry, with more than US$290 billion in assets, is one of the 
region's most profitable. One reason is that banks pay no taxes at all. Profitability has 
been hurt by the credit crunch however and falling real estate prices in the region 
(Euromonitor International, 2010). 
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3.2.5.2 OVERVIEW ON INVESTMENT REGULATIONS 
In the past ten years, Saudi Arabia has moved from a relatively closed economy 
dominated by hydrocarbons and a bureaucracy antagonistic to foreign investment, to 
an open economy friendly to foreign direct investment (FDI). 
The Supreme Economic Council enacted the Foreign Investment Act (FIA) in April 
2000, which replaced the much-decried 30-year-old Foreign Capital Investment Act. 
The FIA established a broad framework within which non-Saudis may invest in the 
kingdom in ventures that are minority, majority or 100% foreign owned (EIU, 2009a). 
The FIA aimed to provide equal treatment for non-Saudi firms, stating that a foreign 
venture "shall enjoy all the benefits, incentives and guarantees enjoyed by a national 
project". The FIA includes guarantees on the free repatriation of profits and capital, 
and it provides a clause that foreign-owned assets can be expropriated only in 
exceptional circumstances, in return for full compensation. It offers the right to buy 
property and allows ventures to sponsor their own employees (previously denied to 
100%-foreign-owned ventures). The FIA promised to streamline the investment 
process, committing the state to providing a response to an investment application 
within 30 days from receipt. If no response is forthcoming, then the application is 
approved by default (EIU, 2009a). 
Significantly, the FIA also established the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority 
(SAGIA), a body with the sole responsibility for approving foreign-investment 
projects. This includes a mandate to regulate the investments made by foreign 
entities to ensure consistency with national interests. The SAGIA also has 
responsibility for developing more-detailed legislation to flesh out the framework 
established by the FIA (EIU, 2009a). 
The SAGIA's Investors Service Centres are one-stop shops that facilitate the 
investment process for foreign companies, minimising the number of bureaucratic 
steps required before investment can take place. According to SAGIA, these single- 
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point entities offer 128 government services in all major cities. Nine ministries are 
represented at the Investors Service Centres (EIU, 2009a). 
On February II th 2001 Saudi Arabia's Supreme Economic Council approved a 
"negative list" of economic sectors barred to majority-foreign-owned firms, thus 
clarifying the issue of where in the economy foreigners may invest. The list was 
published as secondary legislation to the FIA and earmarked for annual revision. It is 
also, in the words of the government, to be interpreted "flexibly". Those sectors not 
included on the list should be regarded as legally open to majority-foreign-owned 
companies. However, few foreign companies are in these sectors because of the 
poor business environment, which includes regulatory and labour problems (EIU, 
2009a). 
In April 2009, the list contained 16 sectors (three industrial and 13 service sectors). 
Several of the service sectors still closed to FDI-including defence, health and 
broadcasting-are subject to FDI restrictions in most other countries, even in those 
WTO member nations most vocally in favour of opening service sectors to foreign 
investment. The list was first shortened in February 2003, with the removal of 
insurance, power transmission and distribution, education, and pipeline services (EIU, 
2009a). 
Upon Saudi Arabia rules for real estate; ownership for foreigners is not permitted 
but there are some exceptions (Cityscape Intelligence, 2009). 
Full ownership on lands and properties is granted for Saudi nationals like in any other 
country. Where for GCC nationals there seem to be the same rules of ownership 
granted to Saudi nationals but at present the relevant law has not yet been fully 
implemented. GCC companies on the other hand can have freehold ownership if 
required to carry out their licensed activities with the approval of the Saudi Arabian 
General Investment Authority. Residents in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Non- 
Saudis and Non-GCC nationals) could get permission from the ministry of interior to 
have freehold ownership, where foreign business investors can get licence to own in 
certain circumstances (generally to further their business objectives). The King has 
the right to approve ownership of real estate (Cityscape Intelligence, 2009). 
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In the areas of Makkah and Medina and due to its religious value there- are special 
rules of ownership. Non-Saudi nationals are not permitted to hold freehold, 
easements or usufruct rights over any real estate between the boundaries of those 
clients, unless the estate is endowed to a particular Saudi institution in accordance 
with the Regulations of Sharia (Islamic Law). However, non-Saudis may lease 
property in Mecca and Medinah for a two-year renewable period (Cityscape 
Intelligence, 2009). 
Non-Saudi investors could own real estate for their licensed business after getting 
the approval of the Licensing Authority. This includes property for personal 
residences and workmen's housing (Cityscape Intelligence, 2009). The property may 
also be leased to other entities. If the concerned License allows for the purchase of 
Real Estate or land for construction, investment, and sale or leasing, the total cost of 
the project, both land and construction, will not be less than SR 30 million. The 
Investment will have to be carried out within the first five years of ownership 
(Cityscape Intelligence, 2009). 
3.2. S. 3 TAX INSTRUMENTS IN KSA 
According to Deloitte International Tax and Business Guides (2010) website, the 
following is the main tax instruments used in Saudi Arabia: 
Corporate income tax is 20% on a non-Saudi's share in a resident corporation and 
on income derived by a non-resident from a permanent establishment in Saudi 
Arabia. 30% rate for companies engaged in the exploitation of natural gas sector, and 
85% on taxpayers engaged in the production of oil and hydrocarbons. Zakat is 
assessed at 2.5% on the Zakat base on a Saudi shareholder. 
Saudi Arabia however, does not impose taxations on real property, transfer or value 
added. 
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It however, imposes withholding taxes for non-residents, where dividends are taxed 
at 5%, interest at 5% and royalties at 15%. 
Saudi Arabia does not offer any tax incentives 
3.2.5.4 MAIN INVESTMENT RISKS IN KSA 
The following key risks are considered by the Economist Intelligence Unit 
comprehensive country report on Saudi Arabia (EIU, 201 Oe) 
Political stability risk 
As in many other Middle Eastern countries, one of the main factors keeping the 
ruling family in place is the absence of any clear alternatives (EIU, 2010e). There is no 
elected parliament. Opposition movements are tightly restricted and it is unlikely 
that any could overthrow the government. The Al Saud family will also rely on 
extensive public spending, patronage networks and backing from influential clerics. 
Power is heavily centralised in the hands of a few senior princes, and policymaking is 
constrained by the king's need to accommodate the interests of these princes and of 
senior clerics. Uncertainty over the succession remains an issue, with the king, 
Abdullah bin Abdel-Aziz al-Saud, and the crown prince both in their eighties, and 
given concerns about the crown prince's health (EIU, 2010e). 
Government effectiveness risk 
The global recession and tight financing environment has made the economy yet 
more dependent on the state (EIU, 2010e). There is a long-term process of 
liberalisation and opening to foreign investment underway, but the state will continue 
to play a leading role in the economy and is likely to retain control of the upstream 
oil sector. The government will sometimes favour domestic interests over foreign 
ones (EIU, 201 Oe). The bureaucracy is large and slow, with regulations often unclear. 
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Plans to overhaul the legal system and introduce a new system of specialised courts 
will make slow progress (EIU, 2010e). 
Legal & regulatory risk 
The EIU (2010e) report states that the legal system provides inadequate protection 
for foreign firms and proceedings tend to be insufficiently transparent. Enforcing 
contracts can be difficult, particularly if the local firm in a dispute is linked to the 
royal family. However in 2007 the king announced that specialised commercial courts 
would be set up as part of an overhaul of the judicial system. The appointment of a 
new justice minister and several other senior judicial figures in 2009 should boost 
these efforts but the process is a long-term one. Intellectual property rights and 
private property rights receive some protection (EIU, 2010e). 
Saudi Arabia is a signatory of the New York Convention on International Arbitration 
on Business Disputes on Legal Arbitration. However, this does not guarantee 
protection. The government acknowledges that Saudi courts will not usually 
recognise contractual provisions providing for foreign jurisdiction. Local accounting 
practices are improving (EIU, 2010e). 
Infrastructure risk 
According to EIU (201 Oe), Saudi Arabia has very good ports, airports and roads, but 
maintenance has been a problem. Infrastructure quality varies considerably between 
regions, although there are some efforts to even this out. The rail network will 
undergo expansion over the medium term, with a role for some foreign investment. 
The retail and distribution network functions effectively, but is largely controlled by 
interests opposed to foreign competition. Telecommunications need considerable 
investment given the limited number of land lines and mobile phone access per 
capita, but it is improving rapidly as a result of greater competition and new 
investment by recent market entrants, and broadband internet access is rising 
strongly from a low base. The report states that there is insufficient investment in 
information technology and the government monitors use of the internet. The power 
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and water networks need significant new investment, some of which is already 
underway. However, for the time being, there will be sporadic water shortages in 
some areas (EIU, 201 Oe). 
3.2.6- TUNISIA 
3.2.6.1 POLITICAL AND ECONOMICAL STRUCTURE IN TUNISIA 
Tunisia is a republic with a severely limited democratic system. Zine el-Abidine Ben 
Ali, who became president in 1987, run the country on similarly autocratic lines to 
his predecessor. The 2010-2011 Tunisian protests have forced the president to step 
down from the presidency and fled Tunisia on 14 January 2011 after 23 years in 
power. In the 15' January, 2011, Fouad Mebazaa (parliamentary speaker) is given 60 
days to organise new election. 
In terms of economic structure, Tunisia was once primarily based on agriculture, oil 
and phosphates; recently however, the Tunisian economy has become more diverse, 
with important manufacturing and tourism sectors (EIU, 2008c). Diversification has 
made the economy more resilient to internal and external shocks, such as downturns 
in agriculture caused by drought. Private consumption is a major and rising 
component of GDP, accounting for 63-64% of GDP in recent years. Government 
consumption has remained relatively high at some 15% of GDP, but is trending 
slowly downward. Gross fixed investment rose to 25% of GDP in 2001, but has 
averaged just over 23% in 2003-07, some way below the government's ambitions. 
Exports as a proportion of GDP have risen steadily over the past few years, jumping 
to 54% in 2007 (EIU, 2008c). 
3.2.6.2 TAX INSTRUMENTS IN TUNISIA 
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According to Deloitte International Tax and Business Guides (2010) website, the 
following is the main tax instruments used in Tunisia: 
Corporate income tax is 30%; a 35% rate applies to certain banking and financial 
institutions; investment companies; insurance and reinsurance companies; companies 
operating in the hydrocarbons sector; and factoring companies. A lower rate of 10% 
applies to agricultural and handicraft companies. 
The transfer of real propriety located in Tunisia is subject to various registration 
fees, such as a 5% transfer tax and a I% tax for unregistered buildings. 
As for transfer taxes, the transfer of immovable property generally is subject to a 5% 
registration duty and a 1% duty on registered or unregistered real estate. 
The value-added tax in Tunisia is 18%, with reduced rates of 6% and 12%. Exports are 
zero-rated. 
As for the withholding taxes for non-residents, the dividends are not taxed, and 
interest is taxed at 20% and royalties are taxed at 15%. 
Certain tax incentives are available in Tunisia for new investments mainly in the 
agricultural, industrial, service and tourism sectors. 
3.2.6.3 MAIN INVESTMENT RISKS IN TUNISIA 
The following key risks are considered by the Economist Intelligence Unit 
comprehensive country report on Tunisia (EIU, 2011): 
Political risk 
As mentioned earlier, the 2010-201 I Tunisian protests have forced the president to 
step down from the presidency and fled Tunisia on 14 January 2011 after 23 years in 
power. The departure of the former president, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, has created a 
power vacuum. Members of the opposition parties have already resigned from the 
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new transitional government. There is a high risk of further protests owing to anger 
over members of the former ruling party retaining key positions. 
Currency risk 
EIU (2011) sees currency risk in Tunisia as negative. This is due to the political 
uncertainty which will have a negative impact on foreign direct investment. In 
addition, a widening current-account deficit will put pressure on the Tunisian dinar. 
Banking sector risk 
EIU (2011) report also thinks that banking sector risk is negative. This is due to weak 
economic growth, as a result of the protests, is likely to make it more difficult for 
banks to recover non-performing loans. It is also unclear what will happen with 
ownership in banks by members of the former president's family. 
3.2.7 TURKEY 
3.2.7.1 POLITICAL AND ECONOMICAL STRUCTURE IN TURKEY 
Turkey is a secular Republic. The Head of the State is the president. Legislative 
power is vested in the unicameral parliament (Grand National Assembly) with 550 
members, elected by popular vote. 
Turkey has been a candidate for EU membership since 1999 and negotiations for 
membership opened in 2005 although they stalled in 2006 as a result of Turkey's 
refusal to recognise the Cypriot government and open its ports to Greek Cypriot 
ships; formally they are still continuing (Euromonitor International, 2007). EU 
membership would help maintain political stability and increase prosperity and give 
easier access to EU markets. An optimistic scenario by Euromonitor International 
(2007) sees Turkey as being ready to join in 10 years. However, many current 
members (France's president has been quoted as saying "Turkey has no place in 
Europe") are against Turkish membership, and within Turkey itself enthusiasm 
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amongst the general population has been waning and the reform process has slowed. 
According to Euromonitor International (2007), if Turkey were to become the first 
country to rescind its application then business confidence would clearly suffer. 
In terms of Turkey's economic structure and according to Euromonitor International 
(2010a) report, agriculture accounts for 9.5% of GDP and employs more than a 
quarter of the work force. Major crops include grapes, fruit, barley and cotton. 
There are roughly 3 million farms in Turkey, most of them small family concerns. 
New investments and more favourable weather conditions should result in a better 
performance in 2010. 
Manufacturing makes up 20.1% of GDP. However, output began to contract in the 
first months of 2009 and the slowdown continued beyond the end of the year. 
Textiles are the country's largest industry, accounting for one-third of manufacturing 
employment. Clothing and textiles make up nearly 40% of total exports (most of it to 
the EU). Turkey has become a production hub for the automobile industry with 
investments by Renault, Fiat, Hyundai and Toyota. Production of automobiles and 
parts fell by 22% in 2009 as both domestic and foreign demand weakened. Turkish 
manufacturers face a threat from cheaper competitors based in India and China 
(Euromonitor International, 201 Oa). 
The tourist industry thrived in recent years but the number of visitors stagnated in 
2008 and began to decline in 2009. Tourism accounts for about 9.1 % of GDP but its 
share is expected to fall over the course of the next decade. Reforms to the banking 
system, introduced after the financial crisis in 2001, have strengthened the banking 
system. Ankara continues to push its privatisation programme. The growth of credit 
has slowed but still remains high (Euromonitor International, 2010a). 
Turkey is building a seabed tunnel which will eventually be a key part of a railway link 
from the Middle East to Europe. The tunnel, which will cost US$3.5 billion, is 
expected to open in 2013 (Euromonitor International, 2010a). 
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The Turkish economy has experienced a very sharp recession in 2009 but a recovery 
is forecast for 2010. With investment lagging behind, the country faces serious 
power shortages just as the recovery begins. As many as half of all employed 
workers hold jobs in the informal sector. The result is massive, unquantifiable losses 
in tax revenue. With public debt rising, there is some uncertainty about the country's 
medium-term prospects (Euromonitor International, 201 Oa). 
3.2.7.2 OVERVIEW ON INVESTMENT REGULATIONS 
According to the PSR Group (2009) report, the Turkish government is considered as 
one of the most liberal legal regimes for foreign direct investments, it views FDI as an 
important economical factor to the development and prosperity of the country. 
Generally sectors open for Turkish investors are also open for foreign investors but 
with some exceptions in certain sectors. However, excessive bureaucracy, a slow 
judicial system, high taxes, weaknesses in corporate governance, sometimes 
unpredictable decisions made at the local government level, and frequent changes in 
the legal and regulatory environment are all challenges facing all investors (nationals 
and foreigners) wanting to invest in Turkey (PSR Group, 2009). 
Since 2001, the Turkish government has been implementing a comprehensive 
investment climate reform program. This program aims to streamline all investment- 
related procedures and to attract more FDI to the country. A national platform 
jointly formed by the public and private sectors, the Coordination Council for the 
Improvement of Investment Environment (YOIKK), provides technical guidance for 
issues relating to the investment environment (PSR Group, 2009). 
In 2004 the Investment Advisory Council of Turkey (IAC) was created to provide an 
international perspective for the reform agenda of Turkey. IAC members include 
executives from multinational companies, representatives of international institutions 
such as the IMF, World Bank and EIB, and the heads of Turkish NGOs representing 
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the private sector. The Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, convenes yearly to 
advise the government on the direction of its reform program. The Council's 
recommendations works as a guideline for the YOIKK Platform, and developments 
regarding the Council recommendations are published in the Turkish Treasury's 
annual IAC Progress Reports (PSR Group, 2009). 
In addition to structural reforms, the Investment Promotion Agency (IPA), whose 
main objective is to support new investors throughout the establishment process and 
solve problems that arise after establishment, became much more active in 2007. The 
agency serves as an advocate within the government for reforms that promote 
investment and will work to raise public awareness of the benefits of investment 
(PSR Group, 2009). 
The Turkish law guarantees the free transfer of profits, fees, and royalties, and 
repatriation of capital. This guarantee is reflected in Turkey's 1990 Bilateral 
Investment Treaty (BIT) with the United States, which mandates unrestricted and 
prompt transfer in a freely- usable currency at a legal market-clearing rate for all 
funds related to an investment. There is no difficulty in obtaining foreign exchange, 
and there are no foreign exchange restrictions. As the result of a 1997 court 
decision, however, the Turkish Government has blocked full repatriation of 
investments by oil companies under Article 116 of the 1954 Petroleum Law, which 
protected foreign investors from the impact of lira depreciation. Affected companies 
have challenged the 1997 decision, but lost the case in 2002. Companies expect the 
new Petroleum Law, which the government claims will go before Parliament in 2008, 
to address this problem and to improve the investment environment for oil and gas 
exploration (PSR Group, 2009). 
Under the BIT, expropriation can only occur in accordance with due process of law. 
Expropriations must be for public purpose and non-discriminatory. Compensation 
must be reasonably prompt, adequate, and effective. The BIT ensures that U. S. 
investors have full access to the local court system and the ability to take the host 
government directly to third-party international binding arbitration to settle 
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investment disputes. There is also a provision for state-to-state dispute settlement. 
As a practical matter, the government occasionally expropriates private real property 
for public works or for State Enterprise industrial projects. The government agency 
expropriating the property negotiates and proposes a purchase price. If the owners 
of the property do not agree with the proposed price, they can go to court to 
challenge the expropriation or ask for more compensation. There are no outstanding 
expropriation or nationalisation cases (PSR Group, 2009). 
Private entities may freely establish, acquire, and dispose of interests in business 
enterprises, and foreign participation is permitted up to 100 percent. 
The right of ownership and establishment is fully obtained, as private entities may 
freely establish, acquire, and dispose of interests in business enterprises, and foreign 
participation is permitted up to 100 percent(PSR Group, 2009). 
Secured interests in property, both movable and real, are recognised and enforced. 
There is a reliable system of recording such security interests. For example, there is 
a land registry office where real estate is registered. Turkey's legal system protects 
and facilitates acquisition and disposal of property rights, including land, buildings, and 
mortgages, although some parties have complained that the courts are slow to 
render decisions and that they are susceptible to external influence (PSR Group, 
2009). 
3.2.7.3 TAX INSTRUMENTS IN TURKEY 
According to Deloitte International Tax and Business Guides (2010) website, the 
following is the main tax instruments used in Turkey: 
Corporate income tax is at 20% (30% if a corporate taxpayer chooses to use the 
investment allowance exemption accumulated from prior years). 
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Concerning real property taxes, these are levied based on the value of land or 
buildings. Rates are as follows: 0.2% for buildings in general, 0.1 % for dwellings, 0.1 % 
for land in general; and 0.3% for building sites. The rates are increased by 100% for 
buildings and land located within larger cities. 
Value-added tax is at 18%, with reduced rates of 8% applicable to basic foodstuffs, 
harmaceutical products and other items, and I% for journals, newspapers and certain 
farm products. 
As for the withholding taxes for non-residents, the dividends are taxed at15%, the 
interest at a 10% rate applies to interest paid on loans from non-resident entities 
that do not qualify as "financial entities", and royalties at 20%. 
Turkey also offers various tax incentives, for example, a reduction of up to 90% of 
the corporate income tax rate may be granted on earnings derived from investments 
in specified regions/ cities and sectors. 
3.2.7.4 MAIN INVESTMENT RISKS IN TURKEY 
According to Euromonitor International (201Oa), Turkey is undergoing an upheaval 
both politically and economically. The report predicts that much could still go wrong, 
especially with regard to relations with the EU concerning Cyprus, and Turkey's 
aspirations to join the EU. Among Turkish Kurds unemployment is several times 
higher than the national average. Clashes between Kurds and Turks have worsened 
after the constitutional court voted in December 2009 to ban the largest Kurdish 
party, the Democratic Society Party (Euromonitor International, 201 Oa). 
3.2.8 UNITED ARAB EMIRATIS 
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3.2.8.1 POLITICAL AND ECONOMICAL STRUCTURE IN UAE 
The United Arab Emirates is a federal presidential elected monarchy and was 
established in 1971 as a federation of seven emirates, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras 
al-Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain and Fujairah. The rulers comprise the Federal 
Supreme Council, FSC, which elects the country's President and Vice President at 
five-yearly intervals from amongst its members. Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, 
Ruler of Abu Dhabi, has been President since 1971, and Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid 
Al Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai, has been Vice President (also concurrently Prime 
Minister) since 1990. The Council of Ministers is chosen by the Prime Minister in 
consultation with the President, and is the executive arm of Government. The 
national legislature consists of a unicameral Federal National Council of 20 appointed 
and 20 elected members representing the separate emirates. 
Economically, the UAE has been one of the great success stories of the past decade 
(Cityscape Intelligence, 2010b). From 2003 to 2008 real GDP grew at a compound 
annual growth rate (CAGR) of 8.5%. Sustained economic growth has granted the 
country the position of the second largest economy in the Arab world. As 
contributors of close to 90% of GDP, Dubai and Abu Dhabi lead national growth in 
the non-oil and oil sectors, respectively. Per capita income has climbed past $55,000 
($39,000 at PPP), double that of neighbouring Oman and Saudi Arabia. Over the past 
few years development in the UAE has flourished under high oil prices and the 
resulting private equity boom. Between 2005 and 2008 the country maintained an 
average annual fiscal surplus of 24% of GDP, and gross total reserves stood at $38bn 
at the end of 2008, leaving it well-positioned to fend off the effects of the global 
financial crisis that have now taken hold (EIU, 2009a). 
The UAE holds about 97.8bn barrels in proven oil reserves - the sixth largest in the 
world - as well as 3.5% of global gas reserves. The majority of the nation's 
hydrocarbon wealth is located in Abu Dhabi, and the Abu Dhabi National Oil 
Company (ADNOC) aims to up production capacity to 3.5m barrels a day over the 
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next few years. For now, mandated production cuts from OPEC have thwarted the 
emirate's expansion plans and the country was producing 2.232m bpd as of April, just 
above its official OPEC quota of 2.22m bpd. The International Energy Agency (IEA) 
reports that as of June, oil production had fallen 400,000 bpd since September, 
beyond OPEC's recommended cut of 379,000. The EIU expects budget revenues this 
year to decline by 35% from last year's estimated $78.7bn on the back of lower oil 
prices (Cityscape Intelligence, 2010b). 
The federal and Emirati governments are embarking on an aggressive stimulus 
programme to counteract the global economic downturn. Recovery measures 
include two liquidity-boosting support packages worth AED 120bn ($32.7bn) and a 
guarantee on bank deposits from the Central Bank, and AED 16bn ($4.36bn) from the 
Abu Dhabi government. Altogether, the UAE's fiscal stimulus package amounts to 
about 16% of 2008 GDP (at current prices), the highest proportion amongst 
emerging markets, according to Deutsche Bank (EIU, 2009a). 
In the long-term hydrocarbon wealth will continue to provide much needed liquidity 
to the UAE's economy. At current rates of production - around 900m barrels of oil 
and 50bn cubic metres of natural gas per annum - reserves should last over 100 
years (EIU, 2009a). 
The UAE along with the other GCC states has instituted programs to liberalise and 
privatise the economy, and its development strategy is one of the most outward- 
looking in the region. It has thus far been successful in creating an open, business- 
friendly environment. This has encouraged significant foreign investment particularly 
in service sector activities such as banking and finance, tourism and technology 
(Cityscape Intelligence, 2010b). 
As a collective whole, the UAE has a well-rounded economy, with non-oil growth 
consistently strong as tourism, real estate and financial services gain international 
prominence. The country is also blessed with huge oil and gas reserves and 
hydrocarbons production has been steadily expanding. But taken individually, the 
economy of each emirate shows less diversification. Accordingly, the impact of the 
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global financial crisis has been felt differently in Abu Dhabi, Dubai and the Northern 
Emirates (Cityscape Intelligence, 2010b). 
Deep integration with the global economy is, as illustrated by the events of 2008 and 
2009, a double-edged sword. International connections have greatly contributed to 
the astounding growth of the UAE - and particularly Dubai - over the past few years. 
Such connections also carry risks and, while direct exposure to financial turmoil 
originated in the US was minimal, the country has seen a tightening in credit since 
last September and has suffered the effects of weakening global demand. However it 
is becoming increasingly clear that the UAE and other major players in the GCC are 
far better placed to face global shocks now than they were in the past, and the 
region could in fact have a stabilising role to play in the international recovery 
process. The sovereign wealth funds of Abu Dhabi, for example, were the most 
active players in the SWF field during the first quarter of 2009, investing a total of 
nearly $5bn in various international projects (EIU, 2009a). 
3.2.8.2 OVERVIEW ON INVESTMENT REGULATIONS 
For UAE, this section will only deal with rules related to real estate, as real estate is 
dealt with on an Emirate-by-Emirate basis rather than at a federal level. In another 
words, looking at ownership rules and regulations should be done for each emirate 
individually depending on its rules and not applicable to the whole country. Important 
terminologies to be known before moving forward are the "musataha" and "usufruct" 
which are types of lease referred to in the UAE Civil Code (the Civil Code). The 
Civil Code is a federal law. In the UAE, as is generally the case throughout the GCC, 
a lease is not an "in rem" or land right but is instead an "in personam" or contractual 
right (although musataha and usufruct are generally treated as rights in land) 
(Cityscape Intelligence, 201 Ob). 
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Musataha permits the tenant to use and build on the land for a maximum of 50 years, 
according to the Civil Code. Usufruct permits the tenant to use the land for a 
maximum of 99 years (Cityscape Intelligence, 201 Ob). 
Dubai. 
In- 2006 Dubai Law 7 of 2006 was passed stating that foreigners are permitted to 
own freehold land in certain areas throughout Dubai. For UAE and GCC nationals, 
they have the right to wholly own properties throughout the Emirate of Dubai. 
Where for Non-GCC nationals, they are only permitted to own properties in 
specific freehold areas, examples of projects in these areas are; the Palm Jumeirah, 
The World Islands, Downtown Dubai, the Marina and the Lagoons. Moreover, Lease 
rights can be granted to non-UAE nationals throughout the Emirate of Dubai 
although if they are not in the designated freehold areas there is a risk this will be 
seen as an attempt to circumvent the law (Cityscape Intelligence, 201 Ob). 
Purchaser protection measures that exist in Dubai include the "escrow law", which 
requires developers to place moneys received for off-plan sales in an escrow account 
that can only be spent for specific purposes in relation to the development. It is 
possible to register off plan sales on an interim real estate register. The Real Estate 
Regulatory Agency (RERA) in Dubai is also a key player that regulates the industry 
and influences both developers and purchasers. The recent downturn in property 
prices has led to RERA becoming increasingly involved and passing new regulations 
to try and regulate the market (Cityscape Intelligence, 201 Ob). 
Abu Dhabi 
In Abu Dhabi the law on foreign ownership was passed in 2005. For UAE nationals 
only have the right to wholly own properties throughout the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. 
Where GCC nationals are permitted to own properties inside designated investment 
zones. And non-UAE nationals are permitted to own apartments or floors in 
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buildings in investment zones for up to 99 years on a leasehold basis but without any 
rights to the underlying land and are also permitted to own musataha (building or 
development leases) for a renewable 50-year term in investment zones but without 
any rights to the underlying land, investment zones. At present investment zones 
include Al Raha Beach, Al Reem Island and Saadiyat Island (Cityscape Intelligence, 
2010b). 
Several new laws to protect purchasers are expected in the near future including an 
escrow law and a law setting up a new real estate regulatory body. 
Ajman 
In Ajman two laws were passed in 2008 that relate to registration of property in the 
Emirate. For UAE and GCC nationals, they have the right to wholly own properties 
throughout the Emirate of Ajman. Where for non-GCC nationals (and companies 
owned by them) are permitted to own property with the consent of the Ruler. This 
often applies in certain designated areas only and they are also permitted to own 
long leases with the consent of the Ruler. These leases can be for 50 years, 
renewable with the Ruler's consent (Cityscape Intelligence, 201Ob). 
Purchaser protection measures include a requirement on developers to register the 
projects with the authorities and accept certain responsibilities in relation to 
commencing and completing the project. The new law requires developers to open 
an escrow account to put in moneys from off-plan sales. The Ajman Real Estate 
Regulatory Establishment regulates the real estate market in Ajman (Cityscape 
Intelligence, 201 Ob). 
Ras Al Khaimah 
Ras Al Khaimah is another Emirate that was quick to pass laws allowing foreigners to 
own. For UAE and GCC nationals, they are permitted to wholly own properties 
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throughout the Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah. In 2005 Ras Al Khaimah decreed that 
foreign ownership is permitted in certain areas provided the property is owned 
through a Ras Al Khaimah free zone company. The areas that foreigners may own 
are known as investment areas (Cityscape Intelligence, 201Ob). 
Umm Al Quwain 
A 2006 law set out rights that may be registered on the title. UAE and GCC 
nationals are entitled for wholly ownership on properties throughout the emirate of 
Umm Al Quwain. Umm Al Quwain follows the Abu Dhabi model so foreigners can 
be granted floors and musataha or usufruct in investment zones they are also 
permitted to hold musataha or usufruct for 50 or 99 years respectively in investment 
zones (Cityscape Intelligence, 2010b). 
Sharjah 
At present there are no laws permitting foreign ownership in the Emirate of Sharjah. 
Decisions Nos. 32 and 38 of 2004 provide that UAE and GCC nationals are 
permitted to own property in Sharjah. Other nationalities are not permitted to own 
property without the Ruler's approval. Foreigners can however obtain and register a 
leasehold right in property for a term of up to 25 years(Cityscape Intelligence, 
2010b). 
Fujairah 
At present there are no laws permitting foreign ownership in the Emirate of Fujairah. 
We understand there are plans to implement new laws on this in the future. UAE 
and other GCC nationals are permitted to own property throughout the Emirate of 
Fujairah. Where some exceptions in certain free zones may apply for non-GCC 
nationals ownership permission(Cityscape Intelligence, 201 Ob). 
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3.2.8.3 TAX INSTRUMENTS IN UAE 
According to Deloitte International Tax and Business Guides (2010) website, the 
following is the main tax instruments used in UAE: 
There are no corporate income taxes imposed on the income of companies, except 
for oil and gas companies (50%/55%) and branches of foreign banks (20%). 
Real property taxations mainly about a transfer charge of 2% which is levied on the 
transfer of real property, with the seller paying 0.5% and the buyer 1.5% on the sales 
value. 
UAE (and as the case for Qatar), does not impose taxations on value added or 
withholding taxes for non-residents. 
As for tax incentives, the UAE offers several free trade zones with renewable 50- 
year tax holidays. 
3.2.8.4 MAIN INVESTMENT RISKS IN UAE 
According to EIU (2010b), the UAE is generally a low-risk investment location. 
Specific threats to physical security are very low, but the UAE's strategic location 
along the Gulf poses some security risk. Risks related to political stability are 
moderate given possible tensions associated with succession within the royal families 
and the lack of clarity and transparency associated with the hereditary system of rule. 
With power ultimately concentrated in the hands of the ruling family, the legal and 
regulatory system is vulnerable to insider influence. The long-standing commitment 
to an open trading regime, free flow of capital and a very low tax environment 
reduce operating threats to business in these areas. The UAE's reliance on 
hydrocarbon-export revenue is a key vulnerability given the inherent volatility of 
international prices. In recent years, the diversification of the economic base and the 
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integration of the local population into the labour force have been policy priorities 
(EIU, 2010b). 
3.3 SUMMARY 
This chapter has reviewed the key themes related to the MENA region and it fit in 
the global context. It was found that there is no specific definition for the MENA and 
it is a region full of controversies in terms political and religious dimensions. The 
chapter also reviewed the selected MENA sample countries, and found how they 
differ politically, economically and the way each country view foreign investment via 
their rules, regulations and taxation regimes. 
4. CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains and evaluates the research methodology adopted, and discusses 
how the research aims have influenced the choice of methods used. 
4.2. RESEARCH METHODS 
Once the theoretical framework of the research has been established, the overall 
research methodology and paradigm must be considered. The choice of research 
paradigm depends on the nature of the problem to be investigated. 
There are two traditional methods available to the researcher when developing 
research strategies, namely qualitative research and quantitative research (Creswell 
2009). The decision to adopt a qualitative or quantitative approach is based on which 
approach is the most appropriate to the research question. Berg (2001) differentiates 
between qualitative and quantitative research by identifying qualitative research as 
referring to meanings, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols and 
descriptions of things, whereas quantitative research refers to counts and measures 
of things. Many researchers identify quantitative research with numbers and 
relationships between variables, whereas qualitative research is associated more with 
the exploration of ideas, concepts and meanings (Levy & Henry, 2003). 
Because there are many research methods can be employed to achieve the main aim 
of the research, including interviews, questionnaires as well as constructing and 
estimating econometric models. It was found the econometric modelling best fit the 
research aim and objectives. Although interviews was considered at the early stage of 
this research, as to gauge the attractiveness of the investigated countries to selective 
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foreign investors, however, due to time and cost limitations, it was not possible to 
interview every foreign investor in the globe. 
Questionnaire surveys was another alternative; however, again, it was not so viable 
in terms of answering the research question, as it will need to be distributed on 
global scale targeting foreign investors interested in the MENA region. This process 
is costly and might not get the required reliability out of the data, due to the 
subjectivity nature of responding to questionnaire surveys. For those reasons, 
econometric modelling is sought to best fit this research, and the most suitable 
technique to answer the research questions. 
The next chapter expand on this discussion and will provide critical review on the 
background of econometrics, its tools and techniques, and this research best utilised 
the available tools to achieve the aims of the research. 
4.3 RESEARCH STRATEGY ADOPTED - QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH- 
ECONOMETRIC MODELLING 
As this research focuses on the relationship between commercial real estate FDI and 
hotel FDI with other factors such as political, economical, and social and sector 
specific factors. This requires adopting the quantitative (econometric) strategy to 
establish which factors determine real estate and hotel FDI across the eight selected 
countries. Lee (1998) as cited in (Chin, 2004) defines quantitative research as "an 
empirical research that aims to quantify relationships in the property market, which 
can be employed into the aggregate level (national or regional) or desegregate level 
(particular markets)". In this research, econometric analysis can help to estimate the 
magnitude of the impact between variables (dependent: real estate and hotel FDI; 
independent variables: macroeconomic, political, social and sector specific factors). 
Econometrics is defined as `measurement of economics' (Ruddock, 2008). Hoover 
(2005) explains the term econometrics by referring it mainly to the statistical apex of 
the economic theory-mathematics-statistics triangle, and that statistics is centrally 
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conditioned by economic theory. According to Ruddock (2008) econometrics in 
practice includes all the statistical and mathematical techniques used in the analysis of 
economic data. 
The main target of using these statistical and mathematical tools with economic data 
is to attempt to prove or disprove certain economic propositions or to test or 
develop models (Ruddock, 2008). The objectives of econometrics have been 
classically described by Christ (1966, p. 4) as cited in Ruddock (2008) as: `the 
production of quantitative economic statements that either explain the approaches 
to economic modelling and analysis behaviour of variables we have already seen, or 
forecast (i. e. predict) behaviour that we have not yet seen, or both'. 
According to Hoover (2005), there are at least four roles for econometrics, these 
are: 
" First, econometrics is used to test an implication of a theory. 
" Second, econometrics may be used to measure unknown values of 
theoretically defined parameters or unobservable variables. 
" Third, econometrics may be used to predict the value of a variable. 
" Fourth, econometrics may be used to characterise a relationship or 
phenomenon. 
This research tries to characterise the relationships between the FDI and other 
explanatory factors for the selected MENA economies. And approaching and testing 
any of the above roles requires following a process which is illustrated by Gujarati 
(2004) in Figure 17 below. 
Figure 17: anatomy of econometric modelling 
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Source: Gujarati (2004) with reference to this research at every stage 
According to Gujarati (2004), these traditional econometric methodology proceeds 
along the following lines: 
I. Statement of theory or hypothesis. 
According to Brooks (2008), this stage usually involves the formulation of the 
theoretical framework, or intuition from economic or financial theory that two or 
more variables should be related to one another in a certain way. He notes that the 
theoretical framework or model is unlikely to be able to completely capture every 
relevant real-world phenomenon; however it should present a sufficiently good 
approximation that it is useful for the purpose at hand (Brooks, 2008). 
For instance, the intuition from the literature is that the larger the market size of a 
country, the more chance it will attract more inflow of FDI. 
Figure 17 above shows this stage of the study and how the consulted literature has 
helped in moving forward. For instance, it was found that the OLI paradigm 
developed by Dunning can be employed to best explain the determinants of the 
sectoral FDI. 
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2. Specification of the mathematical model of the theory 
Although the literature postulated a positive relationship between market size and 
inflow of FDI, the literature might not specify the precise form of the functional 
relationship between the two. So the researcher here might assume that the relation 
can take the following form: 
InflowFDI=, ßi+132MSIZE Equation II 
Where, ßi & ßz known as the parameters of the model, are, respectively, the 
intercept and slope coefficients. The slope coefficient ß2 measures the marginal 
market size to inflow FDI. 
According to Gujarati (2004) a model is simply a set of mathematical equations. If the 
model has only one equation, as in the preceding example, it is called a single- 
equation model, whereas if it has more than one equation, it is known as a multiple- 
equation model (Gujarati, 2004). 
3. Specification of the econometric model 
Because the mathematical model (Equation I) of FDI inflow function assumes that 
there is an exact or deterministic relationship between FDI inflow and market size. 
But relationships between economic variables are generally inexact (Gujarati, 2004). 
To allow for the inexact relationships between economic variables, the deterministic 
function (Equation I) would be modified as follows (Gujarati, 2004): 
InflowFDJ= B1+B2MSIZE+ u Equation 2 
Where, u, known as the disturbance, or error, term, is a random (stochastic) 
variable that has well-defined probabilistic properties. The disturbance term u may 
well represent all those factors that affect FDI inflow but are not taken into account 
explicitly (Gujarati, 2004). 
Details of specifying the research models are provided in the next chapter. 
2 In Equation I the variable appearing on the left side of the equality sign is called the dependent variable and 
the variable(s) on the right side are called the independent, or explanatory, variable(s). 
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4. Obtaining the data 
Data is of the crucial importance for economic analysis (Gujarati, 2004). According 
to Brooks (2008) the data required may be available electronically through a financial 
information provider or from published government figures. Alternatively, the 
required data may be available only via a survey after distributing a set of 
questionnaires (i. e. primary data). As for this study, see section 4.7 for more on the 
main sources of data utilised. 
S. Estimation of the parameters of the econometric model 
Once data are collected, the models can be estimated. According to Gujarati (2004) 
the main tool used to obtain estimates is the statistical technique of regression 
analysis (see section 4.3.1 below). 
6. Hypothesis testing 
Once the model is estimated and assuming that the fitted model is a reasonably good 
approximation of reality, Gujarati (2004) points out that it is important to develop 
suitable criteria to observe whether the estimates obtained are in accord with the 
expectations of the theory that is being tested. Such confirmation or refutation of 
economic theories on the basis of sample evidence is based on statistical inference 
(hypothesis testing) (Gujarati, 2004). 
7. Using the model for control or policy purposes. 
Based on the calculations of the model, and as these calculations suggest, an 
estimated model may be used for control, or policy, purposes. By appropriate fiscal 
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and monetary policy mix, the government can manipulate the control variable X to 
produce the desired level of the target variable Y (Gujarati, 2004). 
The econometric modelling process and specification of the models are illustrated in 
more details in the following chapter which discusses in details proxies of the 
relevant explanatory variables based on the literature reviewed and covered in 
chapters two and three. 
The next section discusses the main statistical tool used for estimating the 
econometric models (i. e. regression analysis). 
4.3.1 MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Regression analysis is concerned with the study of the dependence of one variable, 
the dependent variable, on one or more other variables, the explanatory variables, 
with a view to estimating and/or predicting the (population) mean or average value of 
the former in terms of the known or fixed (in repeated sampling) values of the latter 
(Gujarati, 2004). 
Although regression analysis deals with the dependence of one variable on other 
variables, it does not necessarily imply causation (Gujarati, 2004). Closely related to 
but conceptually very much different from regression analysis is correlation analysis, 
where the primary objective is to measure the strength or degree of linear 
association between two variables (Gujarati, 2004). 
According to Gujarati (2004), regression and correlation have some fundamental 
differences, in regression analysis there is an asymmetry in the way the dependent 
and explanatory variables are treated. The dependent variable is assumed to be 
statistical, random, or stochastic, that is, to have a probability distribution. The 
explanatory variables, on the other hand, are assumed to have fixed values (in 
repeated sampling). In correlation analysis, on the other hand, any two variables are 
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treated symmetrically; (i. e. there is no distinction between the dependent and 
explanatory variables) (Gujarati, 2004). According to Wooldridge (2002a), simply 
finding that two variables are correlated is rarely enough to conclude that a change in 
one variable causes a change in another. 
According to Greene (2003), the generic form of the linear regression model is: 
Y= Xlßl+R2ß2+... +XKßK+E 
Where y is the dependent or explained variable and x1,.., xK are the independent or 
explanatory variables. Mainly the theoretical framework will specify f (x1, x2 ..., XK). 
This function is commonly called the population regression equation of y 
on x1, x2 ..., xK. 
The underlying theories will specify the dependent and independent 
variables in the model. 
The term E is a random disturbance, and according to Greene (2003) it has this name 
because it "disturbs" an otherwise stable relationship. Greene (2003) relates the 
disturbance primarily to the inability to capture every influence on an economic 
variable in a model, no matter how elaborate. Thus, the net effect, which can be 
positive or negative, of these omitted factors is captured in the disturbance. 
4.3.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND THE USE OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION 
According to Kelley & Maxwell (2010), multiple regressions can be used for 
prediction, explanation or both. They assert that although that the models are the 
same (i. e. the equation and results will be the same), the distinction is however 
important because different statistical considerations arise for the two purposes. 
They define the explanatory research as the one that aims to identify the causes of 
the outcome variable Y, which can be identified under ideal conditions, by having 
non-zero regression coefficients (Kelley & Maxwell, 2010). 
1341 P age 
And as this research aims at examining the determinants for both commercial real 
estate FDI and hotel FDI, which will be used for policy recommendations, this study 
thus is explanatory in nature. 
4.3.3 APPROACHES TO THE SELECTION OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
According to Kelley & Maxwell (2010), multiple regression can be applied along two 
continuums of research approaches namely confirmatory and exploratory research. 
They relate the confirmatory anchor to the situation of a well-defined research 
question with a few theoretically justified variables, whereas relate the exploratory 
anchor to a diffuse research question with many variables included in one or more 
different analyses without explicit theoretical justification. 
In this research, the process of selecting the variables is based on both a theoretical 
as well as pragmatic views. Granger (2009) states that while performing an 
econometric analysis it is usual to reach a point where there is a choice between the 
'correct' but lengthy, and often expensive, procedure or a quick but sub-optimal 
'pragmatic' method. He also asserts if time or costs are of major importance the 
pragmatic method will be chosen but otherwise the lengthy, correct method will be 
used. Granger (2009) also thinks the two methods could produce similar results. He 
illustrates these situations as follows: 
" If the purpose of the model is to test the correctness of some theory, then a 
pragmatic model may only be appropriate when discussing alternatives. 
" If the purpose of the model is to directly help a decision maker to make a 
decision, then a pragmatic approach is likely to be helpful. 
" The purpose of the model may be for forecasting. Pragmatic models will be 
appropriate for inclusion in the set of models as they may use incomplete and/or 
very recent data. 
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This research therefore, follows the pragmatic approach, since there is no unanimous 
accepted theory of commercial real estate FDI or hotel FDI, thus this research uses a 
pragmatic approach in selecting the explanatory variables to be included in the 
models, as well as utilising the OLI framework as a guide to selecting the explanatory 
variables. 
4.4 TYPES OF DATA 
According to Brooks (2008), there are broadly three types of data that can be 
employed in quantitative analysis of economic problems: time series data, cross- 
sectional data, and panel data. 
4.4.1 TIME SERIES DATA 
According to Wooldridge (2002a), a time series data set consists of observations on 
a variable or several variables over time. Brooks (2008) defines time series data as 
data that have been collected over a period of time on one or more variables and 
that time series data have associated with them a particular frequency of observation 
or collection of data points. The frequency is simply a measure of the interval over, 
or the regularity with which, the data are collected or recorded (Brooks, 2008). 
Wooldridge (2002a) indicates that past events can influence future events and lags in 
behaviour are prevalent in the social sciences and that time is an important 
dimension in a time series data set, which unlike the cross-sectional data, the 
chronological ordering of observations in a time series conveys potentially important 
information. 
According to Wooldridge (2002a), a key feature of time series data that makes it 
more difficult to analyse than cross-sectional data is the fact that economic 
observations can rarely, if ever, be assumed to be independent across time. 
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4.4.2 CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA 
Cross-sectional data are data on one or more variables collected at a single point in 
time (Brooks, 2008). According to Wooldridge (2002a), sometimes the data on all 
units do not correspond to precisely the same time period. 
Wooldridge (2002a) also points out an important feature of cross-sectional data, 
which is it can be assumed that they have been obtained by random sampling from 
the underlying population. 
4.4.3 PANEL DATA 
According to Brooks (2008), panel data (or longitudinal data) have the dimensions of 
both time series and cross-sections. 
For time series data, it is usual to denote the individual observation numbers using 
the index t, and the total number of observations available for analysis by T. For 
cross-sectional data, the individual observation numbers are indicated using the index 
i, and the total number of observations available for analysis by N. Note that there is, 
in contrast to the time series case, no natural ordering of the observations in a 
cross-sectional sample (Brooks, 2008). 
According to Wooldridge (2002a), the key feature of panel data that distinguishes it 
from a pooled cross section is that the same cross-sectional units (individuals, firms, 
or counties) are followed over a given time period. A second feature of panel data is 
that it allows studying the importance of lags in behaviour or the result of decision 
making. This information can be significant since many economic policies can be 
expected to have an impact only after some time has passed (Wooldridge, 2002a). 
4.5 FORMS OF PANEL DATA ECONOMETRICS 
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According to Baltagi, (2005), the functional form of panel data econometrics is as 
follows; 
Yt =a+ ßlitXlit ++ ßxitXxit +e 
i=N 
t=1,2,..., T 
As it can be seen in the functional form of panel data econometrics, t denotes for the 
time and i denotes for the cross-sections. In this equation, an individual effect exists. 
This effect cannot be observed by independent variables and does not change 
depending on time, but includes characteristics peculiar to sections (Baltagi, 2005). 
In panel data econometrics, the next step after converting cross-sectional data and 
time series data to the panel system is to determine if the cross-section and period 
effects can be explained by the fixed effects model or the random-effects model 
(Gujarati, 2004). 
The fixed effects model creates a different fixed value for each cross-sectional unit 
(Baltagi, 2005). In the fixed effects model, it is assumed that the slope coefficients do 
not change, but fixed coefficients show differences among only cross-sectional data 
or time data or among both types of data (Baltagi, 2005). If the differentiation occurs 
only depending on time, these types of models are named as one-way time 
dependent fixed effect models. If a differentiation occurs in panel data depending on 
both time and section, these models are named as two-way fixed effects model 
(Baltagi, 2005). 
According to Baltagi (2005), most of the panel data applications utilise a one-way 
error component model for the disturbances, with 
utt = Pi + vtt 
Where ii denotes the unobservable individual-specific effect and vit denotes the 
remainder disturbance. 
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4.5.1 CENSORED PANEL DATA MODEL 
A limited dependent variable is a variable whose range is restricted in some 
important way. According to Wooldridge (2002), most variables encountered in 
economics are limited in range, but not all require special treatment. 
Censored regression models generally apply when the variable to be explained is 
partly continuous but has positive probability mass at one or more points 
(Wooldridge, 2002 p. 517). In a panel data context, the censored regression model 
may be described by Honore & Kyriazidou (2000): 
Yct = xit ß+ ai + eit 
Yit = max{0, Yit) 
These equations constitute what is known as the standard censored Tobit model 
(after Tobin, 1956) or type I Tobit model. Where, xit is a k-dimensional vector of 
explanatory variables, # is the parameter vector of interest, ai is the individual 
specific (fixed) effect, and Ect is the error term. In this model, the dependent variable 
is observed only if it is above a certain - known - fixed threshold, i. e. '0'. 
The next chapter discusses in details the employment of the Tobit model when 
analysing the determinants of FDI in CRE and hotel sectors. 
4.6 STATISTICAL PACKAGE 
The number of available packages is large, and over time, all packages have improved 
in breadth of available techniques, and have also converged in terms of what is 
available in each package (Brooks, 2008). 
The main criteria for choosing the software were about its ability to conduct the 
sophisticated pooled Tobit regressions as well as essentially its availability at LJMU. 
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The EViews version '6' therefore, is employed in this research for two reasons; (1) 
because it is available at LJMU; (2) it provides sophisticated data analysis as well as 
regression tools and techniques required to undertake the current econometric 
study (e. g. it estimates the pooled Tobit censored model). 
EViews provides support to read from or write to various file types, including 'ASCII' 
(text) files, Microsoft Excel '. XLS' files (reading from any named sheet in the Excel 
workbook), and Lotus '. WKS I' and '. WKS3' files. And because it is usually easiest to 
work directly with Excel files, this is the case throughout this research. 
4.7 THE SOURCES OF DATA 
One of biggest hurdle in empirical research is data availability. The current study has 
also not escaped from this problem. Moreover, in the social sciences, the data are 
non-experimental in nature, that is, not subject to the control of the researcher. For 
example, the data on GDP, unemployment, FDI flows, etc., are not directly under the 
control of the researcher, and thus may be subject to certain biases and cannot be 
avoided in econometrics studies. However, in this research, and following the 
literature, the most reliable and well known sources are used. 
This research employs several data sources in constructing the panel covering eight 
MENA countries over the years 2003-2009, a timeframe not studied by previous 
empirical work on hotel and commercial real estate investments in this region. 
Data on the dependent variable were acquired (at a cost) from a private organisation 
(fDi Intelligence) part of Financial Times Ltd. 
fDi Intelligence database tracks an estimated 95% of all major global FDI greenfield 
projects as well as 80% of smaller projects and is considered the most 
comprehensive independent source for FDI information. The information is based on 
press reports thus the data can be taken as investment commitments. They refer to 
individual investment projects by source and destination country which are then 
added up to countries and regions. 
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In particular, fDi Intelligence database provide the following quarterly information for 
approximately 95% deals in the eight Middle Eastern countries in commercial real 
estate and hotel related projects between January, 2003 and May, 2010 (Table 5): 
Table 5: Information embedded in fDi Intelligence database 
Project Year Source Region Jobs Created 
Project Quarter 
Parent 
Investor 
Parent Turnover 
Investor Turnover 
Website 
Parent Profile 
Investor Profile 
Source Country 
Source State 
Source Admin Region 
Source City 
Destination Region 
Destination Country 
Destination State 
Destination City 
Jobs Generated 
Investment 
Investment Generated 
Cluster 
Sector 
Technology 
Function 
Activity Description 
Project Type 
Site Area 
It must be noted that fDi Intelligence greenfield projects data differ principally and 
significantly from the FDI data reported in the balance of payments (Hunya & 
Stöllinger, 2009). While balance of payments data are published with one or two 
years delay and are backward looking, the fDi database is continuously updated and it 
is forward looking. It is also important to note that greenfield data tracks the total 
capital amount companies are committing to invest overseas, and thus it this initial 
commitment do not necessarily reflect final investment and/ or the actual capital 
flown (Loewendahl, 2009). 
Furthermore, one significant deficiency with this data set is that, since investors do 
not have to announce the value of the investment, not all projects have actual values 
attached to them. Specifically, only 15% of the investments for the sample period 
have an actual `announced' value attached to them. The remaining 85% have 
estimated values, and as claimed by fDi Intelligence, these values are derived using 
econometric modelling. 
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In another vein, for some countries a value of zero is assigned if no projects are 
announced in a given year. 
The data for the rest of the variables in the study have been drawn from two 
principal types of sources (see : 
I. International Agency Databases: the major sources of data for the 
empirical work are the World Development Indicators (World Bank), Doing 
Business Database (World Bank), the World Travel and Tourism Council 
(WTTC), World Economic Forum and United Nations Development 
Programme. 
2. Independent providers of business intelligence: other data were 
collected from sources such as Economist Intelligence Unit, Datamonitor, 
Euromonitor International, the Heritage Foundation and Jones Lang LaSalle. 
Table 6: main sources of data for variables selected in this study 
FDI in CRE related Source FDI in Hotels related Sources 
variables Variables 
CRE FD1 fDi Intelligence (Financial Hotel FDI fDi Intelligence (Financial 
Times Ltd) Times Ltd) 
Size of institutional Euromonitor International Real visitor export World Travel and Tourism 
real estate market Council WTTC 
Gross Domestic Euromonitor International Tourist Arrival World Travel & Tourism 
Product (GDP) Council (WTTC) 
Unemployment growth Euromonitor International Gross Domestic Euromonitor International 
levels Product (GDP) 
Overall quality of World Economic Forum Overall quality of World Economic Forum 
infrastructure Global Competiveness infrastructure Global Competiveness 
Report Report 
Real Estate Investment various media sources Total tax rates The World Bank (Doing 
Trusts (REIT) Business Database) 
1421 Pd 
Real estate market 
transparency levels 
Corruption (control of 
corruption) 
Government 
effectiveness 
(bureaucratic quality) 
Regulatory quality 
(investment profile) 
Rule of law (law and 
order) 
Voice and 
accountability 
Political stability and 
absence of violence 
Levels of investors 
protection 
Total tax rates 
Levels of human 
development 
Property rights 
Investment freedom 
Jones Lang LaSalle Global 
Real Estate Transparency 
Index 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
The World Bank (Doing 
Business Database) 
The World Bank (Doing 
Business Database) 
Human Development 
Index: 
Heritage Foundation 
(Index of Economic 
Freedom) 
Heritage Foundation 
(Index of Economic 
Freedom) 
Corruption (control of 
corruption) 
Government 
effectiveness 
(bureaucratic quality) 
Regulatory quality 
(investment profile) 
Rule of law (law and 
order) 
Voice and 
accountability 
Political stability and 
absence of violence 
Levels of investors 
protection 
Levels of human 
development 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
The World Bank (Doing 
Business Database) 
Human Development 
Index: 
http: //hdr. undp. org/en/stati 
sties/data 
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4.8 SUMMARY 
The chapter explained and evaluated 'econometric modelling' as the research 
methodology adopted, and discussed how the research aims have influenced the 
choice of this method. The econometric analysis was carried out by different panel 
data procedures to test the hypotheses of the study. As the dependant variables in 
both the CRE and hotel FDI, contained zero observations, the econometric analysis 
has to be done using a corner solution called the Tobit model, which censors these 
zero observations to avoid the biasness and inconsistency that may arise from using 
OLS regressions. 
The chapter also presented the sources of data consulted in formulating the models. 
A specific focus has been given to the main source for the dependant variables (i. e. 
Di Intelligence), and its strength and weaknesses. 
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5. CHAPTER FIVE: DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND 
DISCUSSION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first is concerned with the 
exploratory study and its influence on the research. The second section characterises 
the FDI in both sectors by refereeing to the fDi Intelligence database and reviewing 
the most interesting patterns observed in the data. The third section details the 
quantitative empirical analysis of the determinants of FDI in commercial real estate in 
the eight MENA markets based on the results of econometric modelling. The last 
section presents the empirical results from assessments of determinants of FDI in 
hotels in the selected MENA economies. 
S. 2 EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS 
The scope of the exploratory stage was to capture the parameters (motivations and 
barriers) to international property investments (hotels were not part of the 
exploratory study). It also aimed to examine the attractiveness of global property 
investors to the MENA region. The target group was real estate investment 
managers that are already managing diversified portfolios and funds in emerging 
markets. Investment management firms are an important stakeholder group in the 
investment decision-making process, providing information and research directly to 
investors. They were considered the stakeholder group most qualified to provide us 
with the best factors of most importance to global investors when venturing into 
emerging markets as well as their vision upon the MENA region. 
In order to facilitate reflection upon and analysis of the data, all interviews were, with 
the agreement of the respondents, recorded and subsequently transcribed. 
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The interview analysis started with over twenty pages of transcribed data. The 
researcher started getting familiar with the data by reading through the data several 
times and making notes and memos. Through these notes, and the notes have been 
made during the conversation sessions, the researcher was able to find the most 
interesting issues from the data. 
In order to create the physical structure for the data, the researcher computerised 
it. The researcher used computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software, NVivo 
version 2, which helped to manage the available set of data. 
The researcher started the open coding after the interviews had been conducted. 
The researcher transcribed all the interviews material and re-read the transcriptions 
several times in order to identify the passages that fitted any probable conceptual 
elements. The researcher used open coding to break down the extracts into distinct 
units of meaning. In much the same way as Strauss and Corbin (1990) suggested. The 
researcher was therefore able to identify more general and unspecified categories. 
A formal open-coding procedure was conducted on each selected interview extract, 
involving the search for key words and line by line coding (Table 7) with a view to 
connect them to conceptual themes. Surely, the broad literature review proved 
useful here. 
Table 7: Example of coding of an interview statement 
Interview statement Line-by-line coding 
[... ] in Saudi Arabia 50% of the population are below 25, and 5 children per 14 9 Demographics 
capita, there is big big need. Here comes the need for real estate, first 14 1 Need for real 
residential, [... ] they will look for decent jobs, then they will need office space, estate 
[... ] the people will spend more, for residential property as they will also spend 14 1 Need for real 
it for shopping, so you need retail. estate 
As for the second level analysis, open coding yielded concepts that were later 
grouped and turned into categories. The researcher identified, named, categorised 
and described phenomena found in the data. In fact, three large groups of themes 
seemed to emerge (see below). 
146IPage 
This led to the third level of abstraction. The data reduction and open coding were 
iteratively connected. The goal of this iteration procedure was to include all probable 
conceptual elements in a single analysis in order to deepen the interpretation. 
This resulted in 12 provisional categories (i. e. conceptual themes) from the whole 
data (see Table 8 below). 
The three emerged themes were investment strategies employed at emerging 
markets, the cross border barriers to investing in the MENA and the potential of the 
MENA real estate markets as investable markets. At this point, these theoretical 
elements seemed sufficient. 
Those themes were clear as the respondents gave enough factual and consistent 
information (see Table 8) that shows a first effort of categorising the concepts, taking 
into account the literature discussed earlier. 
The findings of the analysis are presented in the next section. The presentation of 
findings is organised into three broad sections, covering investment strategies, the 
cross border barriers to MENA real estate markets and the potential of MENA 
markets as investable markets. The next section gives an essential insight into the 
qualitative analysis undertaken. The detail in this format is presented in Appendix 6. 
5.2.1 INVESTMENT STRATEGIES IN EMERGING MARKETS 
Appendix 6.1 summarises the key transcripts in relation to investment strategies 
adopted by global investors in emerging markets. Obviously, and as mentioned 
earlier in the literature, economic, political and demographic analysis must be 
undertaken to decide on the potential of a specific emerging market. 
Appendix 6.3 also shows the 'asset allocation system' adopted by one of the 
companies, it shows that investors start with a neutral basis allocation and each 
investment location is then assessed with the help of the 'scoring model' and 
weighted accordingly. 
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Table 8: Defining broad categories 
NVivo revision 2.0.161 
Project MSPROOI User. Administrator Date: 08/0712009 - 08: 14: 56 
NODE LISTING 
Nodes in Set All Nodes 
Number of Nodes: 16 
Number of Nodes: 16 
I Investment Strategy in emerging markets 
2 (13) /Cross border barriers to MENA 
3 (13 1) /Cross border barriers to MENA /Lack of sophistication 
4 (13 3) /Cross border barriers to MENA ! Transparency, 
5 (13 3 2) /Cross border barriers to MENA ITransparencylFinding appropriate local partners 
6 (13 3 4) /Cross border barriers to MENA ITransparency. /Property Data 
7 (13 5) /Cross border barriers to MENA /Market size 
8 (13 6) /Cross border barriers to MENA /Sharia Structuring 
9 (137) /Cross border barriers to MENA /Language 
10 (13 8) /Cross border barriers to MENA /Standing investments 
II (13 12) /Cross border barriers to MENA /Investment Return 
12 (14) / MENA Potential as investable markets 
13 (14 1)/ MENA Potential as investable markets/Need for real estate 
14 (14 9) / MENA Potential as investable markets/Demographics 
I5 (14 10) / MENA Potential as investable markets/Economy 
16 (14 11) 1 MENA Potential as investable markets/Construction 
The scoring model is also provided by the company (see Appendix 6.4), the company 
uses the scoring model for any prospective target allocation, and this must take into 
account economic, political, and demographic as well as real estate market specific 
risks and opportunities, which reflects what have been covered in the literature. 
The inputs to the scoring model are provided by worldwide operating research-team 
(top-down) as well as by real estate professionals on site (bottom-up) (See Appendix 
6.4 for details). The decision making process is found comparable to what has been 
found in Fuchs & Scharmanski (2009). 
5.2.2- CROSS-BORDER BARRIERS TO MENA REAL ESTATE MARKETS 
In this section, the focus was on the MENA market, and the key reasons of avoiding 
this region. The researcher approach this topic from several directions trying to start 
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with other emerging markets, and the risks investors find there, supported by 
examples, and then to focus on the MENA by analysing possible triggers for avoiding 
this region. 
As mentioned earlier this category had seven children (Table 9), (also see Appendix 
6.2 for detail transcripts): 
Table 9: Cross-border barriers to MENA real estate markets (Tree and Children) 
In response to a question that bordered on key cross-border barriers in most 
emerging markets including MENA real estate markets, all the respondents identified 
transparency to be one of the most important factors that affect their decisions to 
invest in emerging real estate markets. One respondent had this to say: The keyword 
here is market transparency. Indeed, Table 10 below confirms the view of the 
respondent as it shows the transparency position of MENA real estate markets 
compared to other peer markets based on the Jones Lang LaSalle real estate 
transparency index (2008). One respondent observed: `I think the Jones Lang survey is 
a good model for transparency, you simply look at the JL transparency data 
By examining JLL transparency data, noticeably, there is no any MENA market that is 
ranked highly transparent (tier I) or even transparent (tier 2). However, some of 
MENA markets are now more transparent than those of China tiers I&2 as well as 
India tiers I, 2&3, which are recently considered as favourite destinations of global 
funds. Table II below also shows that some of MENA countries are in the process 
of improving their transparency by providing strong measures at all levels to attract 
foreign investors. 
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Respondents also relate market transparency to two other issues, availability of 
historical property data and finding the appropriate local partner to venture and 
invest with. Here, respondents were discussing how they deal with lack of property 
data. One respondent states "obviously you would like to see what this market already 
does, ... you would love to see data on the-historical markets which we do not get, ... hence 
derive real estate data out of these data, and that's obviously has an error. I don't know 
plus or minus 20% or so, huge error margin". Indeed, JLL (2008) report states that the 
limited availability of reliable property market indices is a major constraint on the 
transparency of the Middle Eastern real estate markets and remains a threat to global 
investors (also see Appendix 5 for information on major real estate data providers in 
the MENA region). 
In addition, respondents were discussing other key cross border barriers to the 
MENA region, one respondent stated "also a key issue is introducing European banks to 
Sharia structuring for the financing, a lot of them aren't used to them, a lot of the law firms 
that we're using in Turkey haven't been really involved in that, so there were quite a big 
education process for everybody, every European bank we got have to have a lesson in 
Sharia structuring". 
Another respondent observed "a big issue we're facing in emerging markets is essentially 
the lack of sophistication, when you talk about gross yield, let yield, cap rote, they simply 
don't know what it is, and they simply say the property how much it pay, we saw it even in 
Dubai, that is supposed to be at the frontline of the Middle Easy we've been trying to do 
institutional lease contract, people didn't understand, they say why do you need a 20 page 
lease contract, here is the space, here is the rent, period. And that's obviously something 
that threatening institutional investors and they then saying why do we go to such a market" 
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Table 10: Transparency of MENA markets 
Table I l: World's most improved markets 
Source: JLL (2008) 
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One respondent added "Also when you look at these markets, you need to consider the 
market size, that's perhaps for very small countries is difficult, because each and every 
country has different local legislation issues, and it's hard for big companies to drive their 
forces and say, now we need to understand all issues in so small countries of whatever one, 
two or four million population, and they speak two or three different languages, I would say 
forget about it we never go there". 
Another issue emerged from the discussions for instance, is that global investors 
prefer the local partners to be familiar of western ways of doing business. And when 
the respondent has been requested to clarify this issue, he responded 'maybe 
education, maybe language, countries where a healthy proportion of the professional classes 
have been educated in western countries, I mean that helps you know'. 
Respondents interested in investing in the MENA markets linked the lack of 
transparency with the problem of finding the appropriate local partner to invest with. 
On the other hand, a recent interview conducted by Washington Post (2008) with 
Dr. Al Habib, CEO of Jiwar -a real estate developer in Saudi Arabia, who showed 
similar enthusiasm for an international partnership. What the kingdom needs now, he 
says, is more foreign expertise' We need companies with the sort of experience that 
leading American companies have, ' he says. `Our plan for jiwar is to get our name out into 
the public arena and attract some partners. He continues `this is the time when we need 
the American companies and businessmen to come and help us with their knowledge and 
expertise, " he says. We have the cash, but we need help to cope with the change, the 
booming population, the heavy liquidity and the mega-projects. ' `Investors in real estate can 
expect returns of not less than 30 percent, he says, with no taxes and an open 
environment. 
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5.2.3 POTENTIAL OF MENA REAL ESTATE MARKETS AS AN INVESTABLE 
MARKETS 
Generally, respondents were positive about the potential benefits of investing in 
region and especially in the Saudi Arabian market. One of the respondents state "In 
Saudi Arabia I think 50% of the population are below 25, and 5 children per capita, there is 
big big need. Here comes the need for real estate..... the tenancy here is dear". 
In addition, one respondent says`... And what I am expecting excellent demographic, good 
GDP growth, high quality of construction" He continues "7m very interested in Saudi 
Arabia". Another respondent added, "Saudi Arabia would be my favourite, it is a big 
market, market with a lot of potential, it will be a market where all institutional investors 
sooner or later will look at". 
This also confirms the views of leading real estate companies operating in the MENA 
region. For instance, NCBC (2008), JLL (2009) and Colliers (2009) confirmed that 
the current market conditions in the MENA region create significant opportunities 
for all types of investors. 
To sum up, respondents point out that the region has excellent demographics 
(particularly in Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia), high population growth, good GDP 
growth and huge need for residential, retail & office real estate, which are good 
reasons for institutional investors to invest and diversify their portfolios into the 
region. However, they believe that lack of transparency is the most ineffectual hurdle 
to further attract global funds into the region, and suggest that further research may 
assist to develop a better understanding of the MENA local property markets. 
Table 12 below summarises the key barriers and motivations of global investors 
towards the MENA region. The findings confirm what have been covered in the 
literature and add to them other MENA markets specific barriers and motivations, 
which are being uncovered for the first time. 
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Table 12: Key factors influencing international real estate investments: 
Barriers to invest in MENA markets 
" Lack of transparency (i. e. Lack of historical 
market performance data, legal issues, and 
finding qualified local partners) 
Motivations to invest in MENA markets 
0 Good economic prospects 
0 Lack of sophistication 
" Introducing European banks to Sharia 
structuring 
" Lack of research/ knowledge of MENA 
markets. 
" Taxation structure 
" Language and cultural issues 
" Currency fluctuations 
" Lack of standing investments 
" Market size (i. e. Small countries are not 
attractive to large institutional investors) 
0 Excellent demographics 
0 Good quality of construction 
9 Demand driven markets 
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5.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF FDIS IN CRE AND HOTELS FOR THE SELECTED 
MENA COUNTRIES 
This section provides an overview of the key findings from Di Intelligence database, 
which provides detailed information for each greenfield project in both CRE and 
hotel sectors for the selected MENA countries from Q 12003 to Q2 2010 (though 
the econometric analysis was carried out `annually' starting at Q 12003 ending at Q4 
2009). 
5.3.1 A BIRD'S EYE VIEW 
As the intention of this research is to investigate both FDI in CRE as well as FDI in 
the hotel industry, data were collected for both sectors for the eight MENA 
countries. Table 13 below shows the total FDI in CRE for the whole period. 
Interestingly, Algeria ranks second after Turkey in attracting foreign investors. The 
basis for this is that Algeria in year 2008 had huge announcement made by Jelmoli 
Holding AG through its subsidiary (La Societe des Centres Commerciaux d'Algerie), 
to construct five shopping malls in total in cities of Algiers, Oran, Setif and Tlemcen 
with an estimated total investment of $6 bn. 
Figure 18 however, shows a different picture, it shows FDI per capita, and as can be 
seen, UAE ranks first followed by Qatar, as they attracted more FDI per capita 
compared to other countries in the sample. As these two countries in specific has 
been reforming and developing their foreign direct investment (FDI) regulations to 
attract more oversees investment (see the following sections for more details). 
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Table I3: Total CRE FDI inflows in selected MENA markets 
Country 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Morocco 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
UAE 
Commercial real estate FDI USD 
millions 
7986.41 
1400 
777.2 
632.3 
1465 
0 
8235.33 
2997.81 
Source: f Di Intelligence database 
Figure 18: CRE FDI per Capita (USD) 
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The inflow of foreign direct investment and particularly for hotels sector into Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt is low (only 34 projects in KSA with approximately $8bn), and (only 
25 projects in Egypt with approximately $3bn), compared to (88 projects in the UAE, 
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with approximately $ 19bn), in spite of the market size and demographics of Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt are by far larger than the case for UAE (see Table 14 & Figure 19). 
For instance, the total area of the UAE is about 83,600 sq km with total population 
of 5.6 million (Cityscape Intelligence, 2009). In KSA, the total area is about 2.25 
million square kilometres with a total population of 25 million (Cityscape Intelligence, 
2009). And in Egypt, the total population is 87 million and the total area is around I 
million square kilometres. 
Table I4: Total hotel FDI inflows in selected MENA markets 
Country 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Morocco 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
UAE 
Hotel FDI (USD) millions 
1942.6 
3047.1 
7063 
5006.8 
8260.3 
1424.7 
1757.4 
18912.27 
Source: fDi Intelligence database 
Figure 19 Hotel FDI per Capita (USD) 
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Because the Di Intelligence database provides massive amount of information for 
each project for each country, it is not possible to report every available information, 
rather, this section presents the data that sought to be of significance. The following 
sections therefore will be divided into two parts, the first is about the FDI inflows 
received in both sectors for all countries, which will discuss for instance, what kind 
of cities attracted capital (e. g. CBD's, or cities famous for tourism activities)? 
The second part will be concerned with source countries of these capital inflows, 
which will cover for instance, how the concept of culture proximity explains the 
sources of capital for each sector. 
5.3.2 FDI INFLOWS IN THE SELECTED MENA COUNTRIES IN CRE AND HOTELS 
According to fDi Intelligence database, it was found that capital flowed for 
commercial real estate were primarily targeting Central Business Districts (CBD's) 
(see Figure 20 below). 
In Algeria for instance, most FDls in CRE was directed into Algiers the country's 
CBD. The same is for Egypt, as all CRE FDIs in Egypt was directed into Cairo (the 
capital city). The same situation was found in Morocco, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, as all 
the flows were directed into the cities of Rabat, Doha and Riyadh, respectively. UAE 
however, had a different pattern, as more than 90% of the flow was directed to 
Dubai, for its position as the financial services centre in the UAE and the GCC. 
As for hotel related FDI, the fDi Intelligence database (see Figure 21 below) shows 
FDI inflows to hotels for the selected MENA markets have homogenous patterns, as 
capital flows are mostly directed into CBD's cities or cities famous for tourism 
activities. For instance, in Turkey (see Figure 21), FDI inflows were primarily directed 
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to both Istanbul (CBD) and Izmir (the third largest city in Turkey with an 
extraordinary history, spanning around 5,000 years, and has long been amongst the 
most cosmopolitan cities in Turkey, with many archaeological sites relating to past 
Greek, Roman and Byzantine civilisations (World Guides, n. d)). 
The situation is also similar for Egypt, as most hotels related FDI were directed into 
cities of Cairo (CBD) and Hurghada (a city that is famous for scuba diving and special 
marine life (World Guides, n. da)). 
In UAE however, FDI in hotels were mainly targeting both Abu Dhabi (the capital 
city) as well as Dubai. The reason for this maybe is the potential of both cities to 
attract many local and international tourists for both business and leisure. Abu Dhabi 
for instance is a city that famous with heritage sites reaching as far back as 5000 BC. 
The city is also famous for the business-cum-leisure facilities as well as some of the 
world's most famous museums particularly Guggenheim and Louvre (World Guides, 
n. d)). 
As mentioned earlier, Tunisia did not attract any CRE FDI based on fDi Intelligence 
database, however, the country has managed to attract FDI in the hotel sector $1.4 
billion worth of hotel projects from 2003-2010. 
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5.3.3 SOURCE COUNTRY ANALYSIS 
This part of describing the characteristics of FDIs is concerned with the sources of 
capital and the origin source country committing capital to certain city and country. 
Interestingly and as expected, various FDI flows in CRE are intra-MENA, due to 
culture proximity. For instance, FDI flows to Morocco were primarily originated 
from the UAE (see Figure 22 below). This is also the case for Qatar, as all the flows 
were generated from the UAE (see Figure 23). 
Figure 22: Source country FDI in CRE Projects in Morocco USD millions (2003-2010) 
Source country FDI in CRE 
Projects in Morocco USD millions 
(2003-2010) 
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Figure 23: Source country FDI in CRE projects in Qatar USD millions (2003-2010) 
Source country FDI in CRE 
projects in Qatar USD millions 
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Another interesting observation can be found for Algeria, where most FDI in CRE is 
originated from Switzerland. According to the database, a Swiss company "La Societe 
des centres commerciaux d'Algerie" is committed to build five shopping malls in total 
in Algeria costing around $6 bn (see Figure 24). 
Figure 24: Source country FDI in CRE projects in Algeria USD millions (2003-2010) 
Source country FDI in CRE projects in 
Algeria USD millions (2003-2010) 
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In terms of source country analysis related to FDI in hotels, fDi Intelligence database 
revealed few interesting observations. For instance, and in contrast to the case for 
commercial real estate FDI, only few FDI flows were originated from culturally 
similar countries. One case is Algeria, as most of the flows were originated from 
both the UAE and France (as French language is widely used in government, culture, 
media (newspapers) and education, and can be regarded as being de facto the co- 
official language of Algeria (Wikipedia, n. d)) (See Figure 25). 
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Figure 25: Source country FDI in Hotel projects in Algeria USD millions (2003-2010) 
Source country FDI in Hotel projects in Algeria USD 
millions (2003-2010) 
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The rest of the sample had FDI flows from almost every continent. For instance, in 
Tunisia (see 
Figure 27), investments were originated from Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Ireland and Italy), Asia (Hong Kong and India) and Africa (Egypt). The 
situation is also similar for Saudi Arabia, were FDI was originated from Belgium, 
Canada, Switzerland, UAE, UK and USA (see Figure 26). 
Figure 26: Source country FDI in Hotel projects in KSA USD millions (2003-2010) 
Source country FDI in Hotel projects in KSA USD millions 
(2003-2010) 
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Figure 27: Source country FDI in Hotel projects in Tunisia USD millions (2003-2010) 
Source country FDI in Hotel projects in Tunisia USD 
millions (2003-2010) 
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5.4 DETERMINANTS OF FDI IN COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FOR 
SELECTED MEDIA ECONOMIES 
5.4.1 OVERVIEW 
This section presents the econometric specification of the models3 used to test the 
hypotheses (to be discussed in the next sections), the estimation strategy and a 
potential explanation of the empirical results obtained for commercial real estate 
related FDI in the selected MENA countries. 
Figure 28 below provides a road map for this section (5.4) as well as the section 
follows it (i. e. (5.5), determinants of FDI in hotels). 
Figure 28: Roadmap of sections 5.4 and 5.5 
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The main objective is to test which factors affected commercial real estate FDI 
location in the selected MENA markets. In the previous chapters, by reviewing the 
theoretical and empirical background of commercial real estate FDI location 
s Wooldridge (2002a) defines an econometric model as an equation relating the dependent variable to a set of 
explanatory variables and unobserved disturbances, where unknown population parameters determine the ceteris 
paribus effect of each explanatory variable. 
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determinants, the potential motivations for investing in the MENA region were 
brought into attention. 
This section therefore, presents the proxies for some of the variables described in 
Chapter two and assigns their expected signs as well as their hypotheses. In order to 
test the impact of the selected variables (real estate market size and growth, 
infrastructure, institutional quality and market transparency), a Pooled Tobit, Pooled 
OLS4, fixed effect (FE) and random effects (RE) models were estimated to a balanced 
panels of relevant data. 
The choice of host countries (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Qatar, Tunisia, Turkey, The 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates) was determined by the 
availability of data as well as responses to the interviews in the exploratory study as 
potential good location of investments within the MENA region. 
5.4.2 MODEL SPECIFICATION AND METHODOLOGY 
This section analyses the key factors influencing CRE related FDI flows to the 
selected MENA countries. This part adopts the reduced form approach with the 
commercial real estate FDI as the dependant variable". It is also important to note 
that since there is no unanimous accepted theory of commercial real estate FDI, this 
research uses a pragmatic approach in selecting the explanatory variables to be 
included in the models. 
Further, the selection of the variables must be inspired by the empirical literature on 
CRE related FDI. And since as mentioned in earlier chapters, most of the empirical 
" Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is defined by Wooldridge (2002a) as a method for estimating the parameters of 
a multiple linear regression model. The ordinary least squares estimates are obtained by minimising the sum of 
squared residuals. 
' Balanced Panel is a panel data set where all years (or periods) of data are available for all cross-sectional units 
(Wooldridge, 2002a). 
6 Wooldridge (2002a) defines a dependent variable as the variable to be explained in a multiple regression 
model (and a variety of other models). 
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work was about surveys and questionnaires, and only few econometrically tested real 
estate investment related variables, this research however, selects the most 
appropriate variables which cover the main themes emerged from the literature, 
including economic, political, socio-cultural as well as real estate specific variables. 
As this research covers eight MENA countries from QI -2003 to Q4-2009, the 
appropriate modelling strategy is involving both time-series and cross-sectional 
analysis, and as it is the purpose of this research to model the determinants of both 
CRE and hotel related FDI, a cause-effect' relationship has to be established. 
Therefore, each independent variable is lagged' one year. The model for commercial 
real estate FDI therefore can be represented as follows: 
CFDI/GDP, t = ao + a, 
CFDI/GDP, 
t., + a2 RGDPGROWTH ; t., + a3 INSTRE, t., + a4 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT , t., + as INFRAQUAL t., + a6 TOTALTAXRATE it., + 
a7UNEMPLYGROWTH , t., + aBINVFREEDOM, t., + a9INSTITUTIONS, t., 
+a, oPROPERTYRIGHTS, t., +aPROTECTINVESTOR, t., +a12REIT, t., +a13RETRANSP 
k-I +Ci 
+Vit 
Where: 
" C, is a country-specific effect represented by country dummies, i denotes the 
countries, t the year and U an error term. 
" CFDI/GDP: the dependant variable commercial real estate FDI divided by 
country GDP. 
" CFDI/GDP(-I): Commercial real estate FDI divided by country GDP from 
the previous period 
" RGDPGROWTH: Real GDP growth rate from the previous period. 
" INSTRE: Size of institutional real estate market from the previous period. 
" HUMANDEVELOPMENT: Human development level from the previous 
period. 
' The causal-effect situation is a ceteris paribus (all other relevant factors are held fixed) change in one variable 
has an effect on another variable (Wooldridge, 2002a). 
$ Lagged independent variable is equal to the independent variable from an earlier time period (Wooldridge, 
2002a). 
168IPage 
" INFRAQUAL: Infrastructure quality from the previous period. 
" TOTALTAXRATE: Total tax rate from the previous period. 
" UNEMPLYGROWTH: Growth of unemployment from the previous 
period. 
" INVFREEDOM: Level of investment freedom from the previous period. 
" INSTITUTIONS: Quality of institutions: incorporate six variables as follow: 
o CORRUP: Control of Corruption level from the previous period. 
o GOVEFFECT: Government Effectiveness level from the previous 
period. 
o POLITIC: Political Stability level from the previous period. 
o REGQUALT: Regulatory Quality level from the previous period. 
o RULELAW: Rule of Law level from the previous period. 
o VACCOUNT: Voice and Accountability level from the previous 
period. 
" PROPERTYRIGHTS: Enforcement of property rights level from the 
previous period. 
" PROTECTINVESTOR: Investor Protection level from the previous period. 
" REIT: A dummy variable' reflecting the existence of Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs) lagged one year. 
" RETRANSP: Level of transparency of real estate markets, lagged one year. 
As mentioned earlier, some of the selected variables in the model have been selected 
pragmatically, as it is believed that these variables to be of significance to this type of 
FDI, and need to be tested for further contribution to the existing body of 
knowledge. The below section details variables description, sources, and expected 
signs (for a summary see Table 15 below). 
Table 1 5., Description of Commercial real estate FDI variables 
VARIABLES Unit Expected sign Source 
I Dummy variable is a variable that takes on the value zero or one. 
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VARIABLES Unit Expected sign Source 
CFDI 
Lagged CFDI 
% of GDP 
one year lag of CRE FDI 
(%GDP) 
$US millions 
n/a 
1+] 
fDi Intelligence (Financial 
Times Ltd) 
INSTRE 
(Institutional real estate 
market estimation) 
GDP 
REALGDP 
REALGDPGRTH 
UNEMPLYGROWTH 
INFRAQUAL 
REIT 
RETRANSP 
CORRUP 
Corruption (control of 
corruption) 
GOVEFFECT 
Government effectiveness 
(bureaucratic quality) 
$US millions (to be used when 
transforming FDI) 
GDP, Constant 2000 Prices, 
US Dollars (Absolute) lagged 
one year 
GDP, Constant 2000 Prices, 
US Dollars(Growth) lagged 
one year 
% growth lagged one year 
Ranking (1-7) (1: poorest 
quality, and 7: best quality) 
lagged one year- 
A dummy variable reflect the 
existence of REITs vehicles in 
country i in year t 
Ranking I -5, where I means 
countries most transparent 
and 5 to countries with 
opaque real estate markets, 
lagged one year 
Ranking 0- 1, where 0 is for 
countries with most 
corrupted systems, and I for 
least corrupted systems 
Ranking 0- I, where 0 is for- 
countries with least effective 
governments, and I for most 
effective governments 
fDi Intelligence 
Euromonitor International 
[+] 
[+] 
[+l 
Euromonitor International 
Datamintor 
Datamintor 
[+] 
[-] 
Euromonitor International 
World Economic Forum 
[+] Global Competiveness 
Report 
various media sources 
[+] 
Jones Lang LaSalle Global 
Real Estate Transparency 
[-] Index 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
[+] 
[+] 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
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VARIABLES Unit Expected sign Source 
REGQUALT 
Regulatory quality 
(investment profile) 
RULELAW 
Rule of law (law and 
order) 
VACCOUNT 
Ranking 0-I, where 0 is for 
countries with lowest 
regulatory quality, and I for 
highest regulatory quality 
Ranking 0-I, where 0 is for 
countries with least rule of 
law environment , and I for 
best rule of law environment 
Ranking 0-10, where 0 is for 
countries with least level of 
freedom, and 10 for best 
level of freedom 
Ranking 0-I, where 0 is for 
countries with least political 
stability environment , and I 
for best political stability 
environment 
Ranking 0 to 10, with higher 
values indicating more 
investor protection. 
(% profit) 
[+] 
1+] 
[+1 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
Voice and accountability 
POLITIC 
Political stability and 
absence of violence 
PROTECTINVESTOR 
TOTALTAXRATE 
HUMANDEVELOPME # (ranging from 0-I, where, 
NT best =I / worst=0) 
PROPERTYRIGHTS 
INVFREEDOM 
(Investment freedom) 
Ranking 0-100, the more 
certain the legal protection of 
property, the higher a 
country's score; similarly, the 
greater the chances of 
government expropriation of 
property, the lower a 
country's score. 
Ranking 0-100, where 0 means 
countries that impose many 
restrictions, and 100 means 
countries with no investment 
1+] 
The World Bank (Doing 
[+] Business Database) 
[-] 
[+] 
The World Bank (Doing 
Business Database) 
Human Development 
Index 
http: /Ihdr. undp. org/en/stati 
stics/data/ 
Heritage Found, iuon (Index 
of Economic Freedom) 
[+] 
[+] 
Heritage Foundation (Index 
of Economic Freedom) 
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VARIABLES Unit Expected sign Source 
restrictions 
5.4.2.1 DEPENDANT VARIABLE 
5.4.2.1.1 CommercialFD1/GDP: 
The dependant variable, CFDI (Commercial real estate FDI), has been measured by 
the nominal CRE related FDI flows, as provided by fDi Intelligence database. 
The level of CRE investment in each country is normalised by dividing CRE FDI by 
the country's nominal GDP. This allows us adjust the level of investment for the size 
of the country's economy. This transformation is useful for two reasons. First, it 
allows for more direct comparison between countries. Simply comparing the levels 
of investment in Turkey versus that of, for example, Qatar is not very useful because 
of the difference in the size of the economies. Secondly, the size of a country's GDP 
is likely to be relevant for the amount of CRE FDI the country receives (i. e. a larger 
economy has more opportunities for investment). This transformation allows taking 
the market size into account in the model, but avoids the problem of endogeneity. 
Nominal GDP data is derived from Euromonitor International. 
Figure 29: Commercial real estate FDI (%GDP) (2003-2009) 
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Figure 29 above shows the share of CRE FDI as a% of GDP for all countries. It is 
evident that Algeria in year 2008 had huge announcement made by Jelmoli Holding 
AG through its subsidiary (La Societe des Centres Commerciaux d'Algerie) a joint- 
stock company under Algerian law, to construct five shopping malls in total in cities 
of Algiers, Oran, Setif and Tlemcen with an estimated total investment of $6 bn. In 
contrast, fDi Intelligence database shows no commercial real estate FDI has been 
made in Tunisia for the whole study period. 
5.4.2.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
5.4.2.2.1 Lagged commercial real estate FDI/GDP: CFDI/GDP(-I): 
The research employs a one year lag of CRE FDI/GDP in the countries as an 
independent variable to test the 'follow the competitor' hypothesis1°. A positive and 
significant coefficient of lagged commercial real estate FDI flows may support the 
hypothesis that there is evidence for competitor following effects. Therefore, the 
hypothesised sign is positive. 
5.4.2.2.2 Real GDP growth: RGDPGROWTH(-1) 
Real GDP is the GDP number reached by valuing all the productive activity within 
the country at a specific year's prices (here year 2000). When economic activity of 
two or more time periods is valued at the same year's prices, the resulting figure 
allows comparison of purchasing power over time, since the effects of inflation have 
been removed by maintaining constant prices. This variable is directly related to 
economic health and it is hypothesised that the growth of real GDP lagged one year, 
to positively and significantly influence CRE FDI. 
Figure 30: Real GDP growth rate (%) 
I0 See D'Arcy (2009) & Fuchs & Scharmanski (2009) for a discussion on competitor following and 
investor behaviour when investing internationally. 
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Figure 30 above shows the real growth rate of GDP for the sample countries over 
the study period. Interestingly, it is evident that Qatar had huge growth which was 
due to the country's massive investment in the hydrocarbon sector, and its position 
as the world's largest natural gas producer and its oil and gas output has jumped 
dramatically between 2004-2009 (Euromonitor International, 2009). 
5.4.2.2.3 Size of institutional real estate market: INSTRE(-I) 
As discussed in the previous chapters, investors get attracted to large real estate 
markets for many reasons, including potential demand and liquidity. This research 
proxy these factors by estimating the size of institutional commercial real estate 
market, following Kapas & Liang (2009), which relates the size of a country's real 
estate market to a country's GDP. 
They use a model which acccount for both GDP and GDP per capita. As they argue, 
in developed and mature markets, the commercial institutional grade real estate 
market size (INSTRE) can equal to 45%*GDP, however, they also argue that in less 
mature or developing markets, the size cannot be the same, and therefore, they use 
as another proxy 'GDP per capita'. Whereby, the value of the per capita GDP 
threshold $20,000 in year 2000 and $25,000 in year 2008 adjusted annually based on 
the U. S. inflation rate. Also for any given year for any particular country with GDP 
per capita less than these thresholds, they used the following relationship: 
INSTRE=45%*GDP*(GDPpercapita/20000)^(1/3) for GDP per capita < 20000 
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This research also follows Kapas & Liang (2009) by adjusting the Qatari, the Saudi 
and the Emirati's real estate market size up by 25% (see Figure 31 below), because of 
their population densities and proliferation of planned urban development projects. 
Figure 31: Size of institutional grade commercial real estate market (logged) 
Size of institutional grade commercial real estate market (logged) 
/ 
8 
2 8ö9 ä8 82 oo818 8a 219 ös ais 2 ööös a23 8 
............................ ääääýýWýýýmääöýýýýýýýý? ý? ýýý 
It is hypothesised that foreign investors get attracted to large markets, and therefore, 
a one year lagged value of INSTRE, will have a positive, significant influence on CRE 
FDI. Data were collected from Euormonitor International. 
5.4.2.2.4 Human development level: HUMANDEVELOPMENT(-I) 
The Human Development Index'' (HDI) is a composite index measuring average 
achievement in three basic dimensions of human development, a long and healthy life, 
access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. This variable ranges from 0-I, 
where, best =I / worst=0 (see Figure 32 below), and the lagged value of one year is 
believed to be positively and significantly influencing commercial real estate FDI. Data 
is derived from Human Development Report (HDR) database. 
Figure 32: Level of human development 
11 Index number is a statistic that aggregates information on economic activity, such as production or prices 
(Wooldridge, 2002a). 
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5.4.2.2.5 Quality of overall infrastructure: LNINFRAQUAL(- I) 
The World Economic Forum Global Competiveness Report provides an overall 
measure of the quality of infrastructure based on six underlying dimensions; (Quality 
of roads, quality of railroad infrastructure, quality of port infrastructure, quality of air 
transport infrastructure, available seat kilometres, quality of electricity supply and 
telephone lines). They rank countries (1-7) (where, I: poorest quality and 7: best 
quality) (see Figure 33). 
Figure 33: quality of overall infrastructure (logged) 
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This research employs a one year lagged value of this variable as an indicator of the 
overall quality of the infrastructure in the sample countries. It is also believed that it 
will be positively and significantly influencing CRE FDI. Unfortunately, data were not 
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available for certain years, specifically between 2002-2005, and in this case, the study 
follows the three methods suggested by Nardo, et al (2005) in the following order: a) 
to try to find missing data in other databases or via the internet, b) to interpolate 
between the adjacent data records, and c) to use the latest available data. And 
because data were not found, it has been estimated using interpolation of data. 
5.4.2.2.6 Total tax rate: TOTALTAXRATE(-l) 
The research also employs a taxation related variable, which is extracted from The 
World Bank (Doing Business Database). The World Bank provides alongside 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, the total tax rates as a share of profit before all taxes 
borne. 
Figure 34: total tax rate (%of profit) before all taxes borne 
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Unlike other studies (see taxation section in Chapter two) that used corporate 
income tax only (except for Groh & Wich (2009) in their FDI attractivness 
composite index), the research uses the total tax, as it is believed that it reflects to a 
better extent, the real exposure of foreign investors to taxation. For instance, in 
Algeria, the government cut the corporate tax rate in January 2007 from 30% to 25% 
and cut it again to 19% in the supplementary budget of mid-2008. 
However, foreign companies continue to complain that the existing tax system is 
unwieldy and opaque (EIU, 2010). And as provided by the World Bank, total taxes in 
Algeria reach up to 74%, which is markedly above the headline marginal tax of 19%. 
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For this reason the study uses the total tax rate and it is expected to have a negative 
and significant influence on CRE FDI in the selected markets. 
5.4.2.2.7 Growth of unemployment UNEMPLYGROWTH(-I) 
The ILO international standard definition of unemployment is based on the following 
three criteria which should be satisfied simultaneously: "without work", "currently 
available for work" and "seeking work". The study employs this variable, especially to 
its direct relation to commercial related real estate. It is well-known that more office 
and retail space will be required in the case of higher employment and booming 
working conditions. And the opposite will be the case when unemployment in the 
increase. The research therefore, employs the % change in unemployment (lagged 
one year), hypothesising it will be negatively and significantly influencing CRE FDI. 
Data is collected from Euromonitor International 
Figure 35: growth rate of unemployment (%) 
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Interestingly, Figure 35 shows that Saudi Arabia has the lowest unemployment 
growth in the sample, however, despite the `growth rate' is low, the level of 
unemployment is high given that Saudi Arabia is one of the world's fastest growing 
population (estimated 3% per annum, and according to Euromonitor International 
(2010), some 60% of the indigenous population is believed to be less than 20 years 
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old, and 70% is under 30 years old and that unemployment is highest among Saudis in 
their twenties at an estimated 25%. The Saudi government therefore, tries a recent 
policy of "Saudiization", which intends to increase employment of its own citizens by 
replacing 60% of the estimated 5-6 million foreign workers working in Saudi Arabia 
(EIU, 2008). 
5.4.2.2.8 Overall investment climate: INVFREEDOM(-I) 
Another key variable is employed to capture the level of investment freedom in 
countries in the sample. Because it is difficult to account for all restrictions in details, 
the research employs the Heritage Foundation (Index of Economic Freedom), which 
evaluates a variety of restrictions typically imposed on investment. Points, as 
indicated below, are deducted from the ideal score of 100 for each of the 
restrictions found in a country's investment regime. 
Investment restrictions: 
I. National treatment of foreign investment 
2. Restrictions on land ownership 
3. Sectoral investment restrictions 
4. Expropriation of investments without fair compensation 
5. Foreign exchange controls 
6. Capital controls 
The rankings are from 0-100, where 0 means countries that impose many 
restrictions, and 100 means countries with no investment restrictions. It is believed 
that a lag of one year of the index will be positively and significantly influencing CRE 
FDI. 
Figure 36: level of investment freedom 
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Figure 36 shows how restrictions vary across the sample. For instance, Algeria's 
score (70) in 2003 is quite high when compared to (40) in 2009; this can be 
attributed to the recent efforts of the Algerian government to attract more 
investment. They provide some incentives for many types of investments. For 
instance, the Algerian government provides (Markaz, 2008): 
" Exemption of custom duties on certain imported goods; 
" VAT exemption on some goods and services directly involved with the 
investment implementation; 
" Transfer tax exemption, for all real estate purchases made for the specific 
purpose of the investment. 
In addition to the above incentives, special incentives are also offered for investments 
in special development zones and for privileged investments. Such incentives 
incorporate (Markaz, 2008): 
" Partial or total state funding for infrastructure investments; 
" Exemption for ten years from the settlement of corporate income tax, gross 
income tax, flat rate payment and tax of professional activity; 
" Exemption for ten years from property taxes; 
" Additional incentives to improve or facilitate the investment, such as the 
carry-forward of losses and depreciation; 
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5.4.2.2.9 Quality of the institutional framework 
The quality of institutions and regulations are expected to play a significant role to 
attract foreign investors in commercial real estate sectors. For instance, political 
stability is considered as an imperative for planning, profitability and long-run success. 
Corruption though produces heightens uncertainty and raises costs. Inability to 
handle corruption makes FDI challenging for investors from less corrupt countries 
and can result in a negative FDI decision. However, corruption may also provide 
some investors preferential access to profitable markets. Generally, weak institutions 
are expected to deter CRE FDI, whereas high quality institutions attract this type of 
FDI. 
In order to assess the role of institutions and regulations as factors to attract CRE 
FDI, a set of governance variables are required. Many indices are available for this 
purpose. However, as the research tries to cover as many governance indicators as 
possible, the study employs the six dimensions (see below) developed by Daniel 
Kaufmann and Aart Kraay in the late I990's, as they developed the so-called the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), which is based on information drawn 
from 35 data sources provided by 33 different organisations (see Kaufmann et al. 
(2009) for details). One of the 33 private organisations providing information to the 
WGI is the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). 
The research considers employing those six dimensions provided only by the EIU to 
avoid any bias that could occur from employing the aggregate WGI. The EIU data is 
available at WGI website and can be accessed by the public. 
The EIU data reflect the views of experts and a network of over 500 
correspondents, reviewed for consistency by panels of regional experts. The index is 
quarterly since 1997. 
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This index is measured into units ranging from 0- 1, with higher values corresponding 
to better governance, therefore, the hypothesis is that the better the governance, 
the more attractive the country is. A positive sign is expected for all indicators. 
For this research, EIU data covers the eight MENA countries over the period 2003- 
2009 (with a one year lag), and they include six dimensions of governance as follows: 
I. Voice and Accountability (VACCOUNT): 
An indicator measures the extent to which country's citizens are able to participate 
in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media. 
Figure 37: level of voice and accountability 
Voice and Accountability 
s 
.............. 88ö8S888öö89 882 88 88ö23 2 öö8öö8 
............................ ip ýýýwww% %ý ýÖÖÖ9ýýý cc mýS ý 
Figure 37 above shows that the sample ranges from 0.05 to 0.5, which can be 
regarded as low to medium level of voice and accountability. 
2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence (POLITIC) 
An indicator that measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
domestic violence and terrorism. 
Figure 38: level of political stability and absence of violence 
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Figure 38 shows that the sample ranges from an extreme of 0.2 (e. g. Algeria) to 0.85 
political stability as for the case of Qatar. 
For Turkey, there has been much change in recent years (see the above figure 2004- 
2009), in the political system and fiscal discipline and as a result, the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange grew by 400% between October 2004 and February 2006(Euromonitor 
International, 2007). In turn this has generated huge levels of FDI, which reached a 
record US$ 17. I billion in 2006(Euromonitor International, 2007). 
3. Government Effectiveness (GOVEFFECT) 
An indicator that measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies. 
Figure 39 shows how governments in the sample are acting similarly; only recently, it 
is evident that Turkey and UAE are among the most effective governments in the 
sample. 
Figure 39: level of government effectiveness 
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4. Regulatory Quality (REGQUALT) 
An indicator measures the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
Figure 40: level of regulatory quality 
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S. Rule of Law (RULELAW) 
An indicator that measures the perceptions on the effectiveness and predictability of 
the judiciary, as well as enforceability of contracts. 
Figure 41: level of rule of low 
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6. Control of Corruption (CORRUP) 
An indicator that measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state 
by elites and private interests. 
Figure 42: level of control of corruption 
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As variables of institutions are often correlated with one another, it is generally not 
possible to include several institutions in the same equation. This study therefore, 
employs each variable at a time. See Table 20 (M2-M7) 
5.4.2.2.10 Strength of investor protection: PROTECTINVESTOR(-I) 
w 
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The research also employs another important variable that accounts for investor 
protection. The World Bank (Doing Business Database) provides an index of 
strength of investor protection index with rankings of countries based on their level 
of investor protection. The ranking is from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating 
more investor protection. It is believed that the stronger investors are protected, 
the more CRE FDI will be attracted to the country. 
Therefore, a one year lag of the index is expected to have a positive and significant 
influence on CRE FDI. 
Figure 43: strength of investor protection 
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5.4.2.2.11 Enforcement of property rights: PROPERTYRIGHTS(-I) 
The property rights component is an assessment of the ability of individuals to 
accumulate private property, secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the 
state. It measures the degree to which a country's laws protect private property 
rights and the degree to which its government enforces those laws. It also assesses 
the likelihood that private property will be expropriated and analyses the 
independence of the judiciary, the existence of corruption within the judiciary, and 
the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts. Data is provided by the 
Heritage Foundation (Index of Economic Freedom). The index ranking based from 0- 
100, the more certain the legal protection of property, the higher a country's score; 
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similarly, the greater the chances of government expropriation of property, the 
lower a country's score. Therefore, it is hypothesised that it will have a positive and 
significant influence on CRE FDI. 
Figure 44: enforcement of property rights 
80 
70 -f 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
PROPERTYRIGHTS 
22 öö9 8 E2 8 ö8 S8 82 ööF3 as 23 28öö; S 88 
............................ OID (DID r» twc t~Q zzzý=¢¢w WW 
ýýýýWWWäiimOOOýýýH ti ýýýýý>>> 
5.4.2.2.12 Real Estate Investment Trusts: REIT(-I) 
The research proxies market liquidity by employing a dummy variable which reflects 
the existence of REITs vehicles in country i in year t. It is hypothesised that the more 
liquid the market is, the more attracted foreign investments to that market. A one 
year lag of REIT's should have a positive influence on CRE FDI. Various media 
sources were consulted to obtain this information. 
5.4.2.2.13 Level of transparency of real estate markets: RETRANSP(-I) 
As covered in the previous chapters, the more transparent the real estate market, 
the more investments it would attract. The study employs the Jones Lang LaSalle 
Global Real Estate Transparency index, which evaluates the level of real estate 
market transparency in country i in year t attaching a score from I -5, where I means 
countries most transparent and 5 to countries with opaque real estate markets. Not 
all countries were covered for the study period; therefore, it is assumed that these 
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countries have the least value of (5) opaque. The research uses a one year lagged 
value of the index and hypothesis a negative significant influence on CRE FDI. 
Figure 45: existence of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT's) 
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Figure 46: level of transparency of real estate markets 
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In order to test the influence of the above described variables upon commercial real 
estate FDI inflows, the research uses a panel data set. There are several benefits of 
using panel data. The most important is that the combination of time series with 
cross-sections can enhance the quality and quantity of data in ways that would be 
impossible using only one of these two dimensions (Gujarati, 2004). Another 
advantage is that panel data controls for individual heterogeneity (Baltagi, 2005). The 
variables that are studied differ from one country to another and vary with time; by 
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using the panel it is possible to control the presence of individual variable effects that 
are common to a country across time but may 
vary across countries at any one-time period. 
Panel data are also more informative; provide more variability, less collinearity among 
variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency (Baltagi, 2005). 
The data set constitutes a balanced panel that covers the period 2003-2009 for eight 
countries, totalising 56 observations. 
A pooled ordinary least square (POLS), fixed effects (FE), random effects (RE) as well 
as pooled Tobit are used to analyse the factors that affect the flow of CRE FDI. 
However due to the zero observations on the dependent variables (CFDIGDP) 
(specifically 32 observations with zero flows), the POLS, FE and RE will give 
inconsistent and biased estimates and the appropriate technique is pooled Tobit'2 
(Gujarati, 2004, p: 616); (Wooldridge, 2002a) calls this situation 'Corner Solution"3. 
The pooled Tobit is estimated taking into account the observations where no 
investment from a particular country in a particular year takes place (i. e. zero FDI). 
The research pools all the year-country observations as well as explores the panel 
nature of the data in the pooled Tobit model. The Tobit model assumes that the 
same set of factors determines the value of uncensored observation (how much is 
invested) and whether an observation is censored (whether there are investments if 
any). This method has been used by He, Wang, & Cheng (2009), in their recent study 
on China's FDI in real estate. 
Therefore, the observable left-censored dependent variable ylt used in estimation 
can be: 
JY it Yt = to 
if Yit > 0) 
if Yit S Oj 
Ytt = aXtr-i + Eit , 
12 The Tobit model is a model for a dependent variable that takes on the value zero with positive probability but 
is roughly continuously distributed over strictly positive values (Wooldridge, 2002a). 
"Corner solution occurs when a non-negative dependent variable is roughly continuous over strictly positive 
values but takes on the value zero with some regularity (as in our case). 
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Where Yit represents the observed dependent variable, Y« the latent dependent 
variable, X1t_1 stands for a vector of all independent variables, and a the 
corresponding vector of parameters. 
But before estimating the panel data, it is important to carry out the unit root tests 
to examine whether the variables are stationary. Therefore, the next section 
discusses the unit root tests and their results. 
5.4.3 PANEL UNIT ROOT TESTS 
A time series process is non-stationary if its moments or distributional form change 
over time. Two important forms of non-stationarity are unit roots and structural 
breaks, both of which lead to permanent changes. The former induce stochastic 
trends, which can be eliminated by differencing, or cointegration can also remove 
unit roots and retain linear combinations of levels of the variables (however, unit 
roots and cointegration are only invariant under linear transformations of variables) 
(Hendry, 2009; p. 16). 
Regressions run on non-stationary time series variables produces spurious results, 
which are insignificant. Therefore, it is important to make sure that variables are 
stationary. This means that a stationary time series has three characteristics namely 
finite mean, variance and auto-covariance over time (Gujarati, 2004). 
The commonly used root tests like the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and 
PhillipsPerron (PP) lack power in distinguishing the unit root null from stationary 
alternatives (Ben-Taher & Giorgioni, 2009). The traditional ADF type tests of unit 
root suffer from the problem of low power in rejecting the null of stationarity of the 
series, especially for short-spanned data (as in our case)(Ben-Taher & Giorgioni, 
2009). 
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Some recent developments however have appeared in the panel unit root test 
including the Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) tests are the 
most widely used methods for panel data unit root tests in the literature (Ben-Taher 
& Giorgioni, 2009). The IPS is general in the sense that it allows for heterogeneity, 
therefore, it is described as a "Heterogeneous Panel Unit Root Test". As a result, the 
test developers have shown that IPS has higher power than other tests in its class 
(Ben-Taher & Giorgioni, 2009). In contrast, the LLC and IPS tests are based on the 
ADF prescription. However, LLC hypothesises homogeneity in the dynamics of the 
autoagressive coefficient for all cross-sectional(Ben-Taher & Giorgioni, 2009). And 
therefore, this study applies the LLC test for unit roots in the panel data for 
consistency purposes and the results are presented in Table 16. The test has been 
performed using the Modified Schwarz with maximum lag lengths. 
Table 16: Panel unit root tests results and conclusions 
Variables 
CFDIGDP 
RGDPGROWTH 
INSTRE 
LN(INSTRE) 
HUMANDEVELOPMENT 
LNINFRAQUAL 
INVFREEDOM 
TOTALTAXRATE 
UNEMPLYGROWTH 
PROTECTINVESTOR 
PROPERTYRIGHTS 
RETRANSP 
LLC Test Result Conclusion 
-6.26686''** 1(0) 
-6.12141*a` 1(0) 
4.26516*** 1(1) 
-4.73459**'` 1(0) 
- 1.29020* 1(0) 
-4.32190''** 1(0) 
-3.55790'''`* 1(0) 
-3.04086*** 1(0) 
-27.2115*** 1(0) 
-3.55790*** 1(0) 
-3.29306*** 1(1) 
-7.14395*** 1(1) 
*** Significant at I%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
Results of the tests suggest that the model must be estimated using the differenced 
variables, hence it can only look at short run relationships among these variables. 
The final short run model therefore, has the following form: 
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CFDI/GDP; t = ao + a, CFDI/GDP ; t., + a2 RGDPGROWTH t., + a3 instre; t., + a4 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT ; t., + as infraqual ; t., + a6 TOTALTAXRATE rc, + 
a, UNEMPLYGROWTH ; t., + aaINVFREEDOM; t_, + a9INSTITUTIONS; t., +a, o 
APROPERTYRIGHTS; t., +aPROTECTINVESTOR;,, +a12REIT;,, +a13 A RETRANSP 
k-I +Ci +Ui, 
Where: A denotes first difference14. The small case letters denotes that the variables 
are in natural logarithmic terms, all other variables are stationary in level, so they are 
included as they are. 
5.4.4 PANEL DATA ANALYSIS FOR COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FDI 
5.4.4.1 ESTIMATION OF PANEL MODELS 
This section presents the findings on the estimated models. But prior to estimating 
the panel, a correlation matrix of the variables was prepared (the correlation matrix 
and the descriptive statistics are calculated using the absolute values of the variables). 
The pair wise correlations were not large enough to warrant concern about possible 
multicollinearity 15 problems. Eviews also cannot compute matrices with perfect 
multi-collinearity and gives a message `Near Singular Matrix', which indicates the 
existence of near perfect multi-collinearity. 
Table 18 presents the Pearson's correlation coefficients 16 between variables. 
1" First difference is a transformation on a time series constructed by taking the difference of adjacent time 
periods, where the earlier time period is subtracted from the later time period (Wooldridge, 2002a). 
s Multicollinearity is a term that refers to correlation among the independent variables in a multiple regression 
model; it is usually invoked when some correlations are "large, " but an actual magnitude is not well-defined 
(Wooldridge, 2002a). 
16 Correlation coefficient is a measure of linear dependence between two random variables that does not depend 
on units of measurement and is bounded between -1 and I (Wooldridge, 2002a). 
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Table I9: correlation analysis dependant vs. independent variables for commercial real 
estate FDI 
Correlation 
CFDIGDP 
CFDIGDP(-1) 0.060 
RGDPGROWTH 0.124 
LOGINSTRE 0.071 
HUMANDEVELOPMENT 0.225* 
INFRAQUAL -0.054 
TOTALTAXRATE 0.208 
UNEMPLYGROWTH 0.325" 
CORRUP -0.187 
GOVEFFECT -0.103 
POLITIC 0.006 
REGQUALT -0.145 
RULELAW -0.306"' 
VACCOUNT 0.062 
INVFREEDOM -0.001 
PROPERTYRIGHTS -0.246* 
PROTECTINVESTOR 0.106 
REIT -0.0039 
RETRANSP 0.0108 
*** Significant at I%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
Interestingly, the matrix Table 19 shows occasional correlations between dependant 
and independent variables. Clearly, the correlation results can be distorted due to 
the fact that the dependant variable contains 32 zero observations. 
With this in mind, FDI in CRE (CFDIGDP) still have strong negative correlations with 
both rule of law and property rights. And as discussed earlier, these are indicators of 
the importance of the institutional framework of countries and specifically the role of 
law in attracting foreign investments. It will be more interesting to identify the 
direction of influence in the panel analysis, and whether other variables will be 
significant in relation to CFDIGDP in the research models. 
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In terms of panel estimation, and due to the zero observation on the dependent 
variables (CFDIGDP), the POLS, FE and RE will give inconsistent and biased 
estimates and the appropriate technique is pooled Tobit (Gujarati, 2004, p. 616); and 
hence a pooled Tobit regression was employed to analyse the determinants. 
In the previous sections, the overall variables and model has been specified and 
discussed, however, it is not possible to estimate all the specified variables at once, as 
many variables can be proxy for same underlying facts, for this reason, and after 
running many iterations, the research arrived at a base model and have the following 
variables: 
" One lagged period of CRE FDI (%GDP) (CFDI/GDP(- I )) 
" One lagged period of real GDP growth (RGDPGROWTH(-I)) 
" One lagged period of institutional real estate market size (logged) 
(LNINSTRE(- 1)) 
" One lagged period human development level (HUMANDEVELOPMENT(-I)) 
" One lagged period of quality of infrastructure (INFRAQUAL(-I)) 
" One lagged period of total tax rate (TOTALTAXRATE(- 1)) 
" One lagged period of growth of unemployment (UNEMPLYGROWTH(-I)) 
Unfortunately, due to the many zeros in the dependant variable as well as the short 
time series nature of the data, it is not possible to estimate the models using 
different lags (more than one year), as the aim is to maximise the number of 
observation and degrees of freedom in the panel. Also concerning conducting a 
singular cross-sectional analysis, it was not feasible due to only having eight countries 
in the study, thus the best option is to conduct a pooled Tobit estimation for the 
research models, with a one year lag of the independent variables. 
The functional form of the base model is (see Table 20 M 1): 
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CFDIGDP= Constant + (CFDIGDP(- I )) + (RGDPGROWTH(- I )) + (LNINSTRE(- I )) 
+ (HUMAN DEVELOPMENT(-1)) + (INFRAQUAL(- I )) + (TOTALTAXRATE(- I)) + 
(UNEMPLYGROWTH(- 1)) 
Using Eviews statistical package, the panel equation was estimated (see Table 20 M 1). 
For all other 'control' variables, the research adds one independent variable at a time 
to the base model to estimate the effect of that variable (see Table 20 M2-M 12) 
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5.4.4.2 RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
This section reports the results of the panel analysis. Table 21 below summarises the 
findings from different model specifications, starting with Model I, which is the base 
model specification. Subsequent models add different control variables to the basic 
model specification. All models were estimated using the censored pooled Tobit 
model to account for the zeros in the dependant variable. It is important to note that 
the case of pooled Tobit is as in other limited dependent variable models, the 
estimated coefficients do not have a direct interpretation (Wooldridge, 2002). 
A summary of the hypotheses with the independent and control variables and their 
predicted and actual signs is shown in Table 21. 
Interestingly, in the base model (M 1), only real GDP growth, size of real estate 
market, human development level, have the correct signs and are significant at the 5- 
10% levels. Countries with healthier economies, larger institutional real estate 
markets, higher degrees of education and a decent standard of living received more 
CRE FDI than others in the sample. The model reveals some interesting findings 
especially with the lagged value of CRE FDI, which opposed to what is normally 
anticipated in the general FDI literature. 
First, as the research tries to test the 'following the competitor' hypothesis, a lagged 
CFDI/GDP is included in the model specification. The estimated model shows that it 
has a negative and insignificant sign, thus indicates that HI is rejected. Although, as 
pointed out earlier, when that hypothesis was formulated, the positive influence on 
CRE FDI, as several studies have acknowledged that the presence of foreign 
investors may act as a catalyst to attract further investors (see D'Arcy, (2009) and 
Fuchs & Scharmanski, (2009)). The result may suggest however, that investors are 
rational in their investments decisions and might not follow each other, which 
corresponds with findings of (Fuchs & Scharmanski, 2009). 
Second, the growth of unemployment found to be positively and significantly 
influencing CFDI. As this contradicts to what has been initially hypothesised, the 
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results however might indicate that unemployment is a proxy for labour availability, 
which is an essential element to undertaking development projects. 
Finally, quality of infrastructure is found to be negative and insignificant in the base 
model, which opposes to the hypothesis of being positive and significant. 
Therefore, perhaps the role of infrastructure is not so critical in the CRE FDI 
decisions under certain circumstances. 
Throughout, most model specifications (i. e. MI -M 12), the impact of economic health, 
real estate market size and level of human development on CFDI appears to be 
insensitive to changes in control variables. 
In the following models (M2-M 12), the base model specification is augmented by 
other potential CFDI determinants. 
In models (M2-M7), the research tries to capture the impact of quality of institutions 
on CFDI. In model (M2), the research controls for corruption, and as can be seen 
from the table, corruption has a negative but insignificant influence on CFDI, which 
opposes the hypothesis of having a positive, significant impact on CFDI. This could be 
interpreted as the role of control of corruption is not so critical in the CRE FDI 
decisions. 
Table 2 I: Summary of hypotheses and control variables 
H# 
HI 
H2 
H3 
Hypothesis 
Foreign investors are more likely to 
follow their competitors which will 
therefore will be positively associated 
with CRE FDI 
Growth of economies attracts foreign 
investors and therefore, will be 
positively associated with CRE FDI. 
The larger the size of the economy 
(measured by size of real estate 
market), the more attractive is the 
Variable name 
Lagged CFDIGDP 
RGDPGROWTH 
LOGINSTRE 
Expected Actual 
sign sign 
[+] N. S 
[+] [+]* 
[+] [+]** 
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H4 
H5 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
infrastructure will attract foreign INFRAQUAL 
investors and thus increase CFDI. 
country and thus will be positively 
associated with CRE FDI 
Foreign investors get attracted to 
countries with sound human 
development levels, thus will be 
positively associated with CFDI 
The overall quality of country's 
H6 Foreign investors are more sensitive to 
taxation as it impacts the overall 
profitability of the investment and thus 
the higher the taxes, the less investors TOTALTAXRATE 
get attracted to such environment and 
thus will be negatively associated with 
CFDI 
H7 The growth of unemployment will 
discourage investors to invest in CRE UNEMPLYGROWTH 
related FDI 
Control variables I 
CII Overall investment climate (investment 
[+l ý+ýý 
[+] N. S 
[-] N. S 
[-1 1+1** 
freedom) 
INVFREEDOM (+] N. S 
C2 Control of corruption CORRUP (+] N. S 
C3 Government effectiveness GOVEFFECT [+] N. S 
C4 Political stability and absence of 
POLITIC (+] (+]# 
violence 
C5 Regulatory quality REGQUALT (+] N. S 
C6 Rule of law RULELAW [+] N. S 
C7 Voice and accountability VACCOUNT (+] N. S 
C8 Enforcement of property rights PROPERTYRIGHTS (+] N. S 
C9 Investor protection PROTECTINVESTOR (+] N. S 
CIO Existence of Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REIT's) 
REIT (+] H* 
Cl i Overall transparency level of real estate 
RETRANSP (-] N. S 
markets 
*** Significant at 1 %, '' significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. N. S: Not significant 
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In Model 3 the research tries to capture the impact of government effectiveness on 
CFDI. The results show that it has a positive but insignificant influence on CFDI. 
Perhaps the role of this variable is not so critical in the CRE FDI decisions under 
certain circumstances. 
In Model 4, the research controls for political stability and its impact on CRE FDI. As 
expected, political stability has a positive impact on CFDI and is significant at the 5% 
level. Unlike corruption, the results reflect the current political situation in the 
Middle Eastern region, as it is full of tensions and controversies between political 
parties, and still under huge political threats (these threats are beyond the scope of 
this research). Most importantly however, the results suggest that political stability 
and absence of violence is a significant determinant of CFDI. 
Model 5 controls for regulatory quality and as can be seen from the table, it has the 
wrong sign (i. e. negative) and insignificant. The insignificance of the coefficient cannot 
give any firm conclusion. 
In Model 6 the study tries to capture the impact of rule of law on CFDI. The result 
shows the variable to be negative and was not significant. Again, the insignificance of 
the coefficient cannot give any firm conclusion. 
In Model 7, the research controls for voice and accountability and its impact on 
CFDI. As can be seen from the table, the variable has the expected sign (positive), 
but not significant. No firm conclusions can be drawn. 
In Model 8 the research employs the investment freedom index by Heritage 
Foundation as a proxy for investment restrictions. As expected, investment freedom 
has a positive sign, but insignificant. The insignificance of the coefficient cannot 
provide any firm conclusions. 
Model 9 employs another policy-related variable, property rights, and as can be seen 
from the table, the variable has the correct sign (positive), but insignificant. 
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In Model 10, the study also accounts for another policy-elated variable, investor 
protection. As can be seen from the table, the variable has negative and insignificant 
impact on CFDI. This could be interpreted as the role of investment protection is 
not so critical in commercial real estate FDI decisions. 
Model II tries to capture the impact of market liquidity in attracting CFDI. As a 
proxy, the research uses a dummy variable reflecting the existence of REIT's in the 
relevant countries as a proxy for market liquidity. Interestingly, the results suggest 
that market existence of REIT's is negatively and significantly (at 10% level) 
influencing CFDI. One partial explanation is that this region is relatively wealthy and 
specifically the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
and UAE. And that investors and citizens from those countries are targets by other 
MENA countries in all real estate asset classes. For instance, fDi Intelligence database 
(Figure 47 below) shows that considerable amount of CRE FDIs made in Egypt, were 
through GCC investors. 
Another interesting example is Saudi Arabia; nearly half of FDI in commercial real 
estate were through UAE investors (see Figure 48 below). 
Figure 47: Source country CRE FDI into Egypt (2003-2010) 
Source country FDI in Office and Retail Projects USD millions 
(2003-2010) 
Saudi Arabia UAE 
Source: fDi Intelligence database 
Switzerland 
Figure 48: Source country of CRE FDI to Saudi Arabia (2003-2010) 
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Source country FDI in Office and Retail projects USD 
millions (2003-2010) 
800 
600 
400 
200 
692.5 732.5 
o- 
40 
France UK 
Source: fDi Intelligence database 
UAE 
Finally, in Model 12, the study tries to capture the impact of level of transparency of 
real estate markets on CFDI. The study uses the Jones Lang LaSalle Transparency 
index as a proxy. As can be seen from the table, it has a positive sign and insignificant 
influence on CFDI. 
The overall picture that emerges is that country specific factors (i. e. economic health, 
level of human development and standard of living as well as political stability and 
absence of violence and terrorism) as well as real estate sector-specific variables 
(size of institutional real estate market), consistently support their hypotheses as 
explanations for commercial real estate related FDI. 
5.4.5 TESTS FOR ASSUMPTION VALIDITY OF ESTIMATED MODELS FOR 
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FDI 
So far the different panel models have been estimated using the pooled Tobit 
technique. This section highlights the overall robustness and validity of these models 
(details of each individual test can be found in Appendix 7). 
Unlike the fixed and random effects panel estimation, which requires conducting 
tests of autocorrelation, homoskedasticity, White heteroskedasticity and normality 
tests of residuals, the pooled Tobit tests can be done using the Correlogram Q-Stat 
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for both serial correlation and heteroskedasticty as well as normality test of 
residuals, which are all provided by Eviews statistical package for pooled Tobit. 
Therefore the tests to be conducted include: 
I. Serial correlation's in the residuals: 
" HO = No serial correlation in the residuals 
"HI= There is serial correlation in the residuals 
2. Heteroskedasticity'8 of the residuals: 
" HO = no heteroskedasticity (i. e. variance of residuals is constant) 
"HI= There is heteroskedasticity (i. e. variance of residuals is not constant) 
3. Normality19 of the residues: 
" H0= Residuals are normally distributed 
"HI= Residuals are not normally distributed. 
Appendix 7 details all the above robustness and validity tests. Table 22 below 
summarises the results of the tests for all the models. Clearly, HO can be accepted 
for both serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, and rejected for normality of 
residuals. This is not an unanticipated result, indeed, according to Wooldridge (2002; 
p. 534), any inconsistency is expected with pooled Tobit models, as censoring the 
dependant variable do impact the overall distribution of data and can cause 
heteroskedasticity and non-normality in the residuals. He adds that even in the 
presence of both heteroskedasticity or non normality, the pooled Tobit functional 
form can be generalised and that it should be viewed in that light. Thus the research 
models are still valid and can be generalised. 
'i Serial correlation often occurs in a time series or panel data model and is the correlation between the errors in 
different time periods (Wooldridge, 2002a). 
'8 Heteroskedasticity is the variance of the error term, given the explanatory variables, is not constant 
(Wooldridge, 2002a). 
"Normality Assumption is the classical linear model assumption which states that the error (or dependent 
variable) has a normal distribution, conditional on the explanatory variables. 
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Table 22: Summary of validity and robustness tests of CRE FDI models 
Model # 
i 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
Serial correlation Heteroskedasticity Normality 
44 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
x 
4 
4 
J 
4 
4 
4 
q 
4 
4 
4 
4 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
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5.5 DETERMINANTS OF FDA IN HOTELS FOR SELECTED MENA 
ECONOMIES 
5.5.1 OVERVIEW 
This section is the second core empirical work of this research and specifically about 
the determinants of hotel related FDI in the selected MENA markets. 
As in the previous section, this section presents the econometric specification of the 
models used to test the relevant hypotheses, the estimation strategy and a potential 
explanation of the empirical results obtained for hotel related FDI in the selected 
MENA countries. 
The main objective is to test which factors affected hotel FDI location in the selected 
MENA markets. 
Following the relevant literature, this section presents the proxies for the variables 
described in Chapter three and assigns their expected signs as well as the hypothesis 
related to each one. 
In order to test the impact of the selected variables a Tobit, POLS, fixed and random 
effects models were estimated to a balanced panel of relevant data. 
5.5.2 MODEL SPECIFICATION AND METHODOLOGY 
This part too adopts the reduced form approach with the hotel FDI as the 
dependant variable. As for the case of commercial real estate FDI, there is no 
unanimous accepted theory of hotel FDI; therefore, this part of the research also 
uses a pragmatic approach in selecting the explanatory variables to be included in the 
models. Further, the selection of the variables must be inspired by the empirical 
literature on hotel related FDI. And since as mentioned in earlier chapters, most of 
the empirical work was about surveys and questionnaires, and only few 
econometrically tested hotel investment related variables, and since this research 
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covers selected MENA countries from Q 1-2003 to Q4-2009, the appropriate 
modelling strategy is involving both time-series and cross-sectional analysis. The 
model therefore can be represented as follows: 
HFDI/GDP; t = ao + aiHFDI/GDP ; t_l + a2TOTALTAXRATE it. i + 
a3REALVEXPOTGDP ; t_, + a4TAGROWTH it-, + aSRGDPGROWTH , t_, + 
a6HUMANDEVELOPMENT ; t_, + a7INFRAQUAL ; t_, + aBPROTECTINVESTOR ; t_, + 
a9INVFREEDOM; t_l + a, oINSTITUTIONS; t_i +C; +U; t 
Where: 
" C, is a country-specific effect represented by country dummies, i denotes the 
countries, t the year and U an error term. 
" HFDI/GDP: the dependant variable Hotel FDI divided by country GDP. 
" HFDI/GDP(-I): Hotel FDI divided by country GDP from the previous 
period 
" TOTALTAXRATE: total tax rate from the previous period. 
" REALVEXPOTGDP: Real visitor expenditure divided by GDP from the 
previous period. 
" TAG ROWTH: Travel Arrival growth from the previous period. 
" RGDPGROWTH: Real GDP growth from the previous period. 
" HUMANDEVELOPMENT: Human development level from the previous 
period. 
" INFRAQUAL Infrastructure quality from the previous period. 
" PROTECTINVESTOR: Investor Protection level from the previous period. 
" INSTITUTIONS: Quality of institutions: incorporate six variables as follow: 
o CORRUP: Control of Corruption level from the previous period. 
o GOVEFFECT: Government Effectiveness level from the previous period. 
o POLITIC: Political Stability level from the previous period. 
o REGQUALT: Regulatory Quality level from the previous period. 
o RULELAW: Rule of Law level from the previous period. 
o VACCOUNT: Voice and Accountability level from the previous period. 
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" INVFREEDOM: Level of investment freedom from the previous period. 
Some of the variables in the model have been pragmatically selected, as it is believed 
that these variables to be of significance to this type of FDI, and need to be tested for 
further contribution to the existing body of knowledge. The below section details the 
variables used in the research as well as description, sources, and expected signs (for 
a summary see Table 23 below). 
Table 23: Description of hotel FDI related variables 
Variables Unit Expected sign Sources 
HFD1 % of GDP n/a fDi Intelligence (Financial Times 
Ltd) 
HFDI(-I) one year lag of Hotel [+] fDi Intelligence 
FDI (%GDP) 
REALVEXPOT US$ millions lagged [+] World Travel and Tourism 
one year Council WTTC 
TA '000 Tourist Arrivals [+] World Travel & Tourism Council 
lagged one year (WTTC) 
TAGROWTH % Growth of TA [+] World Travel & Tourism Council 
lagged one year 
GDP $US millions [+] 
(WTrC) 
Euromonitor International 
REALGDP GDP, Constant 2000 [+] Datamintor 
Prices, US Dollars 
(Absolute) lagged one 
year 
REALGDPGRTH GDP, Constant 2000 [+] Datamintor 
Prices, US 
Dollars(Growth) 
lagged one year 
INFRAQUAL Ranking (1-7) (1: [+] World Economic Forum Global 
poorest quality, and Competiveness Report 
7: best quality) lagged 
one year 
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TOTALTAXRATE (% profit) [-] The World Bank (Doing Business 
Database) 
CORRUP Ranking 0-I, where 0 
is for countries with 
Corruption (control of most corrupted 
corruption) systems, and I for 
least corrupted 
systems 
GOVEFFECT Ranking 0-I, where 0 
government effectiveness is for countries with 
(bureaucratic quality) least effective 
governments, and I 
for most effective 
governments 
REGQUALT Ranking 0-I, where 0 
regulatory quality is for countries with 
(investment profile) lowest regulatory 
RULELAW 
quality, and I for 
highest regulatory 
quality 
Ranking 0-I, where 0 
is for countries with 
Rule of law (law and least rule of law 
order) environment , and I 
for best rule of law 
environment 
VACCOUNT Ranking 0-I, where 0 
Voice and accountability is for countries with 
POLITIC 
least level of 
freedom, and I for 
best level of freedom 
Ranking 0- 1, where 0 
is for countries with 
Political stability and least political stability 
absence of violence environment , and I 
for best political 
stability environment 
[+] Economist Intelligence Unit 
[+1 
[+] 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
[+] Economist Intelligence Unit 
1+1 Economist Intelligence Unit 
[+] Economist Intelligence Unit 
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PROTECTINVESTOR Ranking 0 to 10, with [+] The World Bank (Doing Business 
higher values Database) 
indicating more 
investor protection. 
HUMANDEVELOPME # (ranging from 0-I 
, 
[+] Human Development Index: 
NT where, best =I/ http: //hdr. undp. org/en/statistics/da 
worst=0) to 
5.5.2.1 DEPENDANT VARIABLE 
S. S. 2. I. I HotelFDl/GDP. 
The dependant variable, HFDI (Hotel FDI), has been measured by the nominal hotel 
related FDI flows, as provided by fDi Intelligence database, GDP data is derived from 
Euromonitor International. It must be noted though that fDi Intelligence database 
does not provide any information on the contractual agreement or type of operation 
of hotels; rather they argue that this information does not exist. However, they also 
claim that they only provide data for projects, that foreign investors have either 
minority or majority equity stack in the projects. This ensures to some extent that 
these projects can be considered as FDIs. 
The level of hotel investment in each country is normalised by dividing hotel FDI by 
the country's GDP. This allows us adjust the level of investment for the size of the 
country's economy. This transformation allows us taking the market size into 
account in the model, but avoids the problem of endogeneity. 
5.5.2.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
5.5.2.2.1 Lagged Hotel FDI/GDP: HFDI/GDP(-I): 
2I31P. 1 
In order to test following the competitor hypothesis, the research employs one year 
lag of Hotel FDI/GDP in the countries as an independent variable. A positive 
coefficient of lagged hotel FDI flows may support the hypothesis that there evidence 
for competitor following effects. 
5.5.2.2.2 Total tax rate: TOTALTAXRATE(-1) 
The research also employs total tax rate as an independent variable. As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, the total taxes as a share of profit before all taxes borne. It 
is expected that taxation will negatively impact Hotel FDI in the selected markets. 
The opaqueness of the regulations in terms of tax holidays and other incentives 
makes it difficult to account for all specific tax considerations for each country. 
However, it is still believed that taxes need to be taken into the model as a key 
determinant for hotel FDI, as sooner or later, taxes will impact these long term 
businesses. 
5.5.2.2.3 Real visitor expenditure: REALVEXPOTGDP(-I) 
The research accounts for tourism demand by employing the real visitor expenditure 
variable. It is defined as the real expenditure by international visitors on goods and 
services within the economy. Such inbound tourism spending includes (from the 
balance of payments accounts) both travel spending and spending on passenger 
transport services provided by the nation's firms to non-residents. Data is collected 
from the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC), and has been transformed by 
dividing it by GDP, to account for variations of market size and account for 
comparability. The variable is lagged one year, and the expected sign is positive. 
Figure 49: Real visitor expenditure (%GDP) 
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Figure 49 shows how tourism is contributing to both the Moroccan and Tunisian 
economies. In Morocco for instance, and since the mid 1990s, tourism has become a 
main driver of the Moroccan economy. This affluence increased in response to the 
Vision 2010 plan set out in January 2001 by King Mohamed A. 
The Vision 2010 is a road map that aims to attract: 10 million tourists in 2010; 
increase capacity by 160,000 beds (130,000 on the coast and 30,000 for cultural 
destinations) to reach a total of 230,000 in 2010; and invest more than Dh80 billion 
over the 2001- 2010 period to improve infrastructure, roads, tourist attractions, 
leisure ports and hotels; and create 600,000 jobs. The Vision 2010 has radically 
changed the map of tourism in Morocco (Euromonitor International, 2009). 
According to Euromonitor International (2009), the Vision 2010 plan has given a 
strong political dynamic to the tourism sector, positioning tourism as a national 
economic priority within six targeted areas. These include: product development; 
professional education and qualifications; the development of the transport 
infrastructure (especially Airline industry); the improvement in marketing and 
communication locally and aboard; the improvement in the tourism environment; 
and finally, the development of an adequate tourism infrastructure. 
5.5.2.2.4 Tourism Arrival Growth rate: TAGROWTH(-I) 
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Another demand driven variable is employed in the study. As mentioned previously 
in the literature, demand for tourism is being determined by accounting for the 
tourist arrival variable. It is believed that the growth of tourist arrivals can positively 
influence hotel FDI. Data were collected from the World Travel & Tourism Council 
(WTTC), and lagged for one year. The expected sign is positive and significant. 
Figure 50: Tourism arrival growth rate 
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Figure 50 above shows the lack of travellers to Algeria, compared to neighbouring 
countries such as Tunisia and Morocco, which in itself an indication of the country's 
long neglect of an industry that can offer one of the world's undiscovered tourist 
gems. According to Euromonitor International (2008), Algeria, now wants to 
promote its tourist industry, as the government has realised that state management 
of hotels is not the best way forward, which has resulted in the low number of 
tourists, a programme has been initiated to privatise its 73 state-owned hotels with 
the aim of revitalising the tourism industry. However, the main weakness of this 
initiative is the inability of the Algerian Ministry of Tourism to provide quality and a 
variety of tourist sites for inbound tourists to explore and visit, which has to work in 
parallel with hotel privatisation to ensure inbound tourists have high-quality locations 
to visit. Another issue is security, as the US State Department and the British Foreign 
Office often advise their citizens against travelling to Algeria (Euromonitor 
International, 2008). 
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5.5.2.2.5 Real GDP growth: RGDPGROWTH(-I) 
Real GDP growth is also employed as one other determinant for hotel FDI. It is 
believed that economic health is key to attracting hotel investors and a one year lag 
is believed to positively influence hotel FDI. 
5.5.2.2.6 Human development level: HUMANDEVELOPMENT(-I) 
As covered in the previous chapter, the research also uses the Human Development 
Index as a determinant for hotel FDI. The variable ranges from 0- 1, where, best =I/ 
worst=0, and the lagged value of one year is believed to be positively influencing 
hotel FDI. Data is derived from Human Development Report (HDR) database. 
5.5.2.2.7 Quality of overall infrastructure: INFRAQUAL(-1) 
The research also employs a one year lagged value of the quality of infrastructure as 
an indicator of the overall quality of the infrastructure in the sample countries. It is 
also believed that it will be positively influencing hotel FDI. 
5.5.2.2.8 Strength of investor protection: PROTECTINVESTOR(-I) 
The study also employs strength of investor protection variable (see previous 
chapter for details). It is believed that the stronger investors are protected, the more 
hotel FDI will be attracted to the country. Therefore, a one year lag of the index is 
expected to have a positive influence on hotel FDI. 
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5.5.2.2.9 Quality of the institutional framework 
As covered in the previous section, the research is devoted to assess the role of 
institutions and regulations as factors to attract hotel FDI. The same set of 
governance variables developed by Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) will be 
employed. These are as follows: 
" Voice and Accountability (VACCOUNT) 
" Political Stability and Absence of Violence (POLITIC) 
" Government Effectiveness (GOVEFFECT) 
" Regulatory Quality (REGQUALT) 
" Rule of Law (RULELAVV) 
" Control of Corruption (CORRUP) 
The first two indicators (VACCOUNT and POLITIC) are essentially related to the 
way authorities are selected and replaced; the GOVEFFECT and REGQUALT 
indicators refer to the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies (credibility); and the last two variables, RULELAW and CORRUP, consider 
aspects related to the respect, on the part of both citizens and the government, for 
the institutions that resolve their conflicts, and govern their interactions (flexibility). 
These six governance indicators are measured into units ranging from about 0-I, 
with higher values corresponding to better governance. 
As variables of institutions are often correlated with one another, it is generally not 
possible to include several institutions in the same equation. Therefore, each variable 
will be employed once at a time (See Table 28). 
5.5.2.2.10 Overall investment dimate: INVFREEDOM(- I) 
Finally, the research tries to capture different investment restrictions in the sample 
by employing the Heritage Foundation (Index of Economic Freedom), which 
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evaluates a variety of restrictions typically imposed on investment. The investment 
restrictions include: 
I. National treatment of foreign investment 
2. Restrictions on land ownership 
3. Sectoral investment restrictions 
4. Expropriation of investments without fair compensation 
5. Foreign exchange controls 
6. Capital controls 
The index ranges from 0-100, where 0 means countries that impose many 
restrictions, and 100 means countries with no investment restrictions. It is believed 
that a lag of one year of the index will be positively influencing hotel FDI. 
To test the influence of the above described variables upon hotel FDI inflows, the 
study uses a panel data set. Concerning the dependant variable, it also has zero 
values in the hotel FDI, specifically five observations. And as the case for CRE FDI, 
estimating using the OLS can be biased and inconsistent (Gujarati, 2004: p. 616). For 
this purpose, the study also analyses hotel FDI censored at zero, hence a pooled 
Tobit regression was employed to analyse the determinants of hotel FDI censored at 
zero values. 
Before estimating the panel data, it is also essential to carry out the unit root tests to 
examine whether the variables are stationary. Therefore, the next section discusses 
the unit root tests and their results. 
5.5.2.3 PANEL UNIT ROOT TESTS 
Table 24 below shows the results of the unit root test (Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC)) 
test, and confirms that the null hypothesis is rejected for all series tested at their 
levels. 
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Table 24: Unit root test results of variables 
Variables 
HFDIGDP 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
INFRAQUAL 
INVFREEDOM 
REALVEXPOTGDP 
RGDPGROWTH 
TAGROWTH 
TOTALTAXRATE 
PROTECTINVESTOR 
LLC Test results Conclusion 
-16.5351*** 1(0) 
- 1.29020* 1(0) 
-4.32190*** 1(0) 
-3.55790*** 1(0) 
-2.44533*** 1(0) 
-6.1214 1 *** 1(0) 
-5.95415*** 1(0) 
-3.04086*** 1(0) 
-3.55790*** i(0) 
'''°'` Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
Results of the tests suggest that the model can be estimated without using the 
differenced variables. The final model therefore, has the following form: 
HFDI/GDP, t = ao + a, HFDI/GDP t_, + a2TOTALTAXRATE + 
a3REALVEXPOTGDP ; t_, + a4TAGROWTH t_, + aSRGDPGROWTH + 
a6HUMANDEVELOPMENT , t_, + a7INFRAQUAL , t_, + a8PROTECTINVESTOR + 
a9INVFREEDOM, t_, + a, oINSTITUTIONS; t_, +C; +U; t 
Where all variables are stationary in level, so they are included as they are. 
5.5.3 HOTELS PANEL DATA ESTIMATION 
5.5.3.1 PANEL MODEL ESTIMATION 
The correlation matrix and the descriptive statistics were calculated using the 
absolute values of the variables (see Table 25 & Table 26). 
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Table 27: Correlation matrix (dependant vs. all independent variables) for hotel FDI panel 
Correlation 
HFDIGDP 
HFDIGDP(-1) 0.391034 
TOTALTAXRATE(-1) -0.418039*** 
REALVEXPOTGDP(-1) 0.345872*** 
TAGROWTH(-1) 0.082825 
RGDPGROWTH_1 0.270806** 
HUMANDEVELOPMENT(-1) -0.056115 
INFRAQUAL_1 0.355238*** 
CORRU P(-1) 0.359171*** 
GOVEFFECT(-1) 0.236522* 
POLITIC(-1) 0.478399*** 
PROTECTINVESTOR(-1) -0.381454*** 
REGQUALT(-1) 0.335257' 
RULELAW(-1) 0.240289* 
VACCOUNT(-1) 0.010185 
INVFREEDOM(-1) 0.080180 
***, **, * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
As with the case of commercial real estate FDI inflows, hotel FDI inflows have zero 
values which makes the POLS, FE and RE inconsistent and biased and the appropriate 
technique is pooled Tobit (Gujarati, 2004, P: 616); and hence a pooled Tobit 
regression was employed to analyse the hotel FDI determinants. 
As it is not possible to estimate all the variables at once, and after many trials, the 
research arrived at a base model and has the following variables: 
" One lagged period of hotel FDI (%GDP) (HFDI/GDP(- I )) 
" One lagged period of total tax rate (TOTALTAXRATE(- 1)) 
" One lagged period of real visitor expenditure (%GDP) (REALVEXPOTGDP (- 
I )) 
" One lagged period of the % growth of tourist arrivals (TAGROWTH (- 1)) 
" One lagged period of real GDP growth (RGDPGROWTH(- 1)) 
" One lagged period human development level (HUMANDEVELOPMENT(-I)) 
" One lagged period of quality of infrastructure (INFRAQUAL(-I)) 
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As mentioned previously, due to the many zeros in the dependant variable as well as 
the short time series nature of the data, it was not possible to try different lags more 
than one year. 
The final functional form of the initial panel estimation is (see Table 28 M 1): 
HFDIGDP= Constant + (HFDIGDP(- 1)) + (TOTALTAXRATE(- I )) 
(REALVEXPOTGDP (- 1)) + (TAGROWTH (- 1)) + (RGDPGROWTH(- 1)) + 
+ (HUMAN DEVELOPMENT(-I)) + (INFRAQUAL(-I)) 
For all other 'control' variables, the research adds one independent variable at a time 
to the base model to estimate the effect of that variable (see Table 28 M2-M 19) 
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5.5.3.2 RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
This section reports the results of the panel analysis. Table 29 summarises the 
findings from different model specifications, starting with Model I, which is the base 
model specification. Models M2-M9 adds different control variables to the basic 
model MI. 
As-mentioned earlier, all models were estimated using the censored pooled Tobit 
model to account for the zeros in the dependant variable. It is important to note that 
the case of pooled Tobit is as in other limited dependent variable models, the 
estimated coefficients do not have a direct interpretation (Wooldridge, 2002). 
A summary of the hypotheses with the independent and control variables and their 
predicted and actual signs is shown in Table 29. 
Starting with the base model (M 1), only total tax rate, real visitor expenditure, real 
growth of gross domestic product as well as the level of human development have 
the correct signs and are significant at the 5% level. However, the other three 
variables still have the correct signs but insignificant. 
As the research tries to test the "following the competitor" hypothesis (H 1), a one 
year lag of hotel FDI is employed. Interestingly, a positive-sign was identified, which is 
in keeping with the formulation of H 1. This influence is not statistically significant 
though. Therefore, perhaps the role of this variable is not so critical in the hotel FDI 
decisions under certain circumstances. This variable has not be tested before in the 
hotel related FDI literature, and thus this research cannot relates it to any other 
similar studies, however, the results suggests that hotel investors act differently 
under different conditions. 
H2 has indeed been confirmed by the model, since the total tax rate has a negative 
and statistically significant influence on hotel FDI (p<0.01). Therefore, taking up again 
what was explained in regard to commercial real estate FDI, it can be concluded that 
the total tax rate have a negative significant influence on hotel investors covered in 
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the period of the study and assume that it is a critical part in their internationalisation 
decisions. 
it must be noted though that tax holidays and other incentives have not taken into 
account, however, the results support the hypothesis that high taxes negatively 
influence hotel related FDI. 
The results obtained also support H3, as the Tobit analysis shows a strong 
relationship between the real visitor expenditure and hotel FDI (p<0.01). This 
suggests that hotel investors do consider this variable as a key determinant in their 
investment decision making, as it reflects the demand for their products/ services. 
Corresponding to the H4, a positive sign for the growth of tourist arrivals is found, 
but without statistical significance. Therefore, perhaps the role of this variable is not 
critical in the hotel FDI inflows. 
As for H3, H5 is found to have positive and significant influence on hotel FDI. The 
results suggests that countries with real growth in their GDP, do receive more hotel 
FDI inflows, and this supports the hypothesis that investors do take the economic 
health of a country as a key determinant in their internationalisation decision. The 
result also corresponds with findings of (Dunning & Kundu, The internationalization 
of the hotel industry - some new findings from a field study, 1995). 
Therefore, following a line of argument similar to H3, it can be deduced that larger 
markets with sound macroeconomics do have influence on hotel FDI inflows. 
H6 has indeed been confirmed by the model, since the level of human development 
has a positive and statistically significant influence on hotel FDI (p<0.05). As for the 
case of commercial real estate FDI, it seems that investors care much about 
countries with decent standard of living. 
Finally, quality of infrastructure, a positive sign was identified, which is in keeping with 
the formulation of H7. However, this influence is not statistically significant. 
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Therefore, perhaps the role of infrastructure is not so critical in the hotel FDI 
decisions under certain circumstances. 
Throughout, all model specifications (i. e. MI -M9), the impact of taxation 
environment, tourism market size, economic health and level of human development 
on HFDI appears to be insensitive to changes in control variables. 
Table 29: Summary of hypotheses and control variables 
H# Hypothesis 
Variable name 
Expected Actual 
sign sign 
HI 
H2 
H3 
H4 
H5 
H6 
H7 
Hotel investors are more likely to 
follow their competitors which will 
Lagged HFDIGDP 
therefore will be positively associated 
with hotel FDI 
Hotel investors are more sensitive to 
taxation as it impacts the overall 
profitability of the business and thus the 
higher the taxes on the long-term, the TOTALTAXRATE 
less investors get attracted to such 
environment and thus will be negatively 
associated with HFDI 
Hotel investors are more likely to 
invest in markets where real tourist REALVEXPOTGDP 
expenditure (% of GDP) is high, thus 
will be positively associated with HFDI. 
Hotel investors get attracted to 
markets with high % growth of tourist TAGROWTH 
arrivals thus will be positively 
associated with HFDI. 
Growth of economies attracts foreign 
investors and therefore, will be RGDPGROWTH 
positively associated with hotel FDI. 
Foreign investors get attracted to 
countries with sound human HUMANDEVELOPMENT 
development levels, thus will be 
positively associated with hotel FDI 
The overall quality of country's 
infrastructure will attract foreign INFRAQUAL 
investors and thus will be positively 
[+] N. S 
[-l [-1*** 
[+) [+]*'°º 
[+) N. S 
[+l [+]*** 
[+) [+]** 
[+) N. S 
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I associated with hotel FDI. 
Control variables I 
Cl Control of corruption CORRUP [+] N. S 
C2 Government effectiveness GOVEFFECT (+] N. S 
C3 Political stability and absence of 
POLITIC [+] (+]** 
violence 
C4 Investor protection PROTECTINVESTOR [+] (. ]** 
C5 Regulatory quality REGQUALT (+] N. S 
C6 Rule of law RULELAW [+] N. S 
C7 Voice and accountability VACCOUNT (+] N. S 
C8 Overall investment climate (investment INVFREEDOM (+] (+]** 
freedom) 
Significant at I%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. N. S: Not significant 
Concerning control variables, it can be highlighted that control of corruption; 
government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law as well as voice and 
accountability levels did not prove significant and have consequently not determined 
the hotel FDI inflows analysed. Only political stability, investor protection and level 
of investment freedom turned out to be statistically significant (p<0.05). 
In model (M2), the research controls for corruption, and as can be seen from the 
table, corruption has the expected positive sign but insignificant influence on hotel 
FDI. Again this could be interpreted as the role of control of corruption is not so 
critical in the hotel FDI decisions. 
In Model 3 and as the study tries to capture the impact of government effectiveness 
on hotel FDI, the results show again that it has a positive but insignificant influence 
on hotel FDI, which makes this variable not critical in hotel FDI decisions. 
In Model 4, the research controls for political stability and its impact on hotel FDI. 
Indeed and as expected, political stability has a positive impact on hotel FDI and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Similar to the results obtained for CRE FDI, 
political instability in the MENA region act as threat to further attract hotel related 
investments in certain markets. 
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For instance, in Algeria and throughout the period of study, only eleven hotels 
investment were announced by foreign chains with an estimated total investment of 
$2.6 billion. Compared with the UAE for instance, this has more than eighty hotel 
investments (for the same period) with an estimated $20 billion, approximately ten 
times what has been announced in Algeria. This assures that political stability plays a 
critical role in hotel internationalisation decisions. 
In Model 5 and contrary to what was expected, the model shows that the strength of 
investor protection has a negative sign and statistically significant at the 5% level. In 
this regard, and although, as pointed out when the study expected the positive 
influence on the hotel FDI, there is empirical evidence in the hotel industry in which 
that relationship is not totally confirmed either it has the wrong sign (i. e. negative). 
According to the UNCTAD (2007), hotel investors are minimising such risks 
considerably (i. e. weak investor protection), as well as achieving a high degree of 
control via certain contractual agreements, thus, growth can take place faster and 
assuming less risk. 
In Model 6 the research tries to capture the impact of regulatory quality on hotel 
FDI. The result shows the variable to be negative and was not significant. The 
insignificance of the coefficient confirms that the variable is not so critical for hotel 
related FDI decisions. 
In Model 7, the study controls for rule of law and its impact on hotel FDI. As can be 
seen from the table, the variable has the wrong sign (negative), and not significant. 
This again implies that the variable is not critical to hotel internationalisation 
decisions. 
Model 8 employs another institutional-related variable, voice and accountability. The 
model shows that the variable has the correct sign (positive), but not statistically 
significant. This again implies on its non-critical role in the hotel FDI decisions. 
Finally, in Model 9 undoubtedly and as expected, level of investment freedom in 
countries has the positive sign, and statistically significant at the I% level. 
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The overall picture that emerges is that country specific factors (i. e. tax environment, 
level of human development and standard of living, real growth of economy, as well 
as political stability and absence of violence and terrorism) as well as hotel sector- 
specific variables (i. e. real visitor expenditure and level of investment freedom); 
consistently support their hypotheses as explanations for hotel FDI. 
5.5.3.3 TESTS FOR ASSUMPTION VALIDITY OF ESTIMATED MODELS FOR HOTEL FDI 
This section summarises the overall validity and robustness tests conducted for the 
models (details of each individual test can be found in Appendix 7). 
The pooled Tobit tests can be done using the Correlogram Q-Stat for both serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity as well as normality test of residuals, which are all 
provided by Eviews statistical package for pooled Tobit. 
Therefore the tests will be conducted includes: 
I. Serial correlation in the residuals: 
" HO = No serial correlation in the residuals 
"HI= There is serial correlation in the residuals 
2. Heteroskedasticity of the residuals: 
" HO = no heteroskedasticity (i. e. variance of residuals is constant) 
"H I= There is heteroskedasticity (i. e. variance of residuals is not 
constant) 
3. Normality of the residues: 
" H0= Residuals are normally distributed 
"HI= Residuals are not normally distributed. 
Appendix 7 details all the above robustness and validity testes. Table 30 below 
summarises the results of the tests for all the models (MI-M9). Clearly, HO is 
accepted for serial correlation, but reject for both heteroskedasticity and normality 
of residuals. 
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As mentioned in the previous section, the models are valid, however, due to non- 
normality and heteroskedasticty of the residuals, the models are less robust, as the 
coefficients can be either over or under-estimated, however, the significance and sign 
of the coefficients are still valid, and the functional form and conclusions can be 
drawn and generalised 
Table 30: Summary of validity and robustness tests of hotel FDI models 
Model # 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Serial correlation Heteroskedasticity Normality 
q 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
if 
4 
5.6 SUMMARY 
xx 
xx 
xx 
xx 
xx 
xx 
xx 
xx 
xx 
This chapter considered the design and development of the econometric models for 
FDI in real estate and different models for FDI in hotels. The chapter also discussed 
the results and validated the models using the validity and robustness tests. It was 
found that the models are valid, however, due to non-normality and 
heteroskedasticty of the residuals, the models are less robust, as the coefficients can 
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be either over or under-estimated, however, the significance and sign of the 
coefficients are still valid, and the functional form and conclusions can be drawn and 
generalised (Wooldridge, 2002). 
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6. CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The overall aim of this thesis is to contribute to the existing body of knowledge by 
examining the determinants of foreign direct investment in commercial real estate 
and hotel sectors, in selected MENA economies. To achieve this aim the research 
econometrically examined selected MENA countries for a certain time-period (2003- 
2009). This chapter summarises the results of the thesis. It also discusses policy 
implications and limitations of the thesis and offers some suggestions for future 
research. 
Chapter one of this thesis outlined the broad scope of study. It also highlighted the 
research aim and objectives, research design and key contributions to the body of 
knowledge. Chapters two and three aimed at building the theoretical frameworks of 
the study. This was achieved by reviewing the relevant literature including the 
international business and real estate and hotel investment sources. The main 
conclusions were about identifying the set of determinants (drivers as well as 
barriers) of FDI in both CRE and hotel sectors. 
Chapter two was mainly concerned with literature review of international real estate 
investment as well as hotel investment. It presented the many forms of investment in 
commercial real estate, and covered the decision-making process of investing in 
international real estate. The chapter also critically reviewed theories related to real 
estate including Modern Portfolio Theory and Dunning's Ownership-Locational- 
Internalisation (OLI) framework, and specifically applied the OLI framework to the 
real estate sector by employing the L dimension as explanation to FDI decisions. The 
chapter also provided a comprehensive review of the different factors influencing 
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international real estate investments (including economic, political, institutional as 
well as real estate specific factors), to formulate a conceptual framework of the 
determinants of FDI in real estate. 
The other sections of the chapter were also concerned with foreign direct 
investment in hotels. They linked tourism to the hotel industry, and then presented 
the most common market entry strategies of hotel MNC's including both FDI and 
non-equity forms of exposure. Then, suggested the application of the OLI framework 
to the hotel industry, by employing the L dimension to explain the FDI decisions. The 
chapter ended by a comprehensive review of the different factors influencing 
internationalisation of hotel MNC's, which formulated a framework of the 
determinants of FDI in the hotel sector. 
It was found that not all developing countries receive as much real estate and hotel 
related FDI as they might expect, despite liberalisation efforts and economic reforms. 
Nonetheless, the rising significance of global real estate and hotel related FDI as two 
attractive sectors have encouraged very few researchers to produce literature about 
determinants of these secotoral FDI. However, there are many gaps in the literature 
which led to this research. The major gap is that there are no empirical studies on 
the determinants of commercial real estate and hotel FDI on emerging and 
transitional countries that specifically focus on the MENA region. This study 
therefore, is the first attempt to investigate the determinants of commercial real 
estate and hotel FDI specifically upon the MENA countries. 
Chapter three was mainly concerned with the MENA region and its fit into the global 
context. The chapter tried to provide a clear view of the MENA region as well as 
examining the selected MENA countries, in terms of their political, economical and 
taxation regimes. 
Chapter four explained and evaluated 'econometric modelling' as the research 
methodology adopted, and discussed how the research aims have influenced the 
choice of this method. The econometric analysis was carried out by different panel 
data procedures to test the hypotheses of the study. As the dependant variables in 
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both the CRE and hotel FDI, contained zero observations, the econometric analysis 
has to be done using a corner solution called the Tobit model, which censors these 
zero observations to avoid the biasness and inconsistency that may arise from using 
OLS regressions (Gujarati, 2004). 
The chapter also presented the sources of data consulted in formulating the models. 
A specific focus has been given to the main source for the dependant variables (i. e. 
Di Intelligence), and its strength and weaknesses. 
Chapter five considered the design and development of the econometric models for 
FDI in real estate and different models for FDI in hotels. The chapter also discussed 
the results and validated the models using the validity and robustness tests. It was 
found that the models are valid, however, due to non-normality and 
heteroskedasticty of the residuals, the models are less robust, as the coefficients can 
be either over or under-estimated, however, the significance and sign of the 
coefficients are still valid, and the functional form and conclusions can be drawn and 
generalised, as the aim of the study is to study the determinants of FDI not to 
predict FDI (Wooldridge, 2002) (see Appendix 7). 
As the empirical work of this thesis consists of two parts (i. e. determinants of both 
FDI in real estate and FDI in hotels), the conclusions also are divided into two 
sections as follows: 
6.2 CONCLUDING REMARKS ON FDI IN REAL ESTATE 
In summary, this research revealed different interesting findings. Starting with 
secondary data related to FDI inflows into CRE for the selected MENA countries. 
According to fDi Intelligence database, it was found that capital flowed for 
commercial real estate were primarily targeting Central Business Districts (CBD's) 
(see chapter 5.3). As an example, all CRE FDIs in Egypt was directed into Cairo (the 
capital city). The same situation was for Morocco, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, as all the 
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flows were directed into the cities of Rabat, Doha and Riyadh, respectively. UAE 
however, had a different pattern, as more than 90% of the flow was directed to 
Dubai, for its position as the financial services centre in the UAE and the GCC. 
Another observation from fDi Intelligence database was related to source country of 
capital. Interestingly and as expected, various FDI flows in CRE are intra-MENA, due 
to culture proximity (see chapter 5.3). For instance, FDI flows to Morocco, was 
primarily originated from the UAE. This is also the case for Qatar, as all the flows 
were generated from the UAE. 
The findings for the econometric analysis of FDI in commercial real estate shows that 
country specific factors (i. e. economic health, standard of living and levels of human 
development as well as political stability and absence of violence) as well as real 
estate sector-specific variables (size of institutional real estate market), consistently 
support the hypotheses as explanations for commercial real estate related FDI. 
These findings are slightly consistent with the results obtained in the literature (see 
Chapter two). For instance, market size and political stability are significant and carry 
the expected positive signs for real estate FDI flows to the selected MENA countries, 
while other determinants such as the quality of infrastructure, real estate market 
transparency, government effectiveness, control of corruption, rule of law and 
regulatory quality are not significant. The one year lagged value of commercial real 
estate FDI has the opposite sign (i. e. negative) that one predicted by previous 
studies20 that indicate that investors are rational in their investments decisions and 
might not follow each other, which corresponds with findings of (Fuchs & 
Scharmanski, 2009). 
Further, one determinant and perhaps the most important finding of the 
econometric analysis of FDI in CRE which explains why some of the selected the 
20 Refer to D'Arcy (2009) and Fuchs & Scharmanski (2009) for a review on international investors 
behaviour in emerging markets. 
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MENA countries attract real estate FDI less than most other MENA countries, it is 
political instability which was found to be a significant determinant and main 
obstructions to attracting real estate related FDI, if not the main one. These results 
seem to be quite important for policy. Policy-makers should be aware of the negative 
effect of the political risk to FDI. Politicians from the MENA should know that 
political risk in their countries is probably the greatest obstacle to their real estate 
market development. These findings should be seriously considered in any policy 
making effort on the part of the government. 
In chapter two, it is found that investors start their venture journey screening 
countries for real estate opportunities using scoring models (see also Appendix 6.4), 
this study supports investors methodology and asserts that certain factors such as 
general macroeconomic indicators, which are obtainable from the IMF, the World 
Bank and other sources, may provide a useful first stage screening comparisons, of 
the country selection process, with the aim to narrow down choices from the 185 
nations in the world. The study also suggests that some variables are very useful to 
partially assess investment risk and of importance when deciding on venturing into 
the unknown (e. g. political instability), as this variable is found to be explaining the 
riskiness of the countries and the flow of funds especially in the MENA countries. 
6.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS ON FDI IN HOTELS 
According to Di Intelligence database (see chapter 5.3), FDI inflows to hotels for the 
selected MENA markets have homogenous patterns, as capital flows are mostly 
directed into CBD's cities or cities famous for tourism activities. For instance, in 
Turkey (see chapter 5.3), FDI inflows were primarily directed to both Istanbul (CBD) 
and Izmir (the third largest city in Turkey with an extraordinary history, spanning 
around 5,000 years, and has long been amongst the most cosmopolitan cities in 
Turkey, with many archaeological sites relating to past Greek, Roman and Byzantine 
civilisations (World Guides, n. d)). 
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The situation is also similar for Egypt, as most hotels related FDI were directed into 
cities of Cairo (CBD) and Hurghada (a city that is famous for scuba diving and special 
marine life (World Guides, n. da)). 
In terms of source country analysis, fDi Intelligence database revealed few interesting 
observations. For instance, and in contrast to the case for commercial real estate 
FDI, only few FDI flows were originated from culturally similar countries. One case is 
Algeria, as most of the flows were originated from both the UAE and France (as 
French language is widely used in government, culture, media (newspapers) and 
education, and can be regarded as being de facto the co-official language of Algeria 
(Wikipedia, n. d)). The rest of the sample had FDI flows from almost every continent. 
For example, in Tunisia, investments were originated from Europe (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Ireland and Italy), Asia (Hong Kong and India) and Africa (Egypt). 
The situation is also similar for Saudi Arabia, were FDI was originated from Belgium, 
Canada, Switzerland, UAE, UK and USA. 
The findings for the econometric analysis of FDI in hotels shows that country specific 
factors (i. e. tax environment, human development level and real growth of economy 
and political stability and absence of violence) as well as hotel sector-specific 
variables (i. e. real visitor expenditure and level of investment freedom); consistently 
support their hypotheses as explanations for hotel FDI. 
The findings of the research are somewhat inconsistent with the results obtained in 
the literature (see Chapter two). For instance, the value of hotel FDI from the 
previous period is not significant for FDI flows to the selected MENA countries21, 
while other determinants such as market size, stability of the country and investment 
freedom are significant and carry the expected signs. The investor protection has the 
opposite sign that one predicted which indicate that hotel investors are minimising 
21 Although there is no previous study exmined the `following the compettitor' hypolthesis, refer to Kundu & 
Contractor (1999) for a discussion and tests of `following the client' hypothesis. 
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such risks considerably, as well as achieving a high degree of control via certain 
contractual agreements. 
Further, three determinants explain why some of the selected MENA countries 
attract hotel FDI less than most other countries at a similar stage of development in 
the MENA region: taxation is considered as a problem to hotel investors and plays a 
key role in attracting MNC's into the MENA region. The second is the level of 
investment freedom which is found to be significant in explaining hotel related FDI. 
Once again, political instability, violence and terrorism were found to be one of the 
most important findings of the econometric analysis of FDI in hotels. 
Governments are required to understand the potential benefits to be gained from 
attracting global hotel MNC's, and in order to do so, UNCTAD (2007) survey 
suggests that a host country need to have in place a wider policy framework to make 
the most of the opportunities (e. g. by encouraging the establishment of local firms 
capable of taking advantage of the transfer and diffusion of technology and expertise) 
and minimise any costs. Governments (if to take full advantage of FDI as a catalyst 
and a complement to domestic investment), need a coherent and integrated policy 
framework (UNCTAD, 2007). But this is not simple in tourism, as it is a cross- 
cutting and interlinking activity, with a long value chain that involves the provision of 
services by many providers - private and public; the number and range of policies 
that need attention are large, far-reaching and diverse (UNCTAD, 2007). 
This study supports what suggested by Kundu & Contractor (1999); as they state 
that managers in the strategic planning departments of global hotel firms 
continuously search for foreign expansion locations, and to do so, mangers analyse 
and compare countries, and as this study shows, the screening process could be 
performed using both general (e. g. tax environment, human development level and 
real growth of economy) as well as sector specific variables (e. g. real visitor 
expenditure). Data are available for the public for all these variables and can assist in 
evaluating options. The study suggests that mangers should consult certain variables 
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(e. g. political stability), as these are of importance in explaining flows of funds into the 
hotel industry in the MENA region and could be of importance to other parts of the 
world. 
Table 31 below shows the key findings from modelling FDI in both CRE and hotels, 
and as can be seen, both types of investors are concerned with almost the same 
country level factors (e. g. country level of development, growth of the economy and 
political stability). The sector specific factors, are consistent with what found in the 
literature and support the research hypotheses, for instance, larger real estate 
markets do attract more investors in to the country. The situation is same for hotel 
investors, as they consider demand for tourism (measured by visitor expenditure) a 
significant variable when deciding on hotel investment. 
Table 3 1: Findings of modelling FDI in CRE and hotel green field projects 
Country specific 
factors 
Real estate 
sector-specitc 
variables 
ýIc t___ cl dILC VI 
institudonal human real estate development 
market 
Real growth 
of. c000my 
I 
I 
PoNtial 
stabNity 
Level of 
investment 
freedom 
In the end, it is worthwhile to emphasise that this is one of the few FDI studies that 
have incorporated sector-specific variables for both real estate and hotel industries. 
And to the best of our knowledge the first to investigate the MENA markets. And 
the findings of this thesis can be seriously considered in any policy making effort on 
the part of the government. Policies should be designed to stabilise the overall 
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investment environment which should help MENA countries to attract more sectoral 
FDI. Such policies could include measures to improve the regulatory environment, 
reduce currency and financial risk, and avoid political and social instability. 
According to the World Bank (2003) MENA strategy paper, the region's sensitive 
political environment has resulted in policies being overly oriented toward short-run 
gain, at the expense of long-run objectives. This has contributed to the instability of 
investment risk. World Bank (2003) paper therefore recommends the reorientation 
of policies toward long-term objectives in order to help reduce the degree of risk 
instability in the region. 
It is hoped that this study will spark more sector-specific studies, especially in the 
relatively neglected area of service related FDI. 
The next sections depict the limitations of this research as well as considering 
recommendations for future research. 
6.4 LIMITATIONS 
This research has two types of limitations. 
I. Data limitations 
The first type of limitations is mostly attributed to data problems. This study uses 
data on an aggregate level, which increases the probability that some important 
information has been lost during the collection and transformation of the data. 
Another limitation is the fact, that only annual time-series have been used to 
compute the panel models. Furthermore, the short time period covers the years 
2003 to 2009 which casts some doubts whether a vigorous econometric analysis can 
be undertaken. 
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The accuracy of the data basis can further be challenged by the fact that the research 
uses data mostly at the aggregate level from a variety of sources including public and 
private agencies, which definitely influence the accuracy of such data. Although this is 
the case, the study collected data from the most reliable sources including firm level 
data (at a cost). 
Another issue in the nature of the data especially the dependant variable has forced 
the use of a corner solution technique (i. e. Tobit model) to overcome the bias and 
inconsistency of using the OLS, however, this came at a cost, essentially in the 
robustness of the models, yet, the functional forms are valid and generalisable. 
2. Period of study 
As the period of study is three years, it was not possible to expand more on the 
qualitative data end. This is however, an opportunity for future research, where can 
collect more primary data from foreign investors, policy makers as well as property 
and hotel markets intermediaries. 
6. S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are few possible directions for future research in this arena, these can be 
summarised as follows: 
The first recommendation is to extend the current research and examine the impact 
of these sectoral FDI's on economic growth of those countries. It would be 
interesting to determine the significance of both sectors to the wider economy, and 
whether governments are making enough efforts to take full advantage of these two 
sectors as part of their plans to economic growth. 
The second recommendation is to look at different countries or regions, for 
instance, to cover Eastern Europe or South East Asia. This could entail modelling 
2441 Pa&e 
3I 
both commercial real estate as well as hotel related FDI's. Data sources could vary 
though, especially for FDI related variables. Concerning independent variables, the 
current study already tried pragmatically a number of variables for the first time, and 
thus suggests that variables from this research as well as other variables will be 
interesting to be empirically tested. 
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8. APPENDICES 
8.1 APPENDIX 1: KEY DEFINITIONS 
FDI in the This study defines FDI as `the direct investment announced 
context of and committed by foreign CRE and hotel investors in a host 
greenfield and country, which will result in creating a new asset or expanding 
expansion of an existing asset which will entail capital investment and 
investments create jobs. ' 
In this research, only greenfield (new assets) and expansions 
of existing projects are considered where additional 
investment and jobs are created. Joint ventures are also 
included in the research where they lead to a new physical 
(greenfield) operation. Mergers & acquisitions (M&A) and 
other equity investments are not included as part of this 
research. 
Property/ real Property or real estate is defined and limited to non- 
estate residential and non-industrial fixed assets of office and retail 
buildings only. There is only one exception where `residential' 
properties may be included, and this where they are under 
the 'mixed-used' project category. 
Hotel property The World Tourism Organisation (WTO) defines hotels 
within the classification of tourism accommodation as 
"collective tourist establishments", comprising: hotels, apartment- 
hotels, motels, roadside inns, beach hotels, residential clubs and 
similar establishments providing hotel services including more than 
bed-making and cleaning of rooms". 
Foreign investors Foreign investors and developers include (public and private 
real estate firms, multinational banks, international 
institutional investors, pension funds and pension fund 
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advisors, construction firms, and multinational corporations) 
who are involved in developing CRE and hotel projects in 
foreign countries. 
Hotel Hotel multinational corporation (MNC) that renders tourism 
Multinational and hospitality services. Including private hotels, residential 
Corporation hotels, guest houses, boarding houses, lodging houses, bed 
(MNC): and breakfast, inns, pensions, motels, etc (Johnson, 2002). 
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8.2 APPENDIX 2: FACTORS INFLUENCING INTERNATIONAL REAL ESTATE 
INVESTMENT 
Category 
Factors Author (s) 
POLTICAL AND 
REGULATORY 
FACTORS 
Liberalisation of financial market environment 
Standardisation of property rights and market 
practice 
Restrictions & regulations on foreign investors 
Legal regulation 
Taxation 
Transparency of legislative system 
Government intervention 
Perceived corruption level 
Preferential tax incentives for FDI 
restrictions on foreign sale 
restrictions on foreign lease/rent 
restrictions on repatriation of profits 
restrictions on currency control 
Internal political Stability 
External political Stability 
Regulation on construction 
Chin, Dent, & Roberts, (2006); 
Lim, McGreal, & Webb (2006) 
Chin, Dent, & Roberts, (2006); 
Lim, McGreal, & Webb (2006) 
Chin, Dent, & Roberts, (2006); 
Mcgreal, Parsa, & Keivani, 
(2002) 
Chin, Dent, & Roberts, (2006); 
Mcgreal, Parsa, & Keivani, 
(2002) 
Chin, Dent, & Roberts, (2006) 
Chin, Dent, & Roberts, (2006), 
Lim, McGreal, & Webb (2006) 
Chin, Dent, & Roberts, (2006) 
Chin, Dent, & Roberts. (2006), 
Lim, McGreal, & Webb (2006) 
Zhu. Sim. & Zhang (2006) 
Mcgr-eal, Parsa. & Kcrv, ini, 
(2002) 
Mcgreal, Parsa. & Keivani, 
(2002) 
Mcgrcal, Parsa. & Kcrvani, 
(2002) 
Mcgreal, Paru, & Ke'ivani, 
(2002) 
Chin, Dent. & Roberts. (2006). 
Lim. McGrcal. & Webb (2006) 
Chin, Dent, & Roberts, (2006); 
Lim, McGreal, & Webb (2006) 
Sim, Zhu, & Zhang (2003) 
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ECONOMIC 
FACTORS 
REAL ESTATE 
MARKET SPECIFIC 
FACTORS 
Regulation on development financing 
Regulation on property investment 
Planning and conservation policies 
Governmental permits 
Bu reaucracylofficialdom 
Economic environment 
Stable development environment 
Availability of skilled workers 
Strength & stability of economy 
Currency exchange stability & convertibility 
Currency exchange Rate 
Track record of macroeconomic policies 
Creditworthiness of Country 
The presence of property intermediaries 
Property market data availability 
standardisation 
Quality of property products 
User and investor opportunities 
Level of transparency of the market 
Urban form (planning) 
Potential of the market 
Education, training and employment 
Availability of institutional investment 
properties 
Sim, Zhu, & Zhang (2003) 
Sim, Zhu, & Zhang (2003) 
Sim, Zhu. & Zhang (2003) 
Sim, Zhu, & Zhang (2003) 
Sim, Zhu, & Zhang (2003); 
Mcgreal, Parsa, & Keivani, 
(2002) 
Chin, Dent, & Roberts, (2006); 
Mcgreal, Parsa, & Keivani 
(2002) 
Chin, Dent, & Roberts, (2006) 
Chin, Dent, & Roberts. (2006) 
Chin, Dent, & Roberts, (2006); 
Lim, McGreal, & Webb (2006) 
Chin. Dent. & Roberts, (2006), 
Lim, McGreal, & Webb (2006) 
Lim, McGreal. & Webb (2006) 
Lim, McGreal, & Webb (2006) 
Lim, McGreal, & Webb (2006) 
Chin, Dent, & Rober tti, (2006); 
Sim, Zhu, & Zhang (2003) 
and Chin, Dent, & Roberts, (2006); 
Sim, Zhu, & Zhang (2003) 
Chin. Dent. & Ruhm ts, (2006) 
Chin, Dent, & Roberts, (2006) 
Chin. Dent, & Rohei ty, (20061, 
Sim. Zhu, & Zhing (2003) 
''' Chin, Dent. & Roberts, (2006) 
Zhu, Sir). & Zhang (2006) 
Zhu, Sim, & Zhang (2006) 
grade Lim, McGreal, & Webb (2006) 
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Limitations of release of site in greenfield areas 
Quality of human resources 
Availability of finance 
Market size 
Liquidity of property markets 
Ability to identify acquisitions in a foreign 
market 
Supply and demand fundamentals 
Cultural differences 
Way of doing business 
SOCIAL RELATED Cultural differences 
FACTORS 
COMPANY/ 
INVESTOR 
MOTIVATIONAL 
FACTORS TO 
INVEST 
INTERNATIONALLY 
Penetration into new market 
Language barriers 
AMIA 
Custom and habit 
Personal contacts 
Company's development strategy 
Accumulation of experience in the market 
Diversification of investment 
Search for higher returns 
Steady income stream 
Potential capital appreciation 
Lack of opportunities in domestic Markets 
Tax incentives 
Match foreign assets to foreign Liabilities 
Sound economic policies and market orientated 
reforms in foreign countries 
Poor returns in home country 
Penetration of new markets 
Broadening markets 
Diversification of investment 
Sim, Zhu, & Zhang (2003) 
Sim, Zhu, & Zhang (2003) 
Mcgreal, Parsa, & Keivani, 
(2002) 
Falkenbach(2009) 
Falkenbach (2009) 
Worzala (1994) 
Lim, McGreal, & Webb (2006) 
Chin, Dent, & Roberts (2006) 
Um, McGreal, & Webb (2006) 
Lim, McGreal, & Webb (2006) 
Lim. McGreal, & Webb (2006) 
Lim, McGreal, & Webb (2006) 
Lim, McGreal, & Webb (2006) 
Zhu, Sim, & Zhang (2006) 
Zhu, Sim, & 7-hang (2006) 
Zhu, Sim, & Zh,, ng (2006) 
Zhu, Sim, & Zhang (2006) 
Lim, McGreal, & Webb (2006) 
Lim, McGreal. & Webb (2006) 
Lim, McGreal, & Webb (20061 
Lim, McGreal, & Webb (2006) 
Lim, McGical. & Webb (2006) 
Lim, McGreal, & Webb (2006) 
Lim, McGi cal. & Webb (2006) 
Lim, McGreal, & Webb (2006) 
Sim, Zhu, & Zhang (2003) 
Sim, Zhu, & Zhang (2003) 
Sim, Zhu, & Zhang (2003) i 
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Establishment of Foothold Sim, Zhu, & Zhang (2003) 
Accumulation of experience Sim, Zhu, & Zhang (2003) 
Share of Culture & Value Sim, Zhu, & Zhang (2003) 
Gaining a dominant position Sim, Zhu, & Zhang (2003) 
Utilizing local fiscal incentives Sim, Zhu. & Zhang (2003) 
Source: Developed for this study 
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8.3 APPENDIX 3: RECENT STUDIES ON MARKET MATURITY PARADIGM 
Author(s)/ Countries Methodology Themes of research 
date /Cities employed 
investigated 
Mcgreal, Budapest, Qualitative: 
Para, & Prague and Primary Data 
Keivani Warsaw Focus groups, 
(2002) structured 
interviews and 
Questionnaire 
survey. 
And 
Four themes: 
I. the rationale for investment in 
emerging markets in general and 
specifically in central Europe; 
2. factors influencing/ barriers to 
property investment; 
3. policy mechanisms and 
institutional perspectives; 
Secondary data 4. future development within a 
sources on regional and wider European 
macroeconomics context 
and market data 
Lim, Central/ South Quantitative: Two Themes: 
McGreal, America and 1. The nature of domestic and 
& Webb Africa Mailed survey foreign real estate investment by 
(2006) the respondent companies and the 
main factors governing the 
decisions of institutions into 
international real estate 
investments. 
2. the perceptions of risk and 
return of active real estate 
investors in Central/South America 
and Africa 
Chin, Singapore; Hong E-mailed Survey Three themes: 
Dent, & Kong; Taipei; and face-to-face I. Market Maturity 
Roberts Kuala Lumpur; interviews 2. Institutional factors 
(2006) and Bangkok 3. Investment determinants 
Source: Developed for this study 
Research Focus 
Analysing market 
maturity levels 
following the 
market maturity 
paradigm 
To examine, from 
the perspective of 
U. S. and European 
real estate 
investors, their 
attitudes about 
direct investment 
into real estate in 
Central/South 
America and 
Africa, 
Explore levels of 
maturity of 
different Southeast 
Asia cities. 
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8.4 APPENDIX 4: SUMMARY OF INFLUENCING VARIABLES ON 
INTERNATIONAL REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT DECISION-MAKING 
Category 
Economic/ 
Political Factors 
Institutional 
Sub Category 
Market Size/ 
Drivers/ 
Barriers 
Governmental 
factors 
FDI Factors 
Variables 
Population 
GDP per capita 
Average expected growth rate in real 
GDP as a proxy for real estate return 
GDP as a proxy for the investable 
market size 
Level of urbanisation 
Real GDP per capita 
GDP growth rate 
Inflation 
Change in unemployment rate 
Market size (using proprietary method to 
estimate the aggregate value of real 
estate). 
the companies in the global property 
research 250 property shares index. Also 
they measure domestic liquidity risk by 
finding out the spread between inflation 
rate and average cap rates 
Market liquidity (analysis of the value of 
Mean annual GDP growth 
Economic system situation 
Global competitiveness 
Infrastructure 
Credit risk 
Market efficiency 
Business sophistication 
Economic efficiency 
Economic risk 
Insurance premiums 
County's literacy race 
Country risk 
Political risk 
Foreign ownership restrictions 
Author 
Baum, A (2008) 
Baum, A (2008) 
Newell, G. (2009) 
Lee, S. (2005) 
Lee, S (2005) 
Chen & Hobbs (2003) 
Lee, S. (2005) 
Chen & Hobbs (2003) 
Chen & Hobbs (2003) 
Chen & Hobbs (2003) 
Chen & Hobbs (2003) 
Chen & Hobbs (2003) 
Chen & Hobbs (2003) 
Liao & Mci (1999) 
Chen & Hobbs (2003) 
Newell, G (2009) 
Newell, G. (2009) 
Geurts & Jaffe (1996) 
Newell, G. (2009) 
Newell. G (20091 
Liao & Mei (1999) 
Gcurts & Jaffe (1996) 
Geurts & Jaffe (1996) 
Chan & H(+bv (2003) 
Lee(2005) 
Liao & Mei (1999) 
GCui ts & J, iffc (1 99h1 
Newell, G. (2009) 
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Factors 
Financial 
Institutions 
Property 
Rights Factors 
Socio-Cultural 
Factors 
Technological 
Factors 
Taxation 
The degree of foreign control 
Soundness of banks 
Local stock market access 
Financial markets sophistication 
The rule of law 
Security of property rights 
Arbitrary expropriation 
Bribery and corruption 
Coercion of contract 
Intellectual property rights 
Entrepreneurship and innovation 
Higher education and training 
Life expectancy 
Illiteracy 
Quality of living 
The percentage of homeownership 
Treatment of foreigners 
Technology readiness 
Innovation 
Real Estate I Real estate market transparency level 
Market 
Transparency 
Corruption 
Legal structure 
Source: Developed for this study 
Lee, S. (2005) 
Geurts & Jaffe (1996) 
Newell, G. (2009) 
Newell, G. (2009) 
Newell, G. (2009) 
Liao & Mei (1999) 
Lee, S. (2005) 
Geurts & Jaffe (1996) 
Newell, G. (2009) 
Geurts & Jaffe (1996) 
Geurts & Jaffe (1996) 
Geurts & Jaffe (1996) 
Geurts & Jaffe (1996) 
Liao & Mei (I 999) 
Newell, G. (2009) 
Geurts & Jaffe (1996) 
Geurts & Jaffe (1996) 
Geurts & Jaffe (1996) 
Geurts & Jaffe ( 1996) 
Geurts & Jaffe (1996) 
Newell, G. (2009) 
Newell, G. (2009) 
Newell. G. (2009) 
Baum, A (2008) 
Lee, S. (2005) 
Newell, G. (2009) 
Liao & Mei (I 999) 
Chen & Huhhti k2003) 
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8.5 APPENDIX 5: REAL ESTATE DATA PROVIDERS IN THE MENA: 
The current sources of real estate data are very limited and only available at a 
relatively high cost with private organisations (except for Mazaya real estate index). 
The main sources can be summarised as follows: 
a. Cityscape Intelligence website: 
The website covers MENA countries except for Algeria and Turkey. It provides a 
comprehensive database on past and current construction projects with great level 
of details. It also provides `country profiles' covering many aspects such as rules and 
regulations, anticipated supply and demand (by real estate sector), and general 
overview of the market. Further, the website details the companies working within 
the construction industry and provides up to date research and consultancy reports 
provided by the key players in the industry (e. g. JLL, Colliers and DTZ and many 
others). 
Most recently, the website launched exclusive pricing data on residential properties 
in major MENA cities. These data however, when compared to the Investment 
Property Databank (IPD) index, Cityscape Intelligence lacks important data on other 
sectors such as commercial, where certain data for the MENA is almost non- 
existence, and this is seen as a major deterrent to global investors (JLL, 2008). 
b. REIDIN. com 
REIDIN. com is considered to be the most informative database on emerging real 
estate markets, including the MENA markets. The website provides many products 
and services that are of benefit to domestic as well as global investors. The main tool 
is called REBIS. com and is concerned with providing data including: 
" Price Indices 
" Market Price Data 
2701P. ß, -c, 
" Macro Economic Indicators 
" Projects Database 
" Building Database 
" Company Database 
" Deals, Valuations, Listings 
The website also provide a product called RETAILFocus which is a retail real 
estate/shopping centres database that provides in-depth data on retail property 
markets across emerging countries. The database includes shopping centre and 
retailer Profiles, GLA, footfall, price data, news, research, upcoming retail projects, 
owner, developer, property manager profiles powered by analysis and comparison 
tools and search engine. 
Another product is DUBAIFocus which is considered the first exclusive online 
information product tracking real estate deals and transactions in Dubai, with a 
comprehensive database going back to 1973. The DUBAIFocus also provides daily 
information on all types of land, villa and flat deals (sales, mortgage, lease, grant, 
inheritance, etc. ) in Dubai. 
The website also comprises indices for residential real estate mainly focusing on UAE 
(Dubai) and Turkey (7 cities, namely Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Kocaeli, Bursa, Adana 
and Antalya). 
c. Mazaya Real Estate index: 
Mazaya Real Estate (a Kuwaiti listed company) has introduced in early 2007 the 
Mazaya Real Estate Index - the first of its kind in the Middle East. The index measures 
the prices of properties across the GCC, as opposed to other indices which only 
measure the share prices of property firms listed on the regions' stock exchanges. 
Since late 2009, the index is temporarily suspended to incorporate market realities 
and to be activated in the near future (Zawya, 2009). 
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8.6 APPENDIX 6: QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS 
PART I: INVESTMENT STRATEGIES IN EMERGING MARKETS 
Jý 
Node: Investment Strategy 
Documents in Set: All Documents 
Passage 1 of 6 Section 0, Paras 8 to 9,392 chars. 
9: when deciding on an emerging market, you look at strong prospective GDP growth, 
number one; usually backed up by good strong demographic, population growth, young 
people, OK, a stable currency, which probably means not huge inflation; we've talked 
about transparency, the presence of partners who are familiar of western ways of doing 
business. 
Passage 2 of 6 Section 0, Para 13,361 chars. 
13: The fund manager will travel to the region and talk to anybody he knows to locate local 
partners. He often uses bankers or real estate service providers to be introduced to local 
developers or local investors to form joint ventures. Sometimes the joint venture partner 
will come to the western market to look at partners, but usually it is the other way around. 
Passage 3 of 6 Section 0, Para 15,406 chars. 
15: Usually the fund manager is simply underwriting the project, which means he audits 
the numbers, make sure that he is comfortable with them, he believes they are a fair 
representation of what could happen and generally speaking would take let's say 50% 
responsibility for the capital, but leave a 100% of responsibility to the partner, subject to a 
committee comprising both partners overseeing the project. 
Passage 1 of 3 Section 0, Para 15,472 chars. 
15: you take this few data which does exist like population growth (estimates, history), 
GDP (history), hence derive real estate data out of these data, and that's obviously has an 
error I don't know plus or minus 20% or so, huge error margin, but this is the only data you 
get, which is definitely one of the key issues there which leads to the risk but the chances 
as well, this is the lack of data. We here try to help ourselves by using local people and 
local knowledge. 
Passage 2 of 3 Section 0, Para 27,228 chars. 
27: you just choose a country and look at its main drivers of the country, which is 
population growth and anticipated GDP growth, and then once we selected this emerging 
country, it is the same process but it is here opportunistic. 
Passage 3 of 3 Section 0, Para 27,1332 chars. 
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27: Also in these countries we have our country ranking, we do have political stability 
ranking and we take lots of the data of the Economist Intelligent Unit, these are quite good 
data for these countries. Ok this how we ended up with a country, then we start defining 
the type of real estate we want to do whatever the strategy is, retail, residential, some 
countries very interesting potentially, we've to define the regions, the cities maybe, and 
then we zoom on the product, whether to take this building or that building, and that is in 
most cases i would say is opportunistic, because you don't always have the choice 
between two plots of land in the same street we want to go, then we set our target range 
and go to get whatever we can get by starting the due diligence on whatever is available in 
the market. And in the due diligence some projects turn out to be feasible, others not, but 
this requires some resources because you have to have like a big filter to choose the 
remaining feasible properties to continue the due diligence. And during due diligence you'll 
get more confidence, it's feasible, satisfy your needs, promising to your investors. For the 
MENA, for instance, we need to understand their local markets to this level of detail. 
PART 2: CROSS-BORDER BARRIERS TO MENA REAL ESTATE MARKETS 
Node: /Cross border barriers to MENA /Transparency, 
Treenode address: (13 3) 
Passage 1 of 2 Section 0, Para 5,183 chars. 
5: I think the Jones Lang survey is a good model for transparency, you simply look at the 
JL transparency data, but really what people mean by transparency is the avoidance of 
corruption 
Passage 2 of 2 Section 0, Para 31,78 chars. 
31: lack of transparency, which make it very difficult to find partners to invest with. 
Document 2 of 3 Interview 2 
Passage 1 of 3 Section 0, Para 33,39 chars. 
33: The keyword here is market transparency. 
Passage 2 of 3 Section 0, Para 33,350 chars. 
33: Further into Egypt for example, it's potentially great country, great story, I think 
population growth is quite high, so there is lot of potential there but in the transparent like 
anything so would not like to go simply because we couldn't survive, then if you would 
work there with local partner you would need to trust the local partner to 100%, 
Passage 3 of 3 Section 0, Para 35,306 chars. 
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35: Transparency could be legal issues, that is very easy to take from the world bank or 
EIU rankings, things like, stability, transparency, corruption also legal security, which 
funny enough worse in Italy but that is not the question, political stability, market data 
accessibility, and any historical data. 
Node: /Cross border barriers to MENA /Transparency, /Property Data 
Treenode address: (1334) 
Passage 1 of 1 Section 0, Para 15,224 chars. 
15: Obviously, you would like to see what this market already do, so you start looking at 
data on population growth, data on the growth income product, also you would love to 
see data on the historical markets which we do not get (.. ) hence derive real estate data 
out of these data, and that's obviously has an error. I don't know plus or minus 20% or 
so, huge error margin 
Node: /Cross border barriers to MENA ! Transparency, /Finding appropriate local 
partners 
Treenode address: (1332) 
Passage 1 of 1 Section 0, Para 31,77 chars. 
31: lack of transparency, which make it very difficult to find partners to invest 
Passage 2 of 7 Section 0, Para 19,80 chars. 
19: And for example in Saudi it is impossible to do anything without a local partner 
Passage 7 of 7 Section 0, Para 23,125 chars. 
23: So you need smart local partner that goes smart enough and understand it and then 
we can enter into such type of partnership. 
PART 3: ALLOCATION SYSTEM 
Investrnent principle of diversification 
ýýýýý 
Neutral Scoring Strategic Adjustment Target 
Allocation Model Allocation (qualitative) Allocation 
(quantitative) 
Investment principle of anticipation 
PART 4: THE SCORING MODEL 
ºrMnary CGiMria ('ý) Sacondary GiMeia Inäcater 
EeaOýmv 
i07. 
Markst Dyns Mks GDP (%. W). lo-Im Faepet 
Markst Depth GDP per cWM 
caugwwV91 ý Gk*W Co-W NVSnM hd@K WOO Eoaiarrc Faun 
Cur sncy Risk EIU Ru*np 
Cwdiy'o roMYcd MM CwMry RU EuromaMy Cm" RMk Raonp (aloo) 
11% 
Damograft rOpl%w011 aVrI01pIM11t PopuMYai FaaCaM 2000 unM 2030 
sx 
MEbbb MMttbt M"ICbt M6ttKlly GbDd WM EM» TqmqmnRy @cdec 2006 
CumMtt YMldb MM Pwnrcwc 
30% Pol" nlib# RLMd ffl 
275IPage 
8.7 APPENDIX 7: TESTS FOR ASSUMPTION VALIDITY OF ESTIMATED 
1 
MODELS 
The pooled Tobit tests can be done using the Correlogram Q-Stat for both serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticty as well as normality test of residuals, which are all 
provided by Eviews statistical package for pooled Tobit. 
Therefore the tests will be conducted includes: 
I. Serial correlation in the residuals: 
" HO = No serial correlation in the residuals (Accepted if Prob>0.05) 
"HI= There is serial correlation in the residuals 
2. Heteroskedasticty of the residuals: 
" HO = no heteroskedasticty (i. e. variance of residuals is constant) (Accepted if 
Prob>0.05) 
"HI= There is heteroskedasticty (i. e. variance of residuals is not constant) 
3. Normality of the residues: 
" H0= Residuals are normally distributed (Accepted if JB<5.99, and/ or 
p>0.05) 
" Hl= Residuals are not normally distributed. 
8.7.1 TESTS FOR ASSUMPTION VALIDITY OF ESTIMATED MODELS FOR 
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FDI 
Model I (base model) 
Correlogram Q-stat for serial correlation 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 08: 21 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
. *I. I . *I. I 
1 -0.144 -0.144 1.0543 0.305 
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'I I 'I I2 -0.161 -0.186 2.4107 0.300 
I' I I' I30.172 0.124 3.9803 0.264 
"I. I 'I i4 -0.179 -0.174 5.7244 0.221 
IIII5 -0.009 -0.008 5.7289 0.333 
Conclusion: Accept HO, no serial correlation 
Correlogram Q squared -stat for heteroskedasticty 
Date 08/02/10 Time 08: 24 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
. 1. I I. ý 
. 1. I . I. ý 
1. I . I. ý 
1 -0.026 -0.026 0.0358 0.850 
2 0.069 0.068 0.2835 0.868 
3 0.030 0.034 0.3317 0.954 
4 0.057 0.054 0.5061 0.973 
5 0.002 0.001 0.5065 0.992 
Conclusion: Accept HO, No heteroskedasticty 
Normality test 
ze , 
24 ý 
20 a 
16ý 
12ý 
e. 
4 
0 
1 
0 cc 001 
Series: Residuals 
Sample 2004 2009 
Observations 48 
Mean -0.000288 
Median -0.000543 
Mabmum 0.020938 
Minimum -0.006178 
Std. Dev. 0.004169 
Skewness 2.750630 
Kurtosis 15.19205 
Jarque-Bera 357.8199 
Probability 0.000000 
ooz 
Conclusion: Reject HO, residuals are not normally distributed 
Model 2 control variable: (CORRUP(- I )) 
Correlogram Q-stat for serial correlation 
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Date: 08/02/10 Time: 08: 35 
Sample 2004 2009 
Included observations 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
. "i i 
. *I. i 
i". I 
"i .i 
ýi .i 
. 1*. I "i .I 
. 1. I 
1 -0.142 -0.142 1.0232 0.312 
2 -0.161 -0.185 2.3730 0.305 
3 0.171 0.125 3.9342 0.269 
4 -0.186 -0.182 5.8229 0.213 
5 -0.010 -0.010 5.8280 0.323 
Conclusion: Accept HO, no serial correlation 
Correlogram Q squared -stat for heteroskedasticty 
Date: 08/02110 Time: 08: 37 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
I. I 
" I. I 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
1 -0.023 -0.023 0.0274 0.868 
2 0.070 0.069 0.2824 0.868 
3 0.024 0.028 0.3138 0.957 
4 0.060 0.057 0.5126 0.972 
5 0.002 0.002 0.5129 0.992 
Conclusion: Accept HO, No heteroskedasticty 
Normality test 
Series Residuals 
Sample 2004 2009 
Observations 48 
Mean -0000290 
Median -0.000428 
Maximum 0020925 
Minimum -0.006278 
Std Dev 0.004169 
Skewness 2.723062 
Kurtosis 15.14743 
Jarque-Bera 3544406 
Probability 0.000000 
Conclusion: Reject HO, residuals are not normally distributed 
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Model 3 control variable: GOVEFFECT(-1) 
Correlogram Q-stat for serial correlation 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 08: 38 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
'I I `I "I1 -0.147 -0.147 1.1053 0.293 
'I I `I "I2 -0.172 -0.198 2.6545 0.265 
I' I I`" I30.181 0.129 4.3976 0.222 
`I "I 
`I "I4 -0.176 -0.173 6.0861 0.193 
IIII5 -0.009 -0.003 6.0910 0.297 
Conclusion: Accept HO, no serial correlation 
Correlogram Q squared -stat for heteroskedasticty 
Date: 08102/10 Time: 08: 38 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
I" III1 -0.026 -0.026 0.0354 0.851 
IIII20.074 0.073 0.3183 0.853 
IIII30.034 0.038 0.3800 0.944 
IIII40.053 0.050 0.5315 0.970 
IIII50.003 0.000 0.5319 0.991 
Conclusion: Accept HO, No heteroskedasticty 
Normality test 
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Series Residuals 
Sample 2004 2009 
Observations 48 
Mean -0000290 
Mean -0.000495 
Mawmum 0020825 
Minimum -0006319 
Std Dev 0 004159 
Skewness 2.725057 
Kurtosis 15.03501 
Jarque-Bera 349.0903 
Probability 0.000000 
Conclusion: Reject HO, residuals are not normally distributed 
Model 4 control variable: POLITIC(-1) 
Correlogram Q-stat for serial correlation 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 08: 39 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation 
.. i i 
NI I 
. 1v. I 
"'1 'I 
Partial Correlation 
1fl I 
1f II 
. 1. I 
'fI 'I 
AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 -0.217 -0.217 2.4055 0.121 
2 -0.256 -0.318 5.8176 0.055 
3 0.186 0.051 7.6544 0.054 
4 -0.089 -0.124 8.0886 0.088 
5 0.001 0.022 8.0887 0.151 
Conclusion: Accept HO, no serial correlation 
Correlogram Q squared -stat for heteroskedasticty 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 08: 39 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation 
. 1*. I 
. 1*. I 
. ý. I 
. 1. ý 
Partial Correlation 
. i*. I 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
. i. i 
AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 0.168 0.168 1.4373 0.231 
2 0.098 0.072 1.9358 0.380 
3 0.042 0.015 2.0286 0.566 
4 -0.018 -0.035 2.0467 0.727 
5 0.008 0.012 2.0504 0.842 
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Conclusion: Accept HO, No heteroskedasticty 
Normality test 
30 
25 
Series Residuals 
Sample 2004 2009 
Observations 48 
an -0.000252 
Median -0.000277 
Maximum 0017737 
Mnimum -0.008170 
Std Dev. 0003654 
Skewness 2.307696 
Kurtosis 1381403 
Jarque-Bera 276.4900 
Probability 0.000000 
Conclusion: Reject HO, residuals are not normally distributed 
Model 5 control variable: REGQUALT(- I) 
Correlogram Q-stat for serial correlation 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 08: 40 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation 
. *I. I i .. I. 
. 1g. I 
. *I. I I. I 
Partial Correlation 
. *I. I 
. *I. i 
. 1*. I 
. *I. i 
AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 -0.128 -0.128 0.8318 0.362 
2 -0.149 -0.168 1.9866 0.370 
3 0.158 0.120 3.3199 0.345 
4 -0.176 -0.173 5.0187 0.285 
5 -0.009 -0.009 5.0237 0.413 
Conclusion: Accept HO, no serial correlation 
Correlogram Q squared -stat for heteroskedasticty 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 08: 40 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
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Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
II I" I1 -0.038 -0.038 0.0736 0.786 
IiII20.064 0.063 0.2866 0.866 
IIII30.025 0.030 0.3193 0.956 
II I" I40.054 0.052 0.4788 0.976 
IIII50.002 0.003 0.4790 0.993 
Conclusion: Accept HO, No heteroskedasticty 
Normality test 
0 00 0.01 o. oz 
Series Residuals 
Sample 2004 2009 
Observations 48 
Mean -0.000292 
Median -0.000529 
Maximum 0.021010 
Minimum -0006082 
Std. Dev 0.004167 
Skewness 2.775604 
Kurtosis 15.41487 
Jarque-Bera 369 8898 
Probability 0.000000 
Conclusion: Reject HO, residuals are not normally distributed 
Model 6 control variable: RULELAW(- 1) 
Correlogram Q-stat for serial correlation 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 08: 40 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
. *I. I i . 1g. ,. i i 
. 1. I 
. -i .i 
. *I. i 
. i-. I . 1. I 
1 -0.114 -0.114 0.6604 0.416 
2 -0.136 -0.151 1.6291 0.443 
3 0.133 0.102 2.5753 0.462 
4 -0.213 -0.214 5.0449 0.283 
5 -0.011 -0.025 5,0520 0.410 
Conclusion: Accept HO, no serial correlation 
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Correlogram Q squared -stat for heteroskedasticty 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 08: 41 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation 
1. ý 
I. ý 
. 1*. i 
Partial Correlation 
. 1. ý 
I. I 
. 1. I 
. 1". i 
002 
Conclusion: Accept HO, No heteroskedasticty 
Normality test 
0 OC 0.01 
AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 -0.035 -0.035 0.0611 0.805 
2 0.051 0.050 0.1960 0.907 
3 -0.005 -0.002 0.1973 0.978 
4 0.094 0.091 0.6743 0.954 
5 0.001 0.008 0.6744 0.984 
Senies Residuals 
Sample 2004 2009 
Observations 48 
Mean -0.000293 
Median -0.000207 
Maximum 0.021111 
Minimum -0.007362 
Std. Dev. 0.004158 
Skewness 2.773272 
Kurtosis 15.84731 
Jarque"Bera 391.6352 
Probability 0.000000 
Conclusion: Reject HO, residuals are not normally distributed 
Model 7 control variable: VACCOUNT(- 1) 
Correlogram Q-stat for serial correlation 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 08: 42 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation 
. *I. I 
. *I. I 
. 1*. I 
Partial Correlation 
. *I. i i . *I. 
. 1*. i 
AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 -0.167 -0.167 1.4215 0.233 
2 -0.154 -0.187 2.6558 0.265 
3 0.199 0.146 4.7671 0.190 
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4 -0.179 -0.158 6.5237 0.163 
5 -0.003 -0.001 6.5242 0.259 
Conclusion: Accept HO, no serial correlation 
Correlogram Q squared -stat for heteroskedasticty 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 08: 42 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
. 1. I 
" I. I 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
. 1. ý 
I. I 
"1. I 
1 -0.018 -0.018 0.0168 0.897 
2 0.050 0.050 0.1485 0.928 
3 0.059 0.060 0.3312 0.954 
4 0.061 0.061 0.5344 0.970 
5 0.003 -0.001 0.5348 0.991 
Conclusion: Accept HO, No heteroskedasticty 
Normality test 
30 
25 
15ý 
1oa 
0 00 
0 I, ^ 0.01 OM 
Series: Residuals 
Sample 2004 2009 
Observations 48 
an -0.000280 
Median -0000500 
Maximum 0.020449 
Mnimum -0.006800 
Std. Dev. 0.004141 
Skewness 2.604821 
Kurtosis 14.33258 
Jarque-Bera 3111353 
Probability 0.000000 
Conclusion: Reject HO, residuals are not normally distributed 
Model 8 control variable: INVFREEDOM(- 1) 
Correlogram Q-stat for serial correlation 
I 
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Date: 08/02/10 Time: 08: 42 
Sample 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation 
-i i 
-i i 
i- i 
-i i 
. 1. I 
Partial Correlation 
. *I. I 
. *I. I 
" i". I 
"i .i 
AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 -0.131 -0.131 0.8792 0.348 
2 -0.155 -0.175 2.1270 0.345 
3 0.163 0.122 3.5466 0.315 
4 -0.178 -0.176 5.2825 0.260 
5 -0.007 -0.005 5.2849 0.382 
Conclusion: Accept HO, no serial correlation 
Correlogram Q squared -stat for heteroskedasticty 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 08: 43 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation 
. 1. I 
i I. 
. 1. I 
I. i 
I. i 
Partial Correlation 
. 1. I 
"1. I 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 -0.036 -0.036 0.0678 0.795 
2 0.062 0.061 0.2701 0.874 
3 0.023 0.028 0.2988 0.960 
4 0.057 0.055 0.4769 0.976 
5 0.002 0.003 0.4772 0.993 
Conclusion: Accept HO, No heteroskedasticty 
Normality test 
30 
25 
a 00 o. a1 o. ox 
Series: Residuals 
Sample 2004 2009 
Observations 48 
an -0.000291 
Median -0.000568 
Mawmum 0.021044 
Minimum -0.006199 
Std Dev 0004166 
Skewness 2.805561 
Kurtosis 15.53392 
Jarque-Bera 377.1677 
Probability 0.000000 
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Conclusion: Reject HO, residuals are not normally distributed 
Model 9 control variable: OPROPERTYRIG HTS 
Correlogram Q-stat for serial correlation 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 08: 43 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
'I I 'I I1 -0.117 -0.117 0.7013 0.402 
'I I ''I "I2 -0.192 -0.208 2.6184 0.270 
I'" I I' I30.176 0.132 4.2686 0.234 
'I "I 'I "I4 -0.179 -0.194 6.0106 0.198 
I" I I" I5 -0.009 0.015 6.0148 0.305 
Conclusion: Accept HO, no serial correlation 
Correlogram Q squared -stat for heteroskedasticty 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 08: 43 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
I" I I" I1 -0.030 -0.030 0.0451 0.832 
Iý I Iý I20.089 0.088 0.4597 0.795 
I" I I" I30.039 0.045 0.5414 0.910 
I" III40.052 0.047 0.6873 0.953 
I" III50.004 -0.000 0.6882 0.984 
Conclusion: Accept HO, No heteroskedasticty 
Normality test 
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000 001 0 02 
Series Residuals 
Sample 2004 2009 
Observations 48 
Mean -0.000290 
Median -0000442 
Maximum 0.020455 
mnorn m -0.006746 
Std Dev 0004105 
Skewness 2644143 
Kurtosis 14.86222 
Jarque-Bera 337.3564 
Probability 0000000 
Conclusion: Reject HO, residuals are not normally distributed 
Model 10 control variable: PROTECT INVESTOR(- 1) 
Correlogram Q-stat for serial correlation 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 08: 44 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
'I I 'I I1 -0.143 -0.143 1.0373 0.308 
'I I 'I I2 -0.167 -0.191 2.4922 0.288 
I'" I I' I30.183 0.135 4.2757 0.233 
'I I 'I I4 -0.160 -0.154 5.6730 0.225 
IIII5 -0.007 0.007 5.6754 0.339 
Conclusion: Accept HO, no serial correlation 
Correlogram Q squared -stat for heteroskedasticty 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 08: 44 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
. 1. ý . 1. I 
. 1. I . 1. I 
"1. I . 1. I 
1 -0.026 -0.026 0.0358 0.850 
2 0.066 0.065 0.2635 0.877 
3 0.043 0.047 0.3629 0.948 
4 0.040 0.038 0.4496 0.978 
5 0.003 -0.001 0.4500 0.994 
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Conclusion: Accept HO, No heteroskedasticty 
Normality test 
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Series Residuals 
Sam ple 2004 2009 
Observations 48 
an -o 000290 
Median -0000452 
Maximum 0.020721 
Mnimun -0006066 
Std Dev 0.004155 
Skewness 2.748545 
Kurtosis 14.83969 
Jarque-Bera 340 7927 
ProbabilRy 0.000000 
Conclusion: Reject HO, residuals are not normally distributed 
Model II control variable: REIT(- I) 
Correlogram Q-stat for serial correlation 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 08: 45 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
. "i .i 
. *I. I 
. i". I 
. -i .I I. I 
. *I. I 
. r. I 
. *I. I 
. 1. I 
1 -0.189 -0.189 1.8283 0.176 
2 -0.167 -0.210 3.2817 0.194 
3 0.210 0.143 5.6383 0.131 
4 -0.167 -0.142 7.1610 0.128 
5 -0.016 -0.013 7.1759 0.208 
Conclusion: Accept HO, no serial correlation 
Correlogram Q squared -stat for heteroskedasticty 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 08: 45 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
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Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
. 1. I . 1. I 
. 1. I . 1. ý 
. 1. I . 1. I 
. 1. I . 1. ý 
. 1. I . 1. I 
1 0.014 0.014 0.0094 0.923 
2 0.051 0.050 0.1433 0.931 
3 0.060 0.059 0.3354 0.953 
4 0.039 0.036 0.4199 0.981 
5 0.004 -0.003 0.4206 0.995 
Conclusion: Accept HO, No heteroskedasticty 
Normality test 
Series: Residuals 
Sample 2004 2009 
Observations 48 
Mean -0.000285 
Median -0.000179 
Maximum 0.019137 
Mnimum -0.005208 
Std. Dev. 0.003870 
Skewness 2.695719 
Kurtosis 14.37692 
Jarque-Bera 317.0039 
Probability 0.000000 
Conclusion: Reject HO, residuals are not normally distributed 
Model 12 control variable: ORETRANSP 
Correlogram Q-stat for serial correlation 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 08: 46 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation 
. "i .I 
. *I. I 
. i*. i 
. *I. I 
. 1. I 
Partial Correlation 
i 
. *I. I 
. r. I 
. "i .I 
. 1. I 
AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 -0.150 -0.150 1.1552 0.282 
2 -0.155 -0.181 2.4035 0.301 
3 0.168 0.120 3.9173 0.271 
4 -0.177 -0.169 5.6313 0.228 
5 -0.010 -0.015 5.6369 0.343 
Conclusion: Accept HO, no serial correlation 
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Correlogram Q squared -stat for heteroskedasticty 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 08: 46 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
. 1. ý 
. 1. ý 
. 1. ý 
Conclusion: Accept HO, No heteroskedasticty 
Normality test 
Series: Residuals 
Sample 2004 2009 
Observations 48 
Mean -0.000287 
Median -0.000426 
Mebmum 0.021159 
Mnimum -0.006392 
Std. Dev. 0.004202 
Skewness 2.755140 
Kurtosis 15.33021 
. i. i 
. 1. I 
. i. i 
. 1. I 
1 -0.024 -0.024 0.0291 0.864 
2 0.067 0.066 0.2618 0.877 
3 0.026 0.029 0.2982 0.960 
4 0.058 0.055 0.4798 0.975 
5 0.002 0.002 0.4802 0.993 
Jarque-Bera 364.7945 
Probability 0.000000 
0 00 0.01 OM 
Conclusion: Reject HO, residuals are not normally distributed 
8.7.2 TESTS FOR ASSUMPTION VALIDITY OF ESTIMATED MODELS FOR 
HOTEL FDI 
Model I (base model) 
Correlogram Q-stat for serial correlation 
Date: 08102/10 Time: 14: 30 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
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'I I 'I. I1 -0.106 -0.106 0.5709 0.450 
II I" I20.069 0.059 0.8227 0.663 
II I'" I30.069 0.084 1.0791 0.782 
IIII40.020 0.032 1.1016 0.894 
II I" I5 -0.004 -0.009 1.1023 0.954 
Conclusion: Accept HO, no serial correlation 
Correlogram Q squared -stat for heteroskedasticty 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 14: 31 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation 
i.., i 
. 1*. I 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
Partial Correlation 
ý . 1*** 
. 1. I 
. 1. ý 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
Conclusion: Reject HO 
Normality test 
14 
12 
10 
e 
6 
4 
2 
0 v 
-001 
I 
r)! - 1 000 0.0i I-, 0.02 
AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 0.397 0.397 8.0404 0.005 
2 0.151 -0.008 9.2237 0.010 
3 0.026 -0.037 9.2585 0.026 
4 0.037 0.049 9.3340 0.053 
5 0.007 -0.023 9.3366 0.096 
Series: Resitials 
Sample 2004 2009 
Observatiau 48 
Man -0.000614 
Medan -0001308 
Maximum 0.018361 
Minimum -0.010306 
Std. Dev. 0.008259 
Skewness 1.001631 
Kurtosis 1808026 
Jarque-Bora 9.331935 
Prababiity 0.009410 
Conclusion: Reject HO, residuals are not normally distributed 
Model 2: Control variable: CORRUP(-1) 
Correlogram Q-stat for serial correlation 
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Date: 08/02/10 Time: 14: 31 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation 
I. I 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
I. I 
Partial Correlation 
*i i 
I. I 
. 1*. i I. i 
AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 -0.132 -0.132 0.8882 0.346 
2 0.048 0.031 1.0072 0.604 
3 0.064 0.075 1.2242 0.747 
4 0.019 0.036 1.2443 0.871 
5 0.005 0.007 1.2459 0.940 
Conclusion: Accept HO, no serial correlation 
Correlogram Q squared -stat for heteroskedasticty 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 14: 32 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation 
. 1*. I 
. 1*. I 
Partial Correlation 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
1 
2 
3 
AC 
0372 0.372 7.0597 0.008 
0.179 0.047 8.7247 0.013 
0.077 -0.004 9.0449 0.029 
0.044 0.011 9.1508 0.057 
0.014 -0.010 9.1613 0.103 
PAC Q-Stat Prob 
I. I I. I4 
II5 
Conclusion: Reject HO 
Normality test 
Series: Residuals 
Sample 2004 2009 
observations 48 
Mean -0.000586 
Median -0.001823 
Mawmum 0.017807 
Mnimum -0.011700 
Std. Dev 0.006284 
Skewness 0.867188 
Kurtosis 3.555229 
Jarque-Bere 6.632675 
PrababNily 0.036285 
Conclusion: Reject HO, residuals are not normally distributed 
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Model 3: Control variable: GOVEFFECT(-1) 
Correlogram Q-stat for serial correlation 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 14: 32 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
'I "I 'I I1 -0.112 -0.112 0.6360 0.425 
II I" I20.071 0.059 0.8997 0.638 
I" I I" I30.028 0.043 0.9424 0.815 
I" I I" I40.015 0.019 0.9545 0.917 
II I" I50.007 0.005 0.9569 0.966 
Conclusion: Accept HO, no serial correlation 
Correlogram Q squared -stat for heteroskedasticty 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 14: 32 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 0.391 0.391 7.7974 0.005 
i' I I" I20.177 0.029 9.4296 0.009 
I"I 'I "I30.002 -0.090 9.4298 0.024 
I" I I'" I40.060 0.099 9.6254 0.047 
IIII5 -0.005 -0.053 9.6266 0.087 
Conclusion: Reject HO 
Normality test 
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Conclusion: Reject HO, residuals are not normally distributed 
Model 4: Control variable: POLITIC(- 1) 
Correlogram Q-stat for serial correlation 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 14: 33 
Series: Residuals 
Sample 2004 2009 
Observations 48 
Mean -0.000598 
Median -0.001575 
Maximum 0.018441 
Minimum -0.010901 
Std. Dev. 0.006204 
Skewness 0.968796 
Kurtosis 3.856167 
Jarque-Bera 8.974570 
Probability 0.011251 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
. *l. I 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
I. I 
Conclusion: Accept HO, no serial correlation 
Correlogram Q squared -stat for heteroskedasticty 
. *I. I 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
1 -0.120 -0.120 0.7354 0.391 
2 0.054 0.040 0.8888 0.641 
3 0.046 0.058 1.0033 0.800 
4 -0.000 0.010 1.0033 0.909 
5 -0.015 -0.020 1.0166 0.961 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 14: 33 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
i". I 
. 1. I 
I--" I 
. 1. I 
. *I. I 
. 1. ý 
1 0.353 0.353 6.3671 0.012 
2 0.172 0.054 7.9162 0.019 
3 0.004 -0.084 7.9169 0.048 
4 0.015 0.033 7.9285 0.094 
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5 0.001 0.000 7.9286 0.160 
Conclusion: Reject HO 
Normality test 
Conclusion: Reject HO, residuals are not normally distributed 
Model 5: Control variable: PROTECTINVESTOR(- I) 
Correlogram Q-stat for serial correlation 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 14: 34 
Series Residuals 
Sample 2004 2009 
Observations 48 
Mean -0.000626 
Median -0001410 
Maximum 0.019646 
Minimum -0009569 
Std. Dev 0005954 
Skewness 1.111246 
Kurtosis 4.562185 
Jarque-Bera 14.75979 
Probability 0.000624 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
. "i i 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
. *I. I 
. *I. I 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
I. I 
1 -0.130 -0.130 0.8680 0.352 
2 -0.053 -0.071 1.0135 0.602 
3 0.045 0.029 1.1203 0.772 
4 -0.052 -0.047 1.2695 0.867 
5 0.021 0.013 1.2948 0.935 
Conclusion: Accept HO, no serial correlation 
Correlogram Q squared -stat for heteroskedasticty 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 14: 34 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
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Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
I" I I" 1 0.263 0.263 3.5218 0.061 
I" I I' 2 0.241 0.185 6.5553 0.038 
IIII30.050 -0.056 6.6889 0.083 
II I" 4 -0.003 -0.052 6.6894 0.153 
II I" I50.025 0.045 6.7254 0.242 
Conclusion: Reject HO 
Normality test 
14 
12ý 
ioa 
8 
8ý 
4ý 
2ý 
ý 1 i" 
0 ý 0 
-001 0 D0 ii 0.01 
Series: Residuals 
Sample 2004 2009 
Observations 48 
Mean -0.000598 
Median -0.001469 
Mabmum 0.019139 
Minimum -0.012887 
Std. Dev. 0.005911 
Skewness 0.933485 
Kurtosis 4.542890 
A 
o. oz 
Jarque-Bera 11.73217 
Probability 0.002834 
Conclusion: Reject HO, residuals are not normally distributed 
Model 6: Control variable: REGQUALT(- 1) 
Correlogram Q-stat for serial correlation 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 14: 34 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation 
. *I. I 
. 1. ý 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
. *I. I 
. 1. ý 
. ig. I 
. 1. I 
. i. i 
AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 -0.123 -0.123 0.7772 0.378 
2 0.069 0.054 1.0233 0.600 
3 0.070 0.086 1.2862 0.732 
4 0.024 0.040 1.3188 0.858 
5 -0.002 -0.004 1.3189 0.933 
Conclusion: Accept HO, no serial correlation 
Partial Correlation 
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Correlogram Q squared -stat for heteroskedasticty 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 14: 34 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation 
.I 
. i". i 
. 1. I 
. i. i 
Partial Correlation 
i... i 
. 1. I 
. 1. ý 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
Conclusion: Reject HO 
Normality test 
Series: Residuals 
Sample 2004 2009 
Observations 48 
Mean -0.000602 
Median -0.001608 
Maximum 0.017788 
Mnimum -0.010644 
Std. Dev. 0.006293 
Skewness 0.945438 
Kurtosis 3.617374 
Jarque-Bera 7.913118 
Probability 0.019129 
Conclusion: Reject HO, residuals are not normally distributed 
Model 7: Control variable: RULELAW(-1) 
Correlogram Q-stat for serial correlation 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 14: 35 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation 
. *I. i 
. 1. ý 
Partial Correlation 
. *I. I 
. i. I 
AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 0.399 0.399 8.1114 0.004 
2 0.156 -0.003 9.3858 0.009 
3 0.036 -0.030 9.4546 0.024 
4 0.049 0.054 9.5843 0.048 
5 0.007 -0.032 9.5867 0.088 
AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 -0.110 -0.110 0.6213 0.431 
2 0.054 0.042 0.7720 0.680 
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II I" I30.047 0.058 0.8895 0.828 
II I" I40.029 0.039 0.9367 0.919 
II I" I50.004 0.006 0.9375 0.967 
Conclusion: Accept HO, no serial correlation 
Correlogram Q squared -stat for heteroskedasticty 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 14: 35 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
i.. i 
. 1*. I 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
. 1ý ý 
. 1. I 
. 1. ý 
. r. i 
. 1. I 
Conclusion: Reject HO 
Normality test 
1 0.335 0.335 5.7386 0.017 
2 0.103 -0.010 6.2975 0.043 
3 -0.021 -0.060 6.3216 0.097 
4 0.064 0.102 6.5428 0.162 
5 -0.010 -0.064 6.5487 0.256 
Series Residuals 
Sample 2004 2009 
Observations 48 
Mean -0.000808 
Median -0.001685 
Maximus 0.018283 
Msimun -0.009262 
Std. Dev. 0.006123 
Skewness 1.060667 
Ketosis 4.048251 
Jarque-Bera 11.19778 
Probability 0.003702 
Conclusion: Reject HO, residuals are not normally distributed 
Model 8: Control variable: VACCOUNT(- 1) 
Correlogram Q-stat for serial correlation 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 14: 36 
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Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
"i i 
. 1. I 
" I. I 
. 1. I 
. i. i 
. *i i 
. 1. I 
" I. I 
. 1. I 
. 1. I 
1 -0.129 -0.129 0.8459 0.358 
2 -0.010 -0.027 0.8507 0.654 
3 0.049 0.045 0.9784 0.806 
4 -0.027 -0.015 1.0182 0.907 
5 0.012 0.008 1.0256 0.960 
Conclusion: Accept HO, no serial correlation 
Correlogram Q squared -stat for heteroskedasticty 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 14: 36 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
1 0.411 0.411 8.6140 0.003 
I" I I" I20.202 0.040 10.749 0.005 
III(30.042 -0.065 10.844 0.013 
IIII40.009 0.007 10.848 0.028 
IIII50.011 0.019 10.854 0.054 
Conclusion: Reject HO 
Normality test 
12 
10ý 
8 
6 
4ý 
2 
0 
-001 
Series: Residuals 
Sample 2004 2009 
Observations 48 
an -0.000591 
Median -0.001630 
Mabmum 0.017308 
Minimum -0.012635 
Std. Dev. 0.006088 
Skewness 0.803488 
Kurtosis 3.690211 
Jarque-Bera 6.117531 
Probability 0.046946 
0 00 0.01 
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Conclusion: Reject HO, residuals are not normally distributed 
Model 9: Control variable: INVFREEDOM (- 1) 
Correlogram Q-stat for serial correlation 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 14: 37 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
'I I `I "I1 -0.167 -0.167 1.4288 0.232 
II I" I20.034 0.006 1.4901 0.475 
IIII30.043 0.052 1.5907 0.661 
II I" I40.024 0.040 1.6211 0.805 
IIII50.013 0.021 1.6301 0.898 
Conclusion: Accept HO, no serial correlation 
Correlogram Q squared -stat for heteroskedasticty 
Date: 08/02/10 Time: 14: 37 
Sample: 2004 2009 
Included observations: 48 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob 
I" I IM I10.317 0.317 5.1301 0.024 
I' I I' I20.209 0.121 7.4118 0.025 
II 'I "I30.031 -0.074 7.4644 0.058 
IIII40.033 0.020 7.5249 0.111 
IIII5 -0.002 -0.006 7.5251 0.184 
Conclusion: Reject HO 
Normality test 
3001 Page 
14 
12, 
10 
-o cl 0 
ö0 0 ö, 
Series: Residuals 
Sample 2004 2009 
Observations 48 
Mean -0.000567 
Median -0.001857 
Maximum 0.016511 
Minimum -0.012853 
Std. Dev. 0.006123 
Skewness 0.820550 
Kurtosis 3.608421 
Jarque-Bera 6.126775 
Probabiity 0.046729 
Conclusion: Reject HO, residuals are not normally distributed 
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